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Table of Contents

Research Articles

Oleksandr Cheremisin and Mykola Herasymenko	4
The Dialectics of the Authority and Morality on the South of Ukraine at the End of 18 th , the Early 20 th Centuries	
Charles McGrath and Nygmet Ibadildin	12
Kazakh Famine 1928-1932	
Olena Pavlova	20
Politically-Technological Potential of Cultural Practices in Ukrainian Perspective	
Zaid Rahmani and Vadym Tytarenko	27
Corruption in Afghanistan: an Experience for Ukraine	
Denys Svyrydenko and Olena Yatsenko	33
Dialectics of Nominal and Real Power in the Ukrainian and World Politics	
Vadym Tytarenko	41
Correlation between Morality and Religion in Ukrainian Society: Productive Ideas in German Idealism for Modern Consideration	
Vyacheslav Vilkov	48
“Scientific Communism” and the Modern Political Science in Ukraine	

Interviews

Mykola Liashenko and Sergii Rudenko	56
Is a New Generation of Managers Likely to Come to Small Towns of Ukraine? (An interview with Mykola Liashenko)	
Authors	63
Information for Authors	67

The Dialectics of the Authority and Morality on the South of Ukraine at the End of 18th, the Early 20th Centuries

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This article is dedicated to the investigation of the fundamental philosophical values which lead the activity of the self-government deputies in the Southern Ukraine region. A complex and ambiguous process of the new socio-cultural reality formation took place at the end of 18th century. The South of Ukraine is considered as the frontier area where the modern Western European, family-protective Ukrainian and bureaucratic Russian traditions come into cross-cultural collaboration. Their close intermingling and contact provided a basis for shaping the new philosophy, the system of values, stereotypes, mentality and awareness of the local elites. The South of Ukraine became a modern region. That enabled to understand the further necessity to intensify the process of decentralization, democratization and autonomization of the local government. The conclusion has been done as to the values the present day politicians should adopt.

Key Words: philosophy of politics; self-management; local government; South of Ukraine; regions; worldview.

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The up to date society is politically charged. It is connected with the general process of the Ukrainian state construction as well as the reformation of the local self-government bodies based on the decentralization principles. In this case, the guidelines and priorities of the local importance turn into the necessary elements. The communities' authority should have some definite humanitarian values which enable them think independently from the central authority in order to provide better life for people. Moreover, the decentralization process makes the local authority play more important role in the civil society construction. In its turn, this process leads to the development of some morality standards and social values. The compulsory element of this process is taking care about people, their education, and medical services, social and legal defense. The formation of common and necessary morality standards and values for the representatives of the local elite will become the guarantee for normal human existence. In this aspect, the historical experience is very useful because it illustrates how destructive for the development of decentralization the inhuman and egocentric manifestations of the local authority could be. The communities in the South of Ukraine had rich experience in creating decentralized self-government bodies and it could help the representatives of the local power mark the standards and values, which play the decisive role in the society life.

The present day political philosophy recognizes the priority of social and moral values to be one of the principles of the power. Politics and morality cooperate not only strategically but they also are the daily forms of social awareness and practice. Ethical concepts of the good, fairness, honesty and decency help estimate the activity of any authority, deputy or politician but as well as support this activity giving it moral sanctions and motivation. It is the morality that estimates the activity of any politician and helps make conclusion about the level of his or her social reliability. Historical bibliography contains numerous examples of such cooperation of political and moral elements.

While studying and analyzing the relationship between the authority and morality the political philosophy defines the nature of this dialectics and its basics. Among the main aspects that the political philosophy studies is the historical investigation of the relationships between the politics and morality as the integral parts of the comparatively whole system that regulates the behavior, defines the points of commonality and controversy and peculiarities of the authority and morality cooperation in the context of "society transitional period" [Andrushchenko, 2003a: 245-247].

To investigate the relationships between the politics and morality one needs to know their social nature, laws, the way they operate, the peculiarities of a theoretical backlash in the social realities defined by the methods of political and ethic sciences as well as one should be aware of the spirit of this particular age.

Political philosophy defines four main points of the politics and morality convergence:

- a) Optimistic (politics and morality can coincide and their discrepancy can be regulated);
- b) Pessimistic (proves that politics and morality are incompatible);
- c) Objectivistic (the specific nature of the politics and morality makes the attempt to establish a constant link between them irrational);
- d) Relativistic (interaction of the politics and morality depends on the particular social and political situation) [Andrushchenko, 2003b: 245-247].

Careful examination of the historical past is of great importance for practicing effective political management in regions in the frames of contemporary decentralization process because this examination will provide the opportunity to analyze the peculiarities of the

political process within “society transitional period”. The history of the South of Ukraine from the end of 18th till the beginning of 20th centuries testifies this.

The authors of this article support the relativistic point of view as to the relationships of the politics and morality (authority and morality) due to the collision of modern and traditional worlds that took place at the specific historical conditions of that time in the South of Ukraine. That collision led to the formation of new living conditions for both authority and society and defined the qualitative changes in the relationships of authority and morality.

The South of Ukraine was a unique territory for the Russian Empire as it differed a lot from other regions. It took the path of modernization earlier than the other regions, the processes of adaptation, urbanization, identification and formation of the city patriotism among the local population developed with numerous peculiarities. Such a phenomenon as “the new life” was cultivated because many people got the possibilities to earn more money, obtain a new status, freedom, fast career progression and so on. The important place in the society functioning was taken by the local self-government bodies which were declared to base on the decentralization principles. For the Russian Empire that fact became the new milestone in the history of the relationships of the society and authority. Traditional stereotypes and modern views on politics, authority and morality united to form the society in transitional period in the South of Ukraine.

At the end of the 18th century considerable changes in the territory, philosophy of life and values connected with the incorporation of the South of Ukraine into the Russian Empire. Took place. In order to keep these territories within the Russian Empire its government started the process of colonization in the southern part of Ukraine. That made the people from different parts of Western Europe, Russia and Ukraine move there and during some years two worlds, modern and traditional ones, which were previously isolated from each other, came into touch and interaction. That influenced not only the everyday life of many nationalities but also their mentality, philosophy of life, mode of their behavior and identity and led to the formation of new socio-cultural reality and the set of values even towards the politics and authority. During a short period, people of many nationalities adapted to new conditions of living and changed their views as to the system of power. Thanks to new territorial acquisition Russia made a giant leap “from barbarism to civilized lifestyle” that influenced the new world outlook. Enlightening ideas of improving the state organization that would change the international isolation of Russia into its global leadership became popular among the representatives of the Russian government. Big seaports in the South of Ukraine opened the ways for trading as well as for philosophic ideas of the French Enlightenment scientists that comprised organizing councils to govern cities. If we take into consideration the fact that those ideas in the countries of Western Europe started to take shape in 18th century, then for feudal monarchic Russia the city councils were a revolutionary event.

It was the incorporation of the South of Ukraine into the Russian Empire that gave rise to the administrative and territorial reforms and initiated the policy of decentralization of the authority [Mikhailovskiy, 1908].

The society, which was chaotically made up in the southern region of Ukraine during just 20 years, formed its regional identification and city patriotism as a measure of love towards the region and city. The South of Ukraine revealed itself as the most modernized region where archaic life could not reach new (modern) patterns. Such elements of civic life as European architecture, literature, philosophic ideas etc. quickly became popular among people whereas they kept their traditions while visiting their relatives in the other regions. For example when the Jews who previously had lived along the right bank of the Dnieper River and kept their

traditional way of living moved to the South of Ukraine they forgot some of their traditions quite soon. However, they knew that their relatives from other regions wanted them to be loyal to the national traditions. That is why long before visiting the relatives the Jewish migrants took out their old traditional clothes and items, grew side curls and appeared before the relatives like that. Some factory workers getting higher salary changed their view of life and morality, led quite free lifestyle, began drinking and so on [Turchenko, 2003: 45-47]. German people always known to be honest, practical and meticulous joined Odessa traffickers [Guthrie, 2012a]. Anyway, society in transitional period caused changes in mentality and lifestyle of all the nationalities that lived on that territory, affected the activity of the local authorities and developed new patterns of collaboration between the society and authority.

Those new (modern) directions in the development seemed to displace the old order. Fed up with Old Russian traditions of bureaucracy, corrupt practices and bribery Russian migrants turned into anti-corrupters while immigrants from the Western Europe when becoming a region or city executives in their turn became corrupted. For example, James Kortazzi being the Mayor of Odessa could not even speak Russian. He became famous due to his corruption scheme for purchasing gravel. As a result he was sentenced [Chizhevich, 1894: 26-32]. Foreign travelers were much surprised by the extent of the corruption and bribery in the South of Ukraine. They thought all Russian people to be bribers and all Jews to be scammers. Nevertheless, in their recollections, they mentioned that nobody else but foreigners turned this region into the most civilized and developed part of the Russian Empire [Guthrie, 2012b].

Among the members of the local authority bodies one could find those characterized by the following types of social behavior:

- a) Self-centered people;
- b) Conformists;
- c) Patrons (benefactors);
- d) Progressive leaders (“City Fathers”);
- e) “Silent people”.

The groups were distinguished by their own morality, values, attitude to common deal and had their own views as to the ways of the city development.

Self-centered people were aimed at their personal beneficiation. Such human values as honesty, diligence and decency were alien to them. Pavlo Zelioniy, the Mayor of Odessa, wrote in his memoirs that such deputies did not appreciate honesty and claim that nobody liked honest people [Zelioniy, 1888a: 2-4]. Those members of the self-government bodies gained their fortune by selling community’s property, raising city taxes in two or even three times, taking away the harvest grown by the citizens, taking bribes, creating corruption schemes and so on. They did not like being informed on and tried to put into prison their most honest opponents. To their great surprise, the foreigners who came to this region noticed the emperor’s portraits in the offices of such officials who accepted bribes. When being asked if they were not afraid of justice, those officials replied arrogantly “The sky is as far and high as the Tsar is!” [Guthrie, 2012c: 64]. Such members of the local authority bodies were absolutely not in fear of any punishment, and by their attempts the policy of decentralization was turned into the policy of amateur hour. Such abuse of power became so public that it was even mentioned in the Royal Ordinance by Pavel I. The citizens suffered from such activity very much.

It is obvious that people living in the cities did not like the local authority members of that kind. The development of the local self-government bodies excluded any interference of the community representatives. Each social group looked out for its own interests and that

is why nobody wanted to spend money other people's needs. Since the reform of 1870, the self-centered members of the local authority bodies had changed their tactics and strategy in their personal fortifying due to such modern inventions as water supply and sanitation, electrification and telephone penetration. Since house owners were the basic group in the city self-government bodies, those technical innovations in their own houses enabled them raise the house prices to a maximum. At the same time, they provided the high-quality service. And it should be acknowledged [Gorbachov, 1908: 6-12]. The representatives of the urban peripheries were not able to provide any significant fortune to the self-centered members of the local authorities and hence were not taken into consideration at all.

As a result, corruption and bribers had never abandoned southern Ukrainian cities. Self-centered representatives of the local authority bodies thought honesty, decency, responsibility and concern for ordinary people needs to be negative features. They tried to hide the very fact of being corrupted. Many of them received a sentence. Hence, the mistrust grew more and more and those who were more of revolutionary started criticizing the decentralized self-government bodies.

Conformists were another widely spread type of the authority members. Their main characteristic feature was the ability to adapt to the existent orders of the life having no desire to change anything their own life as well as in the residents' life. They were completely satisfied and did not discharge their public duties responsibly. The representatives of that kind did mainly nothing. As Pavlo Zelioniy wrote in his memoirs the deputies and the officials of that type were mostly illiterate and seldom showed up to work. They adapted to the established order of things and found no necessity to change somehow both the local or state authority and even the way of living. The conformists did not fulfill their duties as they thought them unnecessary. They were not punished for such a neglect. They were often met in small unimportant county towns. In those towns, the modernization process was slow; many streets did not even have names; the authorities thought unnecessary to have water supply, sanitation, and other civilization achievements. The officials and judges held up with the final decisions for decades. The only serious matter for them was to complain at each other exaggerating their opponents' faults. One should mention a remarkable fact that local people were not irritated or shocked with the activity of conformists and many of the citizens even supported them. In the times after the reforms, there were many of such conformists. The members of that kind often lived having no aim or punishment and spending community or state money [Zelioniy, 1888b: 2-4].

In the history of the Southern Ukraine, one can find numerous examples when the local deputies were devoted to their public work and tried to improve the conditions of life for the city residents. Such members of the local authority were called benefactors. They were unique and interesting people, whose lives were devoted to improving the dwellers living conditions. They were active participants of the City Council debates. They had no need to join any grouping as they thought and acted independently, using their own money [Galagan, 1895: 3-7]. The representatives of that kind were considered as super responsible. They were members of numerous committees. At their own expense, they financed different charity events, libraries, and lecture halls. They built schools, hospitals and a took part in a lot of other projects. Those benefactors were the very deputies who created the positive image of the local self-government bodies. The interest of the people was the main motivator for their activity. The only thing they received in return was satisfaction from their own deeds.

There also were such situations when the representatives of the local authority bodies, who were previously punished for their self-centered activity, restored their reputation by doing

something good. For example, they helped the needy or ill and those who had no possibility to leave the South of Ukraine at the time of epidemics. People admitted anybody could make a mistake and thought everybody should have a chance to start fresh. People also believed that even the worst official could understand people's problems and needs.

The benefactors differed in their social or family status, wealth or any other characteristics. The desire and possibility to work in favour of the community was their common feature. They had never been formalists or bureaucrats whereas their activity was based on the humanity principles of decency, honesty and diligence. By their own role model, they proved that despite numerous examples of the officials' dishonesty the authority representatives could become the facilitators for human relationships, renovations and what the most important thing is they could become a voice of the best inner forces.

The best advocates for the community needs and interests were so-called "City Fathers" who loved their community, its past and future. These representatives of the authority took an active part in sociopolitical and renovation activity. Due to the "City Fathers" activity, the professionals now replaced those officials who previously had held electoral posts on the amateur basis. The "City Fathers" numerous efforts were appreciated and the city residents loved and believed them so much that let them govern the community for decades. They always tried to be helpful in intensification of the community life, make the cities in the South of Ukraine lead in the financial and modernization development. They also were active enemies of corruption and bribery [Overview of the Activity, 1880: 2-36]. Owing to the activity of the "City Fathers" the South of Ukraine turned into the most modernized, independent and autonomous region. The way they governed the region was always characterized as responsible and respectable one. They themselves were the best model to be followed.

The personalities of the "City Fathers" were often identified with their city and vice versa. The most significant "City Fathers" were N. Blazhkov and D. Gorlovskiy (Kherson), V. Dotsenko and P. Turchaninov (Nikolaev), Ya. Novitskiy (Aleksandrovsk), I. Androssov and V. Novoselskiy (Odessa), A. Pashutin (Yelisavetgrad) and many others. Those deputies and Mayors always cultivated their self-improvement. They were the devoted enemies of corruption, bribery and embezzlement. They were active citizens, exemplary for others. Thanks to their heroic attempts people in the South of Ukraine started living in new modernized conditions with the railway and tramlines, running water, sanitation, electric lighting and telephone communication. Their cities became the leaders of the economic growth. Even during the World War I when a lot of the cities and towns of the Russian Empire suffered losses the cities in the South of Ukraine received high incomes [Veselovskiy, 1916: 394-404].

It is due to their excellent management and activity the communities in the South of Ukraine developed, improved their sanitary conditions, won the most of epidemic diseases and raised the level of culture and literacy among the people. They always advocated for free education and medical service [Veselovskiy, 1917: 10-28]. Later those ideas were adopted by the Soviet leaders. The intensive activity of the above mentioned officials and Mayors helped people keep positive attitude towards the local self-government bodies till nowadays. The cities became self-sufficient economic complexes. The authority members understood that the central government had been implementing discriminatory policies. That is why they led the movement to promote the reforms aimed at decentralization and autonomy of the local authority bodies [Turchenko, 2011: 138-144].

The activity of the so-called "silent" deputies of the city councils was considered the quietest and rather humble one. Those deputies came to the authority by accident and were

almost unknown to the public. They always attended the city council sessions but kept silence. That turned them into the inert mass among the members of the local self-government bodies. That is why they got a nickname “a group of silent members.” Though they became very active as far their personal interests were concerned. They behaved as if the most sufficient problems of the community had no relations to them. Many deputies made excuse for themselves saying about the lack of time, experience or were busy with their own enterprises [Fiodorov, 1903: 3]. Those deputies preferred to run things that needed less time and attempts, were easy and clear. In addition, that was their moral choice and position. They could not understand that the life had accelerated, upgraded and went far beyond the old mere patriarchal relationships. The deputies like those turned to be unprepared for the tasks the new life was setting.

The sluggish and slow work of the “silent group” became the object for residents to criticize those deputies [A Voter’s Letters, 1885: 10-36]. The “silent group” argued and proclaimed their work active, helpful and benefiting.

On the pages of periodicals, the local journalists constantly asked one and the same question “How could happen that such inactive and less-than-enthusiastic people had been elected deputies? What were the residents guided by at the elections?” [Yaichkov 1903: 3]. The following simple formulas defined the voters’ behaviour:

- a) The necessity to honour the local businessmen and factory owners;
- b) The candidates were rich people;
- c) The voters were fond of the candidates.

Hence the support groups were formed. For example, the support group for Marchenko, for Blazhkov, for Becker and so on. The residents did not trust those who advocated for modern advanced ideas and that is why they voted according to their own preferences. Nobody thought about the moral qualities of the deputies or realized that their future was determined by their choice during the elections. The elections were considered to be a formality, the only thing to do was to come and vote. The further development of the local life did not depend on the voters any more. That is why the attendance was always very low. Another characteristic feature of that time elections was the voters’ negative attitude towards the intellectuals. The majority of the voters did not take into consideration their words, points of view or arguments. As a result, the elected deputies of the local self-government bodies were often characterized as being inactive, having no independent points of view or thinking, less-than-enthusiastic, incompetent or having poor management skills.

Thus, such phenomena as bureaucracy, bribery, corruption, dishonesty were daily events. However, at the same time there were a large number of the initiative, active, enthusiastic, honest deputies with high moral standards united by their desire to think and create in a new modern way. Alongside with the residents the local authorities accelerated the process of renovation. The deputies supported the decentralization, democratization, a wish to be autonomous. They fought against bribery and corruption. Some deviation from the traditional relationships within the authority bodies of the Southern Ukraine region revealed itself in the absence of strong family protective links, which played the leading role in other regions of the Russian Empire.

With the beginning of the new life and the formation of the society in transitional period, the self-governance in the South of Ukraine obtained more initiative professionals who strived to further changes on the way towards better modern equal to European life.

Nowadays the South of Ukraine has got great potential based on and created by its history. Today’s deputies of the local self-government bodies got a historic opportunity to encourage the

further modernization of the region, and form the new domestic model of the self-governance with the morality basis of honesty, decency, initiative and competence. Reference to the local self-government experience of the end 18th, early 20th centuries can be useful to specify the weak and the strong sides in the relationships between the authority, morality and community.

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Kazakh Famine 1928-1932

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Between 1928 to 1932 a great famine took place in parts of the Soviet Union due to the forced collectivization policy by the Bolsheviks. Some historians accuse Joseph Stalin of purposefully targeting people and others blame the famine on poor management, policy errors, and local misunderstanding of the general idea in making reforms in agriculture. This paper attempts to give the reader a better understanding of what happened in Kazakhstan when collectivization brought massive human losses and the end of Kazakh nomadism as a way of life.

Key Words: USSR, collectivization, nomadism, Stalinism, Kazakhstan, famine, Holodomor.

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Introduction

Study of Great Famine of 1928-1932 in Kazakhstan, which is the most tragic event in Kazakh history and is largely unknown to the Western public and researchers in general. Was it just another page of communist crimes along with the gulags, purges, or something even more sinister?

Research questions for this paper are the following:

1. What happened in the Kazakh case of Soviet collectivization?
2. Why did it happen?

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2.1 Was the famine a deliberate way to pacify Kazakh nomads who were resistant to the Soviet State?

2.2 Was it caused by local Kazakh officials?

2.3 Was it due to incompetence of the policy makers who didn't understand the nomadic way of living?

3. How is the famine remembered in Kazakhstan? What is the political position?

Research methodology — interviews with historians and journalists. Analysis of state memory policies in monuments, public actions, and interviews or speeches by state leaders. Literature on the famine in Russian, Kazakh and English. Novelty of the research is an attempt to create an overall picture of the causes of the Famine in Kazakhstan.

1. What happened?

Between 1928 to 1933 a major famine swept through Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and other parts of the Soviet Union. According to Sarah Cameron and Nicolas Werth, Kazakhstan had become one of the main grain and livestock producers for the Soviet Union. (Cameron, 2016: 119) (Werth, 2016: 38) Beginning in 1929, the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin launched the First Five Year Plan (Cameron, 2016: 118) The Five-Year Plan consisted of forced collectivization and industrialization. Collectivization of private peasant production units meant the people that owned their farms were now state employees of the Soviet State and their farms then belonged to the state. Implementation of the plan was partially voluntary and by force via special measures in selective taxation of rich households and exempting those who organized themselves into collective farms. Prior to that central planning for collecting either grain or livestock was tested. In earlier times when Soviets under Lenin had used this forced expropriation policy — *prodrazverstka* — it led to a massive rebellion by the peasants. Stalin made all of them part of the state production and distribution system to obliterate any possibility for resistance.

A quota was given to nomadic households on how much livestock they had to give to the Soviet State. Often, these quotas were unreachable and a large amount of the livestock that would have been used by Kazakh families and local consumers were sent to other parts of the Soviet Union. Quite often, the meat would simply rot as it was poorly stored and livestock died because of the inability to work in the nomadic style of grazing.

Rich Kazakh landowners had their properties and livestock confiscated and were sent to prison starting in 1928 under the slogan of fighting with *bais* (rich ones). The policy was carried out by the local Soviet official Filipp Goloshchekin, who had arrived in Kazakhstan in 1925 (Pianciola, 2004: 139). Russia partially excluded the rich ones in their own territory as one of the main consequences of the civil war in Russia, as Kazakh society was to a certain extent observing and not participating actively in the civil war, allowing the rich ones to survive up to 1928.

Senior history researcher Talabek Omarbekov of Al-Farab University shared how his family was treated by the Bolsheviks, “My grandfather was a rich Kazakh man, who engaged in horse breeding. He was imprisoned because he was one of the wealthiest men in the area and died in 1930 in Aulie Ata prison.” (Omarbekov, 2016)

The Kazakhs were given unreasonable quotas and new collective farms were created in Kazakhstan. Due to a lack of food for the animals they began dying in large numbers, resulting in an overall food shortage for the local population. In addition, grain producing farms were also given unreasonable quotas compounding the lack of food.

When all the animals were taken, and gathered in designated areas per Soviet policy, the animals were not able to eat sufficiently as the nomadic way of grazing implies relatively constant migration over large territories with an adequate amount of sheep, cows and horses. As a result, the grass gets eaten by the lead animals and the rest are not able to feed themselves. Once the animals died, people began to die in massive numbers.

The famine reached its peak in 1932 but the Soviet government moved slowly to react to the famine under constant bombardment with letters from Kazakh authorities requesting food to help. Emergency aid was offered from the West, yet Stalin refused to accept train shipments of grain denying that there even was a famine. During a previous famine in 1921, Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin had accepted western help and millions were saved in Russia and Kazakhstan. By the end of 1933, the famine had been brought under control.

The famine killed between 6.5 and 7 million people with approximately 4.2 million in Ukraine and 1.5 million in Kazakhstan (Werth, 2016: 35). Researcher Zhyldyzbek Abylkhozyn, one of the foremost experts on the famine, estimated approximately 1.75 million deaths in Kazakhstan due to the famine; though he emphasized it was an approximation as records were insufficient (Abylkhozyn, 2016). Cameron points out that the Kazakhs lost over a third of their population, thus, becoming a minority in their own republic (Cameron, 2016: 120). This figure of human losses is a subject for political debate in Ukraine, Russia and especially Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is a unique case because social consensus has not been achieved yet. Ukraine has recognized the famine as a criminal case and possible genocide. Russia, with its revival of imperial ambitions and glorification of the USSR has avoided this issue. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan continues debating.

2. Why did it happen?

According to Kazakhstani journalist Vladislav Yuritsyn, one has to take into account the atmosphere of the time. The October Revolution had happened in 1917 just over a decade before, and as the revolution was regarded as a great success, it was believed by Goloshchekin and other party officials that another so called ‘Small October Revolution’ was necessary to propel Kazakhstan into the industrial age (Yuritsyn, 2016). ‘Small October’ meant that Kazakhstan had not had its October Revolution yet, and the rich ones were still in power. The days following the civil war also meant the value of human life was quite low. The Soviet leadership, who had been active militants 7-10 years prior, were used to incurring a high number of human losses to achieve their goals. Goloshchekin for example, had participated in the execution of the Russian Tsar Nicholas II and his family, including the women, children, and even the family doctor.

Speaking about the regime’s attitude and lack of knowledge toward the Kazakh people and lifestyle Omarbekov says,

Stalin had never been to Kazakhstan. He did not know anything about the Kazakh lifestyle. And even Goloshchekin who was the local leader, appointed directly from Moscow, had never been to a Kazakh village. That is why no one could predict that Kazakh’s would die. Stalin and all of his governors thought that Kazakh’s were a backwards people. He did not even consider them to be human beings. His main goal was to keep Russians in control, and in senior positions. And he wanted to Russianize all of the Kazakh’s and similar ethnic groups. Before 1991 when Kazakhstan became

an independent republic, the policy of Moscow was to make all the Kazakhs forget their national language and to Russianize the population (Omarbekov, 2016).

Omarbekov points out that although it had been apparent for many months that there was a famine in Kazakhstan with large amounts of livestock starving as well as people, the local officials were too afraid to tell Stalin of the crisis, fearing they would be blamed. Thus, the first known letters regarding the famine were not sent until the summer of 1932, and it only mentioned that livestock were starving neglecting to report the massive amounts of people who were already dying. Letters to Moscow mentioning people starving were not sent for at least another few months, again due to fear of being blamed by Moscow. In rebuttal that Kazakhs were specifically targeted, Yuritsyn states that more Russians died as a result of the famine throughout the Soviet Union, though he acknowledges that percentage wise the number of ethnic Kazakhs that died was much higher — his estimate being nearly fifty percent. He goes on to say,

The Soviet's wanted to force collectivization and they started to work to make that happen. Even the local officials, who were Kazakhs, Russians, Latvians, and Jews got orders from Moscow, they said that it would not work. However, their recommendations either did not get to Moscow, or they were ignored (Yuritsyn, 2016).

Quite directly, Omarbekov and Abylkhodzyn blame Stalin and his regime for causing the famine (Omarbekov, 2016; Abylkhodzyn, 2016). We can say that the Soviet system itself viewed the people not as the citizens but as a resource which could be replenished.

2.1 Was the famine a deliberate way to pacify Kazakh nomads who were resistant to the Soviet State?

Unlike memory of the famine in Ukraine, where the narrative generally accuses Stalin of using genocide to tighten his grip on power, (Ukrainian Genocide 1932-1933, 2018) (Commission on the Ukrainian Famine, 1988), less of that sentiment exists in Kazakhstan. Regarding whether the famine was intentional Professor Gulnara Dadabayeva of KIMEP University says,

But as far as I see the works of the Kazakhstani historians, they provided a lot of documents where the local authorities, where the central authorities acted extremely brutal. They used force, death penalties, a lot of dangerous and tragic things in order to implement their plans, But, at the same time there is not any evidence that within the high party authorities, there existed any kind of plan to destroy at least 30 or 40 percent of the Kazakh population. What for? (Dadabayeva, 2016)

Thus, the famine is regarded by many to be due more to bad management, fear of Stalin, and irresponsibility versus an intentional act. Division among even academic, non social activists, on this issue in Kazakhstan is evident. Some claim it was a conscious extermination and genocide of the Kazakhs who were self-sufficient on food and out of the political reach of the repressive Soviet State; others claim it was a political error of an inefficient political and economic system.

Although it is debatable whether the famine in Kazakhstan was intentional, brutal methods were used to pacify the population. For instance, there were rebellions against the forced collectivization campaign. And the Soviets responded accordingly, “To put down the various rebellions Soviet Headquarters sent the 8th Cavalry Division and some were even bombed by aircraft” (Omarbekov, 2016). In addition, racial discrimination was quite evident against the native population.

In search of food, tens of thousands of Kazakhs fled Kazakhstan to Russia, China and other Soviet Republics. Niccolo Pianciola reported that it was common for people to pose as security agents to steal from the refugees (Pianciola, 2004: 173). Many of the refugees were forced to return to Kazakhstan and they were treated as the lowest class, living without shelter, while the colonists lived in homes (Pianciola, 2004: 176). In addition, food rations for the Kazakhs were lower than for the colonists and there were even reports of Kazakhs being lynched by Russians and Soviets (Pianciola, 2004: 177).

As part of the collectivization campaign, the Soviets wanted to break up the “tribal solidarity” (Pianciola, 2004: 148) and as Dadabayeva explains one of the priorities of the Soviets was to produce a population that considered the state their god so to speak, above religion or tribal loyalties (Dadabayeva, 2016). Thus, seizing the wealth from the rich livestock owners was a means to destroy “the tribal solidarity” that prevented the state from controlling socio-economic relationships in rural areas so that it could reshape them for its own ends” (Pianciola, 2004: 148).

Still several questionable actions were taken by Stalin and the regime. Sarah Cameron points out that “Stalin knew of the Kazakhs suffering at several key points during the famine yet offered no concessions” (Cameron, 2016: 123). She also reports that the Soviets closed the borders to the fleeing Kazakhs at the height of the famine — worsening the crisis (Cameron, 2016: 126). And Nicolas Werth states that Stalin viewed any resistance to his collectivization policy, whether Ukrainian or Kazakh, as a war against the state that must be won by a “knockout punch”, in order to break the will for resistance and achieve total assimilation to the state. He goes on to say that Stalin considered the Kazakh nomads as living an “unredeemable” way of life that had to be done away with forever (Werth, 2016: 48). This ability for the Kazakhs to exist outside of the state distribution system caused Stalin to view the Kazakhs as dangerous, or at least with suspicion.

As stated earlier by Omarbekov, the first letters concerning the famine reached Moscow in the summer of 1932. According to Werth, in the same month Mikhail Khataevich, a party secretary, requested Stalin to “revise the plan downward”, so that the farmers would have enough food and be able to sow for the next year’s harvest (Courtois, et al., 1999: 164). Viacheslav Molotov, First Secretary of the Moscow Communist Party, responded by denouncing Khataevich’s request, stating that the needs of the state cannot be put into second place (Courtois, et al., 1999: 164).

In April 1933, Mikhail Sholokhov wrote two letters to Stalin complaining about the treatment of workers on a collective farm in Kuban — which had a high Ukrainian population. He complained about the methods used to punish workers for not meeting quotas and for hiding grain such as stripping them naked in the open air, simulated executions, and even burning them. For instance, “The feet and the bottom of the skirt of the female workers are doused with gasoline and then set alight. The flames are put out, and the process is repeated...” (Courtois, et al., 1999: 166). Stalin responded in a letter,

The fact that this sabotage was silent and appeared to be quite peaceful (there was no bloodshed) changes nothing — these people deliberately tried to undermine the Soviet state. It is a fight to the death, Comrade Sholokhov!

Of course this cannot justify all the abuses carried out by our staff. The guilty few will be forced to answer for their actions. But it is as clear as day that our respected workers are far from being the innocent lambs that one might imagine from reading your letters. I hope you stay well, and I offer a warm handshake. Yours,
J. Stalin (Courtois, et al., 1999: 167)

Kazakh party leaders wrote several letters asking for help, describing the human casualties, and all the terror made during collectivization to local people. Some of those who wrote these letters were later purged like Turar Ryskulov (executed in 1938). Although Stalin was responding to the crisis in Kuban, it sheds light on his indifference to the treatment and suffering of the workers. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that in respect to Kazakhstan collectivization, assimilation of the Kazakhs into the new system was the priority and avoidance of the famine was not.

2.2 Was it caused by the local Kazakh officials?

Certainly, there was negligence on the part of the local Kazakh officials. In fact, there was a reluctance to take responsibility for the situation, again due to fear of punishment from Moscow. Omarbekov states that “The local Kazakh authorities were afraid to inform Stalin about the situation. They wanted Goloshekin to go away, and they thought that if the situation got worse that he would be sent away” (Omarbekov, 2016). In other words, local officials knew that the situation was turning into a disaster, and they hoped that Goloshekin would be blamed for it and relieved of his position.

Sarah Cameron supports the point that the local authorities in Kazakhstan were also responsible for such a high level of human loss and their short-sighted policy of collectivization. We think this is only part of the blame as the central authorities in Moscow had developed the policy of planned expropriation of the livestock. Placing some blame on the local authorities is fair as neighboring Kyrgyzstan was similarly nomadic, but the human losses were not so staggering.

The problem with the local ethnic Kazakhs who had become communist nomenclature was that they valued their privileged position of being a communist more than of being a Kazakh. They were co-opted by the communist party and acted according to the communist party directives. Which is one of the reasons why people today tend to forget the tragedy of the famine in Kazakhstan, as many people who are alive today are descendants of those who actively lead the communist policies. This memory can be divisive for the Kazakhs under growing Russian sentiments for their imperial revanche.

2.3 Was it due to incompetence of the policy makers who did not understand the nomadic way of living?

One of the primary causes of the famine was a disconnect between policy makers in Moscow and the local Moscow representatives such as Goloshekin and the Kazakh people.

Vladislav Yuritsyn pointed out that Goloshchekin had never been to Kazakhstan and did not know about the science of nomadic herding. Yuritsyn explains,

... the herd can consist of 600 heads of sheep, so while one sheep is eating the grass the next one is fanning out further to eat, and the next one is fanning out even further than the previous one, and so on. When you have 2000 heads of sheep instead of 600, the sheep in the rear have to cover such a distance as they fan out for new grass, that they end up starving to death (Yuritsyn, 2016).

Therefore, as Moscow wanted to force progress at a rapid rate, they consolidated livestock farms and introduced an amount of sheep and other livestock that the land could not support, thus causing them to die on a massive scale.

At the height of the famine Goloshchekin was removed from his position in January 1933 (Pianciola, 2004: 170). Though Pianciola reports that apparats in Kazakhstan and especially Kazakh officials were criticizing and asking for the removal of Goloshchekin, other scholars believe that Goloshchekin was merely a tool following the orders of Moscow and had no choice. Therefore, focusing responsibility on Goloshchekin is a convenient way for the Soviets to avoid responsibility for their actions. (Abylkhozyn, 2016; Omarbekov, 2016).

In addition to problems caused by not understanding nomadic methods, there were also national security issues, or at least that is the way Stalin saw it. For instance, once the famine became known to the West, grain and other aid was sent by train from Europe. Tragically, the desperately needed food was turned away. Professor Dadabayeva describes the rationale, “It’s explained by the geo-political situation, the Soviet government did not want to show its weakness in the face of the — enemy, as the West was usually seen by the Soviet government” (Dadabayeva, 2016). Soviet authorities used the grain as an export commodity to obtain Western technologies for industrialization and thus acknowledging the famine would have interfered with their objectives.

3. How is the famine remembered in Kazakhstan? What is the political position?

In contrast to Ukraine, there is less discussion of the famine in Kazakh society. While Professor Dadabayeva explains that it’s important to speak about the famine carefully as Kazakhstan still has a large Russian population in addition to Russian speaking non — Kazakh ethnic groups like Poles, Ukrainians, Koreans and Russian speaking Kazakhs as well.

Why society is quite not probably indifferent, but less active concerning the discussions of the famine of the 1930’s yes because partly because it is past and we should be very careful concerning certain things and accusations in order to avoid clashes between people (Dadabayeva, 2016).

This is better understood by taking into account Kazakhstan’s proximity, economic dependence, and vulnerability to Russia. There are many ethnic Russians living in Kazakhstan, especially in northern Kazakhstan close to Russia’s borders, and Russian TV also dominates Kazakh media.

Ethnic clashes caused by a reawakening of unresolved offenses could give reason for Russia to send its military to Kazakhstan in order to protect Russians. Perhaps annexing parts of Kazakhstan with a high percentage of ethnic Russian as they have done in Crimea. There is

also a fear of Russia becoming more aggressive concerning efforts to install leaders that they can control; especially, if it seems necessary to counter Kazakh nationalism. Nevertheless, since the 1990's Kazakhstan has moved away from the famine as a subject (Cameron, 2016: 121). In a speech in 2012, President Nursultan Nazarbaev urged Kazakhstanians to remember the famine but warned against "politicizing" it (Cameron, 2016: 121-122).

A new generation of Kazakhs have grown up in a freer and independent Kazakhstan. Unfortunately, memory of the famine is being lost. Abylkhodzyn says sadly that his generation will remember the famine but for the next, its memory is fading (Abylkhodzyn, 2016). Likewise, Omarbekov says that for the young people, the famine seems like a fairytale (Omarbekov, 2016).

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Politically-Technological Potential of Cultural Practices in Ukrainian Perspective

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The article is devoted to the consideration of historical dynamics of the organization's means of cultural practices in Ukraine, in their power and politically-technological perspective, taking into account their optic modes. The difference between classical culture industry and global culture industry is formulated by British researcher Scott Lash is basis of our analysis. It is also taking into account his distinguishing a high culture model of Enlightenment in contrast to a cultural industry. Everyone has its own specificity in the constructing of cultural practices within the organizational dominance of social institutions. In describing the features of each historical form of cultural practices, an attempt has been made to outline their specificity in the Ukrainian cultural space.

Each historical type of cultural practices organization (high culture, the classical culture industry, global industry of culture) has its own ways of involving in political technology, its mediators, and the modes of vision. The early Modern form of the material culture production was balanced by the normativity of social institutions and their disciplinary practices. The discursive practices of Modern provided the status of a high culture and its model of power-over. Its textual mode of vision served the cultural practices of the implementation of the national state. The classical culture industry on the basis of commodification ensures the penetration of the principle of identity in the sphere of cultural practices. Vision mode of the spectacle is the basis of the visual culture in the stage of its industrialization. The global culture industry carries out immanent power such as working from within. There is a global mediation of things. De-differentiation of the principles of reflexivity and spectacle creates a new mode of vision as the transparency of the Internet-space. Classification of ways of cultural practices organization is intended to clarify the situation in contemporary Ukrainian culture.

Key Words: cultural practice, politically-technology, Ukraine, high culture, classical culture industry, global culture industry, optic mode

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Introduction

The long time of Ukraine's evolution in the European tradition with its religion dominating in the sphere of spiritual culture has led to the general cultural appearance of Christian values, which are still a common background for many Ukrainians. Although the technologies of the global culture industry have strongly pushed the culture control by conscious internalization, which had been found in Christianity, is still remains a powerful potential in formation of cultural identity in Ukraine.

Situation of High Culture

The formation of a national state in the secularization conditions required a new way of culture organization and management of social processes. Such a model was formed in the circumstances of the early Modern era, where identity was the basic principle of the modern material culture: "Goods as commodities are all alike. They are distinguishable only by the quantities of money for which they exchange... Commodities only have value in the way they resemble every other commodity" [Lash, 2007: 6]. Material practices of industrial society does not require personal compelling and correlate with interactions of individuals through the system of exchange of the abstract equivalence. The subject in these circumstances is not constituted by the imitation of the previous tradition, but by the passing through the social institutes of the Modern. Enlightenment modification of modern culture has constructed a number of social institutions, including institutions of medicine, law and primary education to control the micro-processes of everyday life. The university has become the highest achievement of the technology of European cultural management as a space for the formation of democracy and civil society. Higher education was not only a "social lift" (in the bourdieusian formulation), the presence of which within itself reduces the conflict potential of society, but also the management technology of the national society, where it took place "to influence the people by certain teachings" [Kant, 2002] (in formulation of Immanuel Kant). The University as a social institution and the space of discourse (in what is the "heroic way" and the tasks of the philosophical faculty) was a main mediator of cultural practices during the era of national state domination. The University, beside and through the autonomous spheres of the spiritual culture of Modern, acted as a mediator of a high culture model. The latter through the sophisticated technique of consciousness self-control, becomes a "prison" for the human body in Foucauldian description.

Visual practices of the text not only serve as "cultural roots" [Anderson, 1991: 9] and a condition for the formation of an "imaginary community" (expect tomb emblem of Unknown Soldiers) [<http://www.nationalismproject.org/what/anderson.htmgf>], but actively working in the formation of such a values set of person as a citizen: consistency, systematicity, linearity, self-esteem and even supremacy.

Being in the space of freedom and the origin of regulative ideas, a high culture adjusts its participants to appropriate habits which carry out the function of disciplinary practices at the level of their routine, High culture as well as complements disciplinary practices by sophisticated content, formulated in discursive practices. "It carries out normalizing functions of domination" [Lash & Lury, 2007: 57], noticed Scott Lash.

Ukraine, which had begun its way of construction of higher education institution since 17th century, has its own collision of formation. The cultural tradition has led to the theological dominance of discursive practices and imperial control over the organization of education until

the years of Ukrainian independence. However, the presence of such a socio-cultural institute as higher education would not make an impact on the organization specifics of domestic cultural practices.

Classic Culture Industry

The gradual penetration of commercialization from the sphere of material production into culture reconfigures its original organizational intentions. This was considered by the founders of critical theory as an extreme negative tendency, noticed by Scott Lash:

A previously autonomous or relatively autonomous sphere now itself came under the industrial principle. This meant that culture, once a space of freedom, came under the principle of instrumental rationality, became instrumental in the hands of Hollywood and the emergent monopoly concentration of capital in publishing, recording and advertising. It meant that culture, previously a source of edification, the *Bildung* of human potential, turned into a machinery of control, whose main goal was the expenditure of resources in the interests of the financial profitability of corporate oligopolies. Culture took on the same principle of accumulation already widespread in the capitalist economy. Now the logic of the factory colonized the dream factories of the culture industry. Now culture, previously associated with the development of human subjectivity, became objective like any other commodity. The implication for Horkheimer and Adorno was that culture, previously a site for critique and a place of non-identity, became subsumed under capitalism's logic of identity. In this identity-logic, the heterogeneity — the grain of the artwork is reduced to identical units of utility; the qualitative, internal values of things are reduced to identical units of exchange-value and quantities of money. Industrialized culture, for Horkheimer and Adorno, is homogenized culture. In homogenized culture, one unit is like every other. One unit, in its nature as commodity and instrumentality, is identical to any other. This was the principle of identity that Horkheimer and Adorno deplored. It was the principle against which critique was to be launched [Lash, 2007: 2-3].

The prevalence of the classical culture industry in the contemporary Ukrainian space is represented by the domination of TV media and the corresponding organization type of cultural practices. Television does not implies answers and communications, as representatives of post-structuralism have argued. Therefore, by simulating and the immediacy of communication, TV in certain way is “the end of social.” In particular, this is manifested in the appearance of “intellectual crowd” [Bourdieu, 1998: 46] “intellectual stock market” [Bourdieu, 1998: 57], and even “anti-intellectualism” [Bourdieu, 1998: 58], as Pierre Bourdieu pointed out. The rigid frameworks for debates and discussions that have established radio and television (the lack of consistency, limitation and fragmentation of the presentation of the subject logic, the background frame of the TV and radio broadcasting) undermine the “heroic way” of discursive practices as they had been carried out at the university. Thus, television as a cultural practice of the classical culture industry represents a de-differentiation of technology and cultural form. Famously influential figure in the field of TV studies Raymond Williams wrote: “Analysis of a distribution of interest or categories in a broadcasting programme, while in its own terms significant, is necessarily abstract and static. In all developed broadcasting systems the

characteristic organisation, and therefore the characteristic experience, is one of sequence or flow. This phenomenon, of planned flow, is then perhaps the defining characteristic of broadcasting, simultaneously as a technology and as a cultural form” [Williams, 2003: 86]. In the dimension of the political-technology TV turns into a follow of some mantras, the contradictions of which is not obvious to the “The Unhappy Consciousness” [Hegel, 2001]. Uncritical thinking in the Ukrainian situation shows a regional spread, which, unfortunately, represents a split position. Concerns about these issues are reported of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine for 2017 [Report, 2017].

The attention drawing of the viewership on the surface of the television screen is carried out by the optic mode of the spectacle, which organizes not only the general flow of television programs, but also the whole of political material, according to its own logic. The spectacle mode corresponds to the intensification of the significant dynamics and to the reduction of the event’s semantics. It correlates with the logic of the policy’s transformation in the show and bureaucratization of management functions. Thus, the disciplinary practice of controlling through consciousness, which conformed to the rational argumentation set of high culture, was superseded by techniques (not only and not primarily political) of manipulating consciousness in organizing the “Mass Ornament” [Kracauer, 1995: 1]. And the emphasis of technology (especially political technology) is a symptom of the fact that the idea of self-organization of civil society remains as unattainable as the Perpetual Peace.

The optic mode of the classical culture industry is based on the visual practices of the spectacle, with their entertainment, fragmentary, background, every day, multilinearity. TV spectacle is so tempting to the certain audience in Ukraine, which makes it all the obsession of long-term advertisements.

Global Culture Industry

The audience gradually reorients to the Internet space in “a shift in power from the hegemonic mode of ‘power over’ to an intensive notion of power from within (including domination from within) and power as generative force” [Lash & Lury, 2007: 56]. So many researchers assume Trump’s luck with his more successful political-technology in social networks. In Ukraine, the priority of the Internet is characteristic for certain age groups, ranging from middle-aged people. Their livelihoods in organizational way do not allow them to be tied to the schedule of television programs. That is why the future of the audience with free work schedules is more connected with the Internet environment, which is based on the logic of the global cultural industry. The latter is characterized by Scott Lash as follows:

In Horkheimer and Adorno’s culture industry, mediation was predominantly through representation. In global culture industry, we have the mediation of things. Horkheimer and Adorno’s culture was commodified. But these were commodified representations and not cultural things. Mediation by representation is quite other to the mediation of things. The object of art is different from an object like a hammer in that we engage with the former primarily in terms of meaning, while the latter is a matter of doing or ‘operationality’. Painting and sculpture are media or mediums, as writers like Rosalind Krauss (1999) insist. They are media before the age of the mass media of communications. But they are media only insofar as their value is primarily cultural: only insofar as their value has to do with meaning. When media become things,

however, they no longer exclusively have cultural value. They come very importantly to have use-value and exchange-value [Lash, 2007: 7-8].

Global industries of culture get used to cultural practices of branding, informatization, events through the logic of media things. Internet technologies of the contemporary political system cannot be pretended through the monopoly of television channels in the process of consciousness manipulation (in the Soviet past of Ukraine, this state monopoly was total). Therefore, the choice of browsing mode is not so limited and even so censored as for the viewership. Even the national control frameworks are not very productive here. As recent Ukrainian experience shows.

It is also worth noting that the wider format choice of Internet products varies over time parameters. You can choose not only the speaker, the style arguments and the topic, but also the genre of cultural products, as well as the duration of the arguments being explained from the short message and the sarcastic phrase to a rather long and even pedantic statement of a certain issue. And while entertainment in the organization of Internet communication also plays an important role, it is only one of dimensions of “policy poetry,” “thinking aesthetics,” “event architectonics” and many other indicators that really allow the use of Internet-technology to the mean of organization in global culture industry as the Scott Lash classified.

The technical easiness of stopping an Internet broadcast and rewinding a video allows you to repeat your favorite and obscure places, and allows you to delve into the essence of the matter. All of these mentioned points give optimism to Scott Lash’s expectations as for the specific type of reflexivity, which is not equaled, with the high standards of discursive and disciplinary practices of university, but so far exceeds the emotional and imbalance of the spectacle society.

It is not less important for our analysis of the differences between cultural practices and the ability to respond to Internet practices. Contemporary cultural studies distinguish between two types of involvement in the multimedia environment of the Internet. The first one is formulated by Renira Rampazzo Gambarato in concept of Transmedia Storytelling [Gambarato, 2016] as interaction. In this case, human activity on the Internet resembles the possibilities of TV, and only quantitatively exceeds it. The motion of a mouse click on a computer resembles the interaction of a man’s hand with a TV remote, but the multiplatformity of the Internet networks exceeds so far the possibilities of TV multimedia, not only in number of elements of the structure, but also in a high degree of freedom of their organization.

The second possibility of an answer in the Internet environment is classified in Media Studies as a participation. It is not only the ability to click and watch something, but also to intervene, to take part and to leave albeit a virtual contribution: beginning from the like, commentary, posting of someone’s material on its own page in social networks to the publication of your own a video on the same topic or even organization of event off-line. The de-differentiation of consumption and production in the cultural practices of the global cultural industry has just begun. According to Scott Lash:

There is such a thingification of media when, for example, movies become computer games; when brands become brand environments, taking over airport terminal space and restructuring department stores, road billboards and city centres; when cartoon characters become collectibles and costumes; when music is played in lifts, part of a mobile soundscape. Media objects in everyday life come to rival manufactured objects.

We deal with media as representations — painting, sculpture, poetry, the novel — in terms of meaning. When media become things, we enter a world of operability, a world not of interpretation but of navigation. We do not ‘read’ them so much as ‘do’ them (‘just Do It’), or do with them. This was already incipiently the case with the ‘mass media’, newspapers, radio and television. Their ubiquity, and the fact that they were not confined to a separate space, as was art, the museum, cinema or indeed the university, meant that they were already encountered as things. They were much more ready-to-hand already than are mediums such as painting or sculpture. What was incipient with the emergence of mass media has become the axial principle of global culture industry. In global culture industry, what were previously media become things. But also, what were things become media [Lash, 2007: 8].

Therefore, the specifics of political-technologies as an Internet cultural practice are, on our opinion, de-differentiation of reflectivity and spectacle, production and consumption, cultivating new types of experiences other than “pleasure of the text” and of spectacle. “Images and other cultural forms from the superstructure collapse into the materiality of the infrastructure. The image, previously separated in the superstructure, is thingified, it becomes matter-image” [Lash, 2007: 7]. Contemporary Ukrainians are taking possession of all these possibilities very quickly.

Conclusions

It should be said that the presence of the following technological models of medium and their corresponding political-technologies does not deny the existence of previous types of cultural practices nowadays. Despite all demolishing all of the philosophical disciplines studying, the according practice of nation creation has not completely been destroyed in contemporary Ukraine. Television as the popular cultural practice of spectacle society has even prevailed in some age and regional viewships. Internet-practices in the logic of global culture industries conquer and strengthen their positions on the markets of ideas and spectacles. Cuz “Domination in the global communications order is, many argue, through notdiscipline but control” [Lash & Lury, 2007: 67].

This analysis is just an attempt to outline the possibilities of the organization of political technology out of the point of post-hegemonic Cultural Study. After all, it allows to trace not only the ideological content of the cultural product (on which it has always been focused as the interest of critical theories), but the way of organizing its cultural practice, optic mode of perception, coordinating the emotional trajectory of consequences.

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Corruption in Afghanistan: an Experience for Ukraine

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The problem of corruption is one of the most urgent and important to solve for present Ukraine. Corruption is considered to be one of the main reasons for the lack of prosperity in Ukraine as well as political instability. Despite the numerous governmental attempts to fight against the corruption its level unfortunately still increases. Effective strategies search in resolving this problem appears as most relevant and necessary today. Ukrainian authority and anti-corruption organizations can effectively use the passive and active experience of other countries that have the same problem in order to prevent or stop the facts of corruption. Unfortunately, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is a “superlative” in some corruption statics in the world. The permanent long time struggle against a corruption under the conditions of permanent war allowed to collect a large experience that must be comprehended by other countries with similar problems.

This paper targets to observe and generalize some crucial corruption statistics and significant anticorruption steps of Afghans in order to contribute to the formation of future successful anti-corruption strategies of Ukraine.

Key Words: Afghanistan, Ukraine, corruption, anti-corruption, public administration, Ukrainian policy

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Introduction

For some years Afghans have been reporting in surveys that corruption is a daily problem. The United Nation Assistance Mission to Afghanistan's previous report on corruption detailed the pervasiveness of the phenomenon. Corruption has a concrete impact on all citizens of Afghanistan, who are required to pay bribes in nearly every aspect of daily life, and who suffer from inequities in economic and employment opportunities as a result of widespread nepotism and patronage. More fundamentally, the perception of endemic corruption — based, unfortunately, on real experiences as a recent survey³ demonstrated — has undermined public confidence in Government institutions, which has, in turn, hindered the pursuit of wider objectives, such as domestic political stability, electoral preparations, and a credible peace process with the armed opposition.

Ascertain emblematic instances have shown, corruption in Afghanistan is massive (the nearly one billion dollars stolen in the Kabul Bank case), inhumane (the treatment of wounded soldiers in the Military Hospital case), and brazen. The degree of corruption, and the apparent lack of concern by those committing it that there will be any consequences — legal, financial, or even in terms of social opprobrium — to their often despicable actions, has surprised even those with the most realistic perspectives on the challenges of post-conflict state-building. Fighting corruption is also a condition for creating an appropriate investment climate.

The question is, therefore, how has it come to this state? While some have argued that low-level corruption was always present in Afghanistan, it is clear that the decades of resistance and civil war created a culture of impunity and left a legacy of political actors who wield informal power, are often disposed to act at the behest of foreign financial backers, and are skilled at resisting formal authorities.

This historical lens should also help us understand what may be unique about Afghanistan's corruption problem. The problem of corruption in Afghanistan can be seen as materially different from that in other countries, even other countries emerging from conflict, in that it is characterized more by a lack of public institutions than the abuse of public institutions by private rent-seekers. The weakness of public institutions is rooted in Afghanistan's pre-conflict legacy of weak statehood, as well as decades of war which, as described above, created a political economy that privileged and preserved informal power-holders who have been able to resist attempts to formalize and legalize the exercise of power. Decades of war also fundamentally transformed society, weakening the traditional norms that once might have prevented the sorts of accumulation of wealth and abuse of power that Afghanistan has witnessed since the new political order was established in 2001, and developing psychologies of scarcity and uncertainty.

This coupled with an international effort that has treated state-building generally and anti-corruption in particular in a haphazard way has created the seemingly intractable problem we face today. As much as the international community sees itself as a driver of anti-corruption efforts, it cannot overlook that, as Vanda Felbab Brown has recently written, the international community “has oscillated between tolerating corruption for the sake of other goals, battlefield shortcuts, and exigencies (with the justification that Afghans are used to corruption anyway) and confronting it head-on but with little effectiveness.

Corruption and Afghan's political authority

The two leaders of Afghanistan's post-2014 National Unity Government, President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, are not only aware and concerned about the problem but separately campaigned on anti-corruption platforms. Afghanistan's slight rise in its Transparency International score from 8 in 2012 to 15 in 2016 and 2017 — although the country still ranks as the fourth most corrupt country in the world is evidence that some of their efforts are bearing fruit. The leaders of the National Unity Government should be congratulated for the undertaking, in particular, the drafting of a national anti-corruption strategy, which is discussed in this report. Furthermore, the Government and its representatives at various levels engaged forthrightly with a draft of this report, seeking to ensure accuracy and context but not trying to hide deficiencies in the anti-corruption effort. The details in this report describe some of these efforts, but also make clear both that much more needs to be done and that the problem cannot be addressed by the executive alone. An insufficiently noted irony is the millions that the international community pays to hold credible and democratic elections for a parliament that, as soon as it is elected, is often ignored. As this report describes, Afghanistan's legislature is part of the corruption problem and has, for the most part, avoided trying to be part of the solution. Nonetheless, the credibility of the commitment of the Government to see through reforms is an unavoidable pre-requisite for the success of anti-corruption efforts. In this, the current Afghan Government — though it will face re-election next year — is not only far superior to its predecessor, but also to many other countries that are both less corrupt but less committed to dealing with the problem.

For many countries, corruption is manageable if unfortunate, and bribes are seen as an unofficial tax on Government services. If UNAMA is paying much attention to this problem in Afghanistan, it is because the current situation is not manageable; addressing corruption is simply essential for national survival. On a more pragmatic level, a failure to make progress against corruption will discourage already-fatigued donors from financing the Afghan state. If this financing has, as this report details, contributed more than it should have to the problem of corruption, it is also essential for the survival of the State and its efforts to root out corruption.

The most known corruption case of the recent times is Kabul Bank financial swindle that was organized under a supervision of President Hamid Karzai administration. Several responsible top managers (Sherkhan Farnood, Mohammed Fahim and others) who were in charge of this financial institution were stealing and spending about 1 billion US dollars for individual needs (luxurious lifestyle etc.) as well as loaning money unofficially to their friends, family mates and members and other people from President Hamid Karzai and Mahmood Karzai surrounding. Due to the financial reports, the Afghan government collected only 180 million dollars of 980 million illegal loans.

Numerous surveys report that unemployment, corruption and insecurity are the most commonly spread and urgent problems of Afghans everyday life. "Surveys of Afghan opinion repeatedly put corruption as the third biggest problem after insecurity and unemployment, with the notable exception of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2010 survey that places it as the biggest problem of Afghans" [Torab, 2012: 3]. Other important figures reflected in the Asia Foundation reports are the following. "Administrative corruption is perceived as the second most important failure (25%) of the government after insecurity (32%). This is a significant improvement over the results of the 2010 Asia Foundation survey, in which failure to fight corruption was tied, at 30%, with insecurity in being cited

as the biggest failure of the Afghan government. Nonetheless, there is little change in citizen perceptions of their government actually tackling corruption, and the gap is striking between areas of perceived government success, such as education (85%) and poor perception of Afghan government success in fighting corruption (35%)”[Torab, 2012: 3].

Different international organizations report that corruption in Afghanistan is no longer a serious disease of the social system, but the social system itself.

The Agency for International Development (USAID) emphasized in 2013 that “Corruption in Afghanistan has become entrenched and extremely well-organized through patronage groups, imposing a staggering impact on the daily lives of Afghans. Afghanistan is seen to be a ‘bazaar economy’ where every government service is subject to illicit bargaining and payment” [USAID, 2013: 9].

The most commonly spread kinds of corruption activity today in Afghanistan are casual bribes (demanding and offering in private and public spheres), graft, nepotism, illegal land transfer. The Ukrainian corruption reality looks almost similar to Afghan one. The corruption is present on the all possible levels of social affairs.

It was estimated that more than half of the annual state customs income is lost because of the illegal corruption goods transfer.

Parag R. Dharmavarapu in his paper devoted to the corruption in the post-conflict Afghanistan, numerous examples of corruption acts. “What is extremely disconcerting about corruption in Afghanistan, is not simply the number or value of bribes that take place; instead, it is the endemic nature of corruption within the Afghan government... Police officers extort goods from shopkeepers, levy taxes on vehicles at highway checkpoints, and impose fines on individuals unable to produce proper identification documents. Some of them on the top turn a blind eye to or even collude with criminals and insurgents, while mid- to high-level police officials collaborate with criminals in smuggling, kidnapping for ransom and other illegal activities, collecting thousands of dollars in the process” [Dharmavarapu, 2015].

Afghanistan’s and Ukraine’s rankings in the world corruption statistics

“Transparency International’s” annual “Corruption Perceptions Index” ranks Afghanistan as the 4th most corrupt country in the world. Previous positions in the ranking obtain Syria, South Sudan and Somalia.

The organization informs that most of the countries on the list show a marginal or a totally absent progress in order to stop corruption. The results reveal that activists and journalists in corrupt countries are permanently in danger because of their professional activity.

The index deals with 180 countries and territories ranking them by the level of public. The index is formed by the feedbacks of experts and businesspeople, using a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is not corrupt.

Presently, the index revealed that more most of countries (2/3) appear on the level of less than fifty. The middle score is 43.

In 2017, New Denmark and New Zealand obtain the top positions with the score of 88 and 89. Somalia, Syria and South Sudan are the lowest in the list obtaining following figures: 9, 14 and 12. Afghanistan’s score is 15. Sudan and Yemen are on the positions of 17 and 16. The most interesting fact is that North Korea has a better rank than Afghanistan — 17. By far the most no-corrupted region is Western Europe, which has a ratio 66.

By far the worst region in the matter of corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa (score 32) Central Asia and Eastern Europe (average score 34). Ukraine shows the very poor result in comparison with most of the post-soviet countries. Ukrainian score in the rank is 30.

After 2012, some states crucially improved their result in the matter of score. Ukraine, unfortunately, could add only 4 points to its general score. Afghanistan changes were also not so high in the matter of points, but in the general amount, it showed the double progress: from 8 to 15. Some of the countries showed negative tendency and no development at all (Syria, Yemen and Australia).

We must assert due to the mentioned report that Afghan authority's struggle against the corruption reveals its ineffectiveness especially in the targeting of the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

SDGs, which was accepted by 193 nations aspire to stop poverty, defend the Earth and guarantee prosperity for everybody by 2030. established a series of different aims for governments in order to develop the level of justice, sustainable development, healthcare, economic growth, clean energy.

Struggle against corruption is a part Goal 16 of SDG, which is provided, gives a hope for further sustainable development.

One of the most important analytical sources which can give a lot of significant instructions for Afghanistan and other corrupted countries is a comprehensive report named "Policy, SDGs and Fighting Corruption for the People». This report provides an assessment of the progress of Afghanistan in obtaining the anti-corruption aims. The report provides an evaluation of the states' contribution to the salvation of three key "Goal 16" connected with the corruption:

Target 16.4 on illegal money and weapons flows, organized crime etc.

Target 16.5 on corruption activity and bribes.

Target 16.10 on informational freedom and common freedoms.

In experts' opinion, Afghanistan requires a responsible and anticorruption active government. Such authority is one of the necessary conditions for the state to meet SDG commitments to stop poverty, to defend peace and guarantee the justice implementation.

Afghanistan and Ukraine are the countries that have adopted the SDGs; nevertheless, struggle against corruption in case of Afghanistan has not fully begun and in case of Ukraine mostly is declarative but not real. Anticorruption strategies of Afghanistan have not been widely publicly discussed. The plan of Sustainable Development Goals still remains the matter of future. The author is sure that creation of such a plan has to be completed first and its implementation is done as well. The accomplishment of the Goal 16 targets and other SDG tasks will definitely help the state to overcome a present deep crisis.

An interesting anticorruption project was held in Kyiv "Corruption Park" [Corruption Park, 2018]. It is a project especially developed to inform a society about the drawbacks of the corruption and the effective ways of the corruption fight.

Conclusions

Afghanistan and Ukraine both suffer from corruption and other illegal power and finances connected activity. The corruption is spread on all levels of the social and political life of the states (road police, public administration, education of all levels, the legal system, military administration, top governmental authority etc.) Consequently, this corruption problem negatively impacts national economies and affects the general prosperity of a population

[Bazaluk, 2016; Bazaluk & Blazhevych, 2016].

In accordance with a mentioned above situation the following solutions for Afghanistan can be proposed as an attempt to solve the problem: a) reduce bureaucracy at all levels of public administration. All the administrative personnel have to be carefully selected by the specialized organizations with an assistance and consultation of international organizations; b) accept of international anticorruption aid programs as well as reform of the legislation that regulates financial flows; c) to create the conditions for cooperation with an Afghan society in order to change the perspective on the corruption and develop the civil society, using the educative technologies.

The Afghan corruption and anti-corruption struggle experience can be useful for Ukraine to avoid all negative drawbacks of postwar recovery. Ukraine is now higher in the international corruption ranks than Afghanistan, but paying no attention to the key experience of other countries can make the situation worse.

Fighting against corruption can provide a lot of advantages for the sustainable development of both Afghanistan and Ukraine. That is why both countries must focus all possible attention to resolve this crucial problem and obstacle to the prosperity.

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Dialectics of Nominal and Real Power in the Ukrainian and World Politics

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The philosophical problem of representation becomes of particular relevance in modern politics. Publicity and responsibility of the power for the effectiveness of its work creates a differentiation to the nominal and real power. There is a dual tendency: the subjects of real power delegate proxy to the representatives of the nominal power, trying to avoid publicity and responsibility. Representatives of the nominee power create an impression of the reality and effectiveness of the realization of power. The dialectic of nominal and real power in society is carried out by means of the formation of surrogate forms of government: democracy-monarchy, democracy-oligarchy, democracy-aristocracy; ductility in the work of state institutions and commercialized support by the creative class. To direct the contradictions of nominal and real power in a productive direction is possible by increasing the publicity and responsibility of the subjects of power.

Key Words: nominal power, real power, noumenal power, creative class, social freedom, democratic liberalism

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Introduction

Modern information society produces an increasing role of representative processes and phenomena. Widespread use in the humanities embodies the concept of simulation, or simulative

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reality. According to the philosophy of postmodernism, which accurately describes the state of socioculture precisely, modernity operates symbols of such order, which for its effective application do not require substantiation in reality. Hence, the representations are legitimized as a self-sufficient process that offends ontological essence. The fundamental metaphysical problem of essence and phenomenon has lost the preconditions of its relevance. This is a very comfortable position for the time of conformism. This convenience lies at the heart of manipulative practices that are widely used in all areas of modern life: from economics to art, from everyday practice to high politics. Simulative reality produces a gap in the ontological reality in many respects, and in politics too. This gap of reality and simulation in the political realm produces dialectic of nominal and real power.

Along with the simulation, modern conformism is characterized by an increasing role of communication. Indeed, modern communications technology greatly enhances the potential for impact on the general public. At the same time, communication technologies substantially change the boundaries of public and private. Therefore, the subjects of real power in society often seek to avoid excessive attention from the community. Increasing the scale of the information space, in turn, leads to the differentiation of real and nominal. The freedom of speech is also an important criterion for the life of a democratic society. Communication is both a way and a method of ensuring it. But freedom of speech has the purpose of transparency of the actions of the authorities and its relevant reporting to society. It is clear that the declared liberalism of the modern era exacerbates the eternal struggle of interests of both the subjects of power and the general public. In the conditions of information and communication freedom, the authorities, with the rest, are forced to play hide-and-seek with their own voters. This article is devoted to the study of the dialectics of real and nominal power in contemporary Ukrainian politics.

Theoretical and Methodological Basis of the Study

The phenomenon of power has a long history of research and analysis. Modern society produces new challenges and requests for feminization and mechanisms for the realization of power. As the organization of society is being pursued, there are also new forms of exercise of power, including political ones. The hierarchy of power relations, accumulated in social welfare through the power of the genus, the power of the nation, the power of the state, the power of civilization in the modern space of socioculture does not disappear and does not lose its relevance. However, the logic of the realization of power relations in modern society forms and covers qualitatively new problems and perspectives of the discourse of power.

There is a widespread differentiation of the phenomenon of power in modern research literature, considering the mechanism of its implementation. Thus, primary power is interpreted as physical coercion, implemented through a policy principle, or investment of one's own freedom and will in a supersonic integrity, community or state as a result of hopelessness. The personification of this invested capital of freedom and the will of the general public is a specific subject of power: the monarch, the feudal lord, or the leader. Such subordination is due to the power relations, therefore, the reality of the government is supported by its application, and the level of social tension is steadily high.

The next algorithm for the implementation of power relations is based on a functional or teleological principle. T. Parsons, one of the most prominent of his ideologues, convinced that power is the mobilization of resources for the purpose. This type of power subordination is

based no longer on the force of physical coercion, but on the basis of economic feasibility and effectiveness. Freedom is invested not in the person of the subject of power, but in a certain ideological basis, the idea of the values that determine and guide the course of life. Thus, there is a gradual discreteness of the phenomenon of power in society, and on the other — the formation and growth of an ontological gap between nominal and real power is taking place. Investments of freedom are no longer characterized by irreversibility, forced alienation. Therefore, the range of social discontent forms the leverage of influence on power. Accordingly, carriers of real power in society begin to delegate representative functions to other subjects of power, who have the opportunity to be responsible for certain defects in the work.

The modern day of the information society significantly complicates the hierarchy and structure of power relations. Therefore, the implicit topic of power research is inferior to the essentially. The discreteness of power is extrapolated into the “collective phenomenon of social consensus” (H. Arendt), the “spraying of power relations” (M. Foucault), the postmodern discourse of anonymous and irrational power, the totalitarian nature of power from the primitive society to modern democratic liberalism (A. Glucksmann), the real and the symbolic capital of power (P. Bourdieu). Consequently, at the present stage, the contradiction between real and nominal power is exacerbated.

The modern Ukrainian politician is going through terrifying transformations. Post-colonial development tendencies pose serious challenges to civil society and its management system. Therefore, Raisa Naumenko notes the following: “Thus, a real revolution is taking place in a global world, both in content, in methods, and in the forms of government. The destiny of the destroyer-revolutionaries who seek to change the modern Ukrainian state is sad. After all, they will have to start building a new one after they destroy the old one. However, they are not ready for such work” [Naumenko, 2018: 110]. Such a disposition is due, among other things, to the unstable post-colonial motivation of the power. Oleg Bazaluk and Denys Svyrydenko explain this imbalance by the metaphor of rhizomes: “The problem lies in the rhizome — in the plane of understanding of the difference between space-aggressors and space-victims, which include all the limitrophe states” [Bazaluk & Svyrydenko, 2018: 94]. The dialectic of will and coercion in the interpretation of the phenomenon of power often creates grounds for emotional assessments of political activity and the growth of social tension. Colin Hay and Gerry Stoker are explicit it so: “Contemporary political disaffection is not, we suggest, a story of the decline of civic virtue, nor is it a story of political apathy — it is one of disenchantment, even hatred, of politics and politicians” [Hay & Stoker, 2009: 226]. In addition, the question arises whether nominal power is capable of performing real functions? These authors say: “We think the government and political elites more generally (and not just in the UK) have failed fully to recognise the scale, depth and nature of the democratic political malaise we face” [Hay & Stoker, 2009: 227]. One of the daemons of modern democracy, or the most common form of abuse of power, is corruption. We are convinced that corruption should be considered as a consequence of the collision of nominal and real power. After all, “Democratization, where it has survived with any substance, has often been accompanied by spreading corruption, a decline in public order and an erosion of the administrative capacity and authority of the state” [White, 1998: 3]. The multi-vector of political activity to some extent disorients the subjects of power, necessarily reduces the effectiveness of their activities, and forms signs of political instability in public life. Such a situation makes it possible to verify certain tendencies in the discourse of power. Simon Susen thus defines the various trends in the exercise of power: “This tendency appears to suggest that it is possible to distinguish fundamental types of power in

binary terms. In this respect, the following conceptual oppositions are especially important: (1) ‘soft power’ vs. ‘hard power’, (2) ‘power to’ vs. ‘power over’, and (3) ‘power for’ vs. ‘power against’” [Susen, 2017: 22]. In addition to the above-mentioned multidirectional discourse of power in society there are upward trends in self-organization of citizens for the achievement of a common goal. So must a civil society, which is the goal of democratic liberalism. Therefore, it is fair to note Tiina Rättilä and Jarmo Rinne: “Like many other forms of new social movements and civic activism, resident activism operates outside formal political institutions and is motivated by the prospect of engaging in do-it-yourself (DIY) politics at the grassroots level” [Rättilä & Rinne, 2017: 1].

Mechanisms of Nominal and Real Power

The complication of the social structure in the course of historical development predetermines the extrapolation of the discourse of power to the extremely broad context of sociocultural. The social will of the era of primitive society and modern processes of globalization require different mechanisms for the implementation and legitimization of power. In place of physical coercion and economic dependence, manipulative practices are widely implemented. It is clear that manipulative practices are implemented against the background of a symbolic or semiotic space. Therefore, real power is forced to operate successfully with nominal meanings, reinforcing the impression of its own competence. The criterion of such competence in the eyes of society is the effectiveness and efficiency of the work of the power. That is why the leading politicians of our state seek to associate their name with persons and events that are positively perceived in general, but have nothing to do with the work of the political community. Numerous PR campaigns with outstanding athletes, prize-winners of the Olympiad and Paralympics, subject to the total lack of state support to physical education and sports institutions. Any achievement of our neighbors abroad, or recognition at the international level, is represented by the first persons of the state as a logical achievement of their laborious work. Consequently, success as a criterion for the work of power in the space of symbolic exchange greatly optimizes the dialectic of the nominal and real in the discourse of power. The representation of power as a nominal phenomenon in the era of the information society plays a significant role in the work of both the domestic and world politics. Therefore, the charisma of the leader becomes unimportant in contemporary politics, and leaders of the first countries of the world are becoming young and attractive figures like Justin Trudeau or Emanuel Macron.

The plasticity, networking and the location of the global context of politics in the dialectics of real and nominal power actualize the problem of predictive functions in the course of world history. A striking confirmation of this thesis is the conflict in the east of our country. Unrecognized republics, like their representative leaders, although taking part in the negotiation process on conflict resolution, do not actually have the authority to make and implement decisions. And the country-aggressor by all possible means tries to avoid nominating it as a party, or parties to the conflict. A reviewing the chronicle of the war in Syria, in which more than 70 thousand people have already died, comes the understanding that Ukraine saves exclusively geo-racial closeness to the countries-leaders of world politics and real participants of the conflict. In addition, the UN’s work at the present stage, which is not effective in resolving military conflicts, but simply helpless in solving the contradictions and challenges of the modern world, is indicative in the dialectic of real and nominal power.

Nominal and real power is differ from the point of view of representation and institutionality.

Nominating power acts as representing the interests of the community. That is why the charisma of the leader and the success, efficiency in the work of the nominal power is so important. However, real power is often not concentrated in the hands of official bodies of power, but belongs to certain institutions of statehood, such as the education system, or law enforcement agencies. Is it possible to carry out an illegal referendum on the territory's membership of a particular state, with the absence of support from the educational institutions where this event was held, or under the condition of a good work of the law-enforcement system in this area? It is hardly possible. Except this, there are numerous examples of illegal possession of someone's property during the political instability in Luhansk and Donetsk region during 2014-2018. The conclusion is obvious that institutions of statehood have a significant influence of real power in society. A nominal, representative political power is the governing, but derivative of the basic, fundamental level of the real power of state institutions.

Robert A. Dahl proposes a distinction between the discourse of power on the basis of "connection" (nominal, organizational, representative power) and "causa" (real, determinant, controlling form of government). Indeed, the declarative principles of political economy often do not correspond to the processes that are taking place in reality. Thus, democracy is the most widespread form of social organization in the modern world. However, given the specific conditions for the formation of statehood, the declarative principles of democracy are undergoing significant transformations, resulting in different forms of quasi-democracy. Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America – all these countries are democratic in the state system. However, do we have any reason to assert the identity or, at least, the similarity of these democracies? It is obvious that the practical mechanisms of the exercise of state power in these countries are significantly different. Declaratively proclaimed democracy in the Russian Federation in the last two decades demonstrates signs of a monarchical system. Therefore, in the Russian Federation, we observe a quasi-form of democracy-monarchy. Such tendencies can be traced, in particular, in the management technologies of other states of the former Soviet Union: Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and others. Or the militarized monarchist republic of North Korea clearly manifests the viability of such a quasi-form of government. An interesting nominative tendency of representing power in a totalitarian system is a demonstration of its perfection. Igor Samoylov explains it this way: "A totalitarian state has the intention to demonstrate its own perfection, and there are grounds for that. What can be more perfect than a logical and reasonable system where the government controls all aspects of the life of each individual, from birth, forms his personality, creating a "new man" for which the universal good of the state is the highest goal of existence, constructed in accordance with the ideal concept that arose in the minds of the authors of this social system and became a reality, totalitarianism is a sort of explication of the beginning of the scope of the ideal to the material world" [Samoylov , 2014: 177].

If we analyze the specifics of state power in Ukraine, then the existence of a democracy-oligarchy in our country is quite obvious. Nominee political power is delegated not by the people, by the general public, but by separate oligarchic structures. So, Oleg Bazaluk says: "The coming to power of Poroshenko and his inner circle did not change the membership of the Ukrainian ruling "elite" [Bazaluk & Svyrydenko, 2017: 221]. The basis of motivation in such a policy is the protection of business interests, not social justice and the stabilization of public life. Of course, Ukraine is not unique in its oligarchic democracy. The vast majority of South American countries have been fruitfully implementing similar principles of public administration.

Moreover, the developed forms of democracy of the advanced countries of the world, such as the USA, France, Germany, can hardly be called democracies in its pure form. Rather, it is certain forms of democracy-aristocracy, when real power is concentrated in the hands of political groups that have tradition, authority and weight of influence on public opinion and the course of social life. Thus, the gap between nominal and real power takes place in countries with different levels of development of democracy: “The change of the political leader and even the political regime in the state does not necessarily exert a significant influence on the will-power-will phenomenon.” Despite the changed conditions, the established structure of the power-will relations continues. The power elite of the society in every concrete case prove the conduit of this common will. The change of the imperious phenomenon always leads to a radical restructuring of the life of society, since the former social relations and connections are completely reconstructed” [Samoylov, 2014: 156]. Investigating the principles of legitimizing the oligarchic system of post-colonial states, Igor Samoilov comes to the following conclusions: “Since the oligarchy can exist only in the context of the recognition of the right of private property by the society, the will of the masses to possess even a small part of such property inevitably causes a social need to establish institutions that provide and protect this right, in particular, the state. And, at the same time, the “state of owners”, in which each individual is accorded principally equal rights to own property on various scales. It is beneficial primarily to the oligarchic ruling elite, because it receives the greatest benefit from such a social organization” [Samoylov, 2014: 174].

The real subjects of power and nominal representatives of power relations are presented individually in person. Steven Lukes justifies the contradiction between the “unchanging amount of power” in society, emphasizing the totality of the discourse of power; and the power of “short-term”, or domination of representative, nominal power. Events in the eastern part of Ukraine are also indicative in this regard. When in 2014 there was a threat to Ukrainian statehood in certain regions of Lugansk and Donetsk region, and then the governors in this area were appointed people who actually kept the full power in these regions: Igor Kolomoisky in the Dnipropetrovsk region, Sergey Taruta, person, close to Rinat Akhmetov in Donetsk. Such appointments were a clear signal that these figures were determined by a civic position and are ready to invest their own time, resources and personal responsibility for asserting Ukrainian statehood. These significant actions by the authorities caused the desired and expected impact on the situation at that time. After all, like the thermal motion of molecules, when some molecules collide with others, people are under the influence of their closest social environment [Samoylov, 2014: 141].

Consequently, the dynamics of power relations in society is carried out through the proletariat of real and nominal power. Such a disposition is conditioned by the internal mechanism of power, namely the tendency to act “Contrary to real interests and preventing possible discontent” [Lukes, 2018: 39]. Nominal power in society performs functions of scenery, or simulation space, under the cover of which the subjects of real power are able to carry out of power.

There is a reverse trend of influence. It is clear that real power needs nominal representation. However, nominal power, in turn, needs support from the real actors of power. In addition, this is not just about the election posts of political power. Igor Samoilov describes the functions of the creative stratum of society on the legitimization of subjects of real power: “Demonstrative, deliberate consumption, which is presented to the society as an “ideal” and the only true direction of will demonstrated by so-called “stars”, is manifested, among other

things, in the phenomenon of glamour. In turn, the creative class, being close to the real power, receives significant material preferences from it. The bright glare of glamour overshadows the real power, which, while remaining in the shadows, actually possesses both power and wealth” [Samoylov, 2014: 173]. And although creativity and art are the realms of spiritual production that accumulate true values. Yes, Galina Shevchenko stresses: “Culture and arts are the catalysts for appearance of excellent humans who have good souls, thoughts and deeds, who feel an urgent necessity to live in accordance with their conscience, to give people joy and happiness” [Shevchenko, 2017: 177]. However, in the age of conformism of art, as well as other cultural projects, it was not possible to avoid commercialization.

Conclusions

Simulation, or simulation of reality, causes a series of ontological ruptures. The conventional perception of things and phenomena does not guarantee the trustworthiness of knowledge. Extensive and virtuous manipulative practices are widely used in all spheres of modern life, and especially in politics. Therefore, analytics of the contradiction between nominal and real power in the modern information society becomes of special significance. Consequently, nominal power is a representative, public, electoral component of the modern political system. The real power is the political elites, or oligarchic clans, or individual personalities that usurp power beyond the legal field of the state. The distance between the nominal and the real power is determined by the publicity of democratic power, and hence its responsibility. Subjects of real power for obvious reasons seek to avoid both publicity and responsibility. This strategy allows them to hold power for a long time. The ways of legitimizing real power through the nominal are the following: the formation of quasi-forms of a democratic system, the institutionalization of statehood and the so-called “creative class”. Nominal democracy of some countries shows signs of opposing state structures: democracy-monarchy in Russia, democracy-oligarchy in Ukraine, aristocracy-democracy in the USA. The institutions of statehood are an intermediate link between nominal and real power. Thus, sabotage by the leaders of local power institutions makes it impossible to coordinate the work of centralized authorities. That is, the institutions of the state have the opportunity, in turn, to enter into object-object relations of manipulation by the authorities. The creative class also plays a significant role in the dialectic of nominal and real power, by popularizing those benefits that accompany real power.

Thus, the differentiation of power into nominal and real in the information society is a natural and inevitable phenomenon. Minimizing the risks of such differentiation is possible by increasing publicity and accountability of government actions.

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Correlation between Morality and Religion in Ukrainian Society: Productive Ideas in German Idealism for Modern Consideration

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Kant's and Hegel's ways to resolve the problem of correlation between the morality and religion at first glance seem to be opposite. Such opinion is evidenced by Hegel's statements in which he puts himself into the opposition to Kant and demonstrates his own theoretical and methodological superiority. Many scholars of German Idealism support such opinion. But in spite of such radical alternativeness, in author's opinion, it is possible to discover some mutual and non-contradicting positions of Kant and Hegel on the issue of correlation between the morality and religion.

The purpose of this article is a comparison of the Kant's and Hegel's ways to resolve the problem of correlation between the morality and religion in order to discover the moments of complementarity in these extremely alternative philosophical systems. The results of this inquiry can be fruitfully assembled and used by the modern Ukrainian political and social science for resolving of this problem within the modern Ukrainian society. To achieve this purpose, it is necessary: a) to analyze and compare the general methodology used by Kant and Hegel in their philosophical systems; b) to conduct a comparison of their doctrines on morality, religion, and their correlation; c) to carry out a research in order to discover how Kant's and Hegel's theoretical and practical models, as well as achieved conclusions, can be fruitfully applied in the modern comprehension of the problem of correlation between the morality and religion.

Key Words: Kant, Hegel, morality, religion, Ukraine, society, religious safety

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Introduction

The inquiry on productive potential of Kant's and Hegel's ethics and philosophy of religion requires a general outline of the present state and comprehension of these phenomena in the context of individual and a social being.

The correlation between morality and religion can be comprehended both at the individual (subjective) level and at the level of social consciousness. On an individual level, it is possible

to provide a didactic connection between religion and moral consciousness. Such didactic connection appears as the potential ability of the religious education and upbringing to form and improve the level of morality (in the meaning of the sense of inner duty) of an individual. At the social level, such an individual-didactic function of religion becomes a certain general opportunity for the increase of the general moral standard of society. The main difficulty of the didactic role of religion in the matter of development of both individual and social morality appears as the lack of a definite, universally valid criterion of Good and Evil. In modern Ukrainian society, there is still no certainty about common values. This situation is caused by the peculiarities of the post-totalitarian condition of modern Ukraine. The society rejected the previous socialistic-utopia ideals and their related individual and social aspirations. Some important issues on Ukrainian post-totalitarian rehabilitation are outlined by Sergii Rudenko in his paper. [Tytarenko & Rudenko, 2018]

In the new Ukrainian society religion is the extremely powerful force claiming to establish new ideals of moral perfection. Ukrainian society is currently experiencing an unprecedented surge of religiosity. The social aspiration to find moral benchmarks also explains the emergence and popularity of the latest non-orthodox religious communities that offer different ways of self-improvement. It's difficult not to get lost in such religious diversity. The individual must have a clear awareness of its own aspirations and be reflexive on all proposed ways of self-improvement.

Along with a surge of religiosity, there is also a growing mercantile-utilitarian attitude towards social problems. In such situation, the morality descent appears as inevitable. The traditional issues and problems of individual improvement remain beyond the aspirations of utility. This attitude to the world can be combined with religiosity. However, such religiosity cannot be considered as true. The motive of such religiosity is the Fear of God, and its goal is to obtain a profit, etc. Such moral situation and pseudo-religiosity, unfortunately, are the realities of the modern Ukrainian society. Gennadii Aliaiev in his writing on the religion's impact on culture development proposes some significant explanations on this problem [Aliaiev, 2016, 190-198]. In order to resolve this difficult situation, as well as other problems of the formation and development of Ukrainian society, it is necessary to revise the most significant intellectual heritage of the past. On the problem of morality, religion and their correlation, the important achievements were gained by Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.

Kant's and Hegel's methodological solutions for the inquiry of the problem of correlation between the morality and religion

One of the main reasons for the interpretation of Kant's and Hegel's doctrines as extremely alternative appears the methodology used by thinkers to resolve the basic philosophical problems. Let us overview and compare the methodology of both thinkers.

The first point of the Kantian approach to the consideration, analysis and solution of the problem of the correlation between morality and religion is an "aprioristic" interpretation of the human nature. "Aprioristic" approach appears as a peculiarity of his transcendental methodology. Kant states that the moral ability and the religious consciousness are the essential elements of human nature that are revealed by the study of the theoretical and practical application of the reason and the judgement.

The second crucial point is the proclamation of the duality of the world: the distinction between the "noumena" (the sphere of man's freedom (free causality) and the "phenomena"

(the sphere of the inevitability of the law of causality). As a result of the interpretation of morality and religiosity as the pre-experiential abilities of the human soul (the noumenal component), Kant proclaims them to be the conditions of such social phenomena as law and religion (phenomenal correspondences). The thinker, on the pages of his *Critiques* [Kant, 1998; Kant, 2015] and numerous letters as well, repeatedly noted that the main purpose of his philosophical inquiry is to answer the question “what is a human being?” [Kant, 1977, 205]. Such question represents Kant’s intention to conduct all his inquiries towards one purpose: to uncover the deep essentials of a human being by observation of their real-life manifestations: science, art, law, religion, etc. Due to such aims of his inquiry, Kant deliberately ignores the cultural-historical perspective of interpretation of mentioned phenomena in order to discover and explore all their conditions within the “human soul.” Such consideration of human being and cultural-historical process essentially distinguishes Kant’s and Hegel’s approaches to solving the problem of the correlation between morality and religion.

Essential peculiarities of the Hegelian approach to the morality and religion correlation are “historism”, the dialectical method and philosophical monism.

Unlike Kant, Hegel tries to build a chain of historical justifications for ability, reality or necessity of any phenomenon of history and culture. In his opinion, any randomness is random only at first glance. Historical research can prove the regularities that were previously not noticeable. One of the most important Hegelian philosophical discoveries is the total inconsistency of reality. Historical formation occurs due to constant struggle and interaction of contradictory elements.

The second peculiarity of Hegel’s research strategy is the monist philosophical approach, which reveals itself in the idea of spiritual nature of reality. Such interpretation of reality appears as the reason why some authoritative scholars consider Hegel’s system to be a “mystical pantheism.” The Spirit acts as the essential background of the world. It unites in itself the whole reality. All historical processes appear as the specification of the general scheme of “self-movement,” “self-revelation” of the “Absolute.” This process, the thinker calls the Spirit’s implementation of its own concept, the embodiment of the logical “Absolute Idea”. Hegelian philosophical monism gives a possibility to conduct a philosophical inquiry in the field of objective historical processes, casting the individual, subjective level aside. Hegel carries out his studies of morality, religion, and their correlation in the field of objective history. Mentioned peculiarity shows a distinction between his theoretical position and the Kant’s one.

Kant and Hegel on the correlation between morality and religion

Kant’s heritage on ethics and philosophy of religion demonstrates the relative sustainability of his research principles and positions in this field. On the contrary, Hegel’s philosophical creativity is extremely dynamic and changing. There are three more or less independent ways of Hegel’s consideration of morality, religion and their correlation: a) in early theological writings, b) in “Phenomenology of Spirit”, c) in the “Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences.” Such variety of ideas and evaluations makes difficult to compare Kant’s and Hegel’s philosophical conclusions. Nevertheless, it is necessary to compare Kant’s ethical doctrine with the above-mentioned variants of the Hegelian doctrine of morality and religion in order to make the corresponding theoretical generalizations.

Kant’s philosophy played an important role in the formation of Hegel’s philosophical position. The first philosophical steps that he carries on the pages of his early theological

works bear the obvious imprint of the Kantian perspective and methodology. His first theoretical receptions of Kant's ideas took place in the field of ethics and philosophy of religion. Hegel's ethical views, presented in his early writings, such as *Folk religion and Christianity* [Hegel, 1907, 1-72], *The Life of Jesus* [Hegel, 1907, 73-136], *Positivity of the Christian Religion* [Hegel, 1907, 137-240], almost completely coincide with the moral doctrine of Immanuel Kant. Hegel's philosophical position is so active and dynamic that even within this first period of his work there is no theoretical unity. Recent works of the early period, particularly the *The Spirit of Christianity* [Hegel, 1907, 241-342], indicate Hegel's gradual theoretical break with Kant and shift to opposition to his moral philosophy. Hegel does not come along with the deontological and transcendental basics of Kant's ethics. He considers it to be the representation of the "spirit of Jewish slave religiosity." In contrast, he proposes the New Testament's concept of love, which overcomes the contradiction between the "tendency" and the "law." External law-abide and authority, which Kant formally does not accept, in fact, now act from inside as the principles of his "categorical imperative." However, whether the authority and law-abide are external or internal, their essence does not change. Therefore, in Hegel's opinion, Kant's ethical doctrine holds a contradiction and the morality requires a fundamental theoretical reconsideration. The principle of this new Hegel's theoretical approach is the accentuation of the historical context of the study of philosophical problems, or in terms of "Phenomenology of Spirit", is the necessity to evaluate the result only with its development. "Nor is the result which is reached the actual whole itself; rather, the whole is the result together with the way the result comes to be." [Hegel, 1979, 4]

Correlation between the morality and religion in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, it still close to the Kantian. Hegel, conducting his inquiries on the historical level, still remains partly at the level of the problems of subjective awareness of own belonging to total absolute. That is why in *Phenomenology of Spirit* the thinker highlights the connection of subjective morality and objective religiousness. Moral consciousness still remains in the role of a "guide to religion." The central concept of moral doctrine is "duty", the dialectical development of which, gradually pushes the self-consciousness to the idea of God as the eternal perfect moral legislator. Morality and duty (its essential basis, which conciliates the relativity of sensual tendencies and necessity of moral obligation) appear as the essential conditions of self-consciousness's consideration of its own spirituality and divinity and the same consideration about the entire Universe. In *Phenomenology of Spirit*, morality appears as a transitional link from alienated spirituality in determinate-being-as-such up to the "sublation" of this alienation in the absolute comprehension.

Such a model of the correlation between morality and religion in terms of content is very close to Kantian. However, Kant's and Hegel's models are not equal. In Kant's opinion, the moral consciousness is the basis of religious consciousness and leads to the idea of a God. Nevertheless, the question of the final justification of the "Practical Reason" postulates (which are the conditions of possibility of morality) still remains open. That is because Kant clearly realizes the impossibility of its rational resolve without carrying out the pure rational speculations (that have nothing in common with the reality). Kant considers such essential postulates of morality as the subjects of "Rational Belief." By doing this he demonstrates his agnostic position on this issue. Hegel, by contrast, proclaims the possibility of knowledge of God. Moral and religious consciousness in these terms appears as the necessary stages of such knowledge. Such totally-cognitive position of Hegel appears more optimistic that Kant's one.

At the same time, Kant in the matter of justification of morality, religion and their correlation seems to be more realistic. The reason for such realism is the following: Hegel touched upon the questions of the “philosophical abyss” by proclaiming the knowledge of God, but did not overcome Kant system, as he believed. His methodology could be called a radical metaphysical turn, rehabilitation of the pre-Kantian, dogmatic method of metaphysical speculation, which still holds antinomies, pointed out by Kant.

Alternativeness of Kant’s and Hegel’s positions is evident. However, at the same time, it becomes clear that they both, in all their greatness, remain unilateral. It seems impossible to re-conciliate their positions. But in this case, it seems suitable to mention the lines, written by Leo Shestov that there are such philosophical questions which are risky to answer because the answer might kill the question. Enough contribution to the history of philosophy would be the fact of asking of such questions itself. The contradiction between Kant and Hegel cannot be solved without standing on a particular position. Nevertheless, their attempts to solve the problem of prove of the possibility of God’s existence is highly crucial for the history of philosophy as well as Kant’s doctrine of antinomies, deontological ethics, the Hegelian principle of identity between “thinking and being” and his dialectics.

Hegel’s concept of the correlation between morality and religion within the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* [Hegel, 2010] fundamentally differs from the Kant’s model of it. *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* represents his fully formed, historical and objective point of view on morality and religion, and the general transformation of his earlier theoretical positions. Hegel’s concepts of morality as a personal form of realization of the absolute and religion as self-revelation of Spirit did not transform much in comparison with *Phenomenology of Spirit*. However, his perspective on the correlation between these two phenomena altered essentially.

Kant’s and Hegel’s positions, if considered separately, reveal a certain unilateralism. Kant proved himself as an outstanding philosophical anthropologist and skilful analyst of human subjectivity. He carried out a fundamental study on morality and religion considering them as grounded in the human soul. Hegel developed the dialectic method, justified and observed the principles of deployment of the world objectively-historical and cultural reality, and provided a comprehensive assessment of the Man as the social and historical being. He considered morality and religion as the necessary stages of development of the social consciousness. He propounded the doctrine of “ethical life”, as a form of human relations regulation that overcomes the controversy of morality and law themselves. Theoretical combination of productive achievements of both approaches allows him to carry out the complete philosophical evaluation of morality, religion and their correlation.

Conclusions

Several key theoretical ideas of Kant and Hegel, which can be used productively in the modern solution of the problem of correlation between morality and religion, can be consequently pointed out.

Kant’s consideration of religion as “bridge” between the ideal of morality (which is possible only in a noumena world) and everyday life of a person (phenomena world) becomes relevant today. The thinker emphasizes that religion, along with the law (legality), most appropriately implement the idea of moral perfection in the phenomenal world. Presently due to a deficit of morality and the permanent search for the ways to conserve, develop and strength it, the Kant’s

consideration of religion as a medium between morality and the phenomenal world is worth to be heard.

We must outline another presently important Kant's idea. He mentioned that it is impossible to uncover the essence of humanity ("human nature") without the consideration and thorough study of the ability to believe. Kant emphasizes the ontological status of mentioned ability (in other words — religiosity) within the human soul. The evidence for such statement seems to be the general historical process. Despite all the historical theoretical and practical attempts to prove the inability of religious consciousness and worldview and eventually to destroy it, the phenomenon of religion still exists and plays an important role in the moral education and preservation of morality.

In addition, finally, the Kant's emphasis on the problems of religion and their irreconcilability to church-religion worth attention in general. The necessity for consideration and study of this experience is caused by the present Ukrainian's tendency of non-reflexive religious worship (rituals, symbols etc.)

Hegel's theoretical model of correlation between morality and religion delivers following relevant concepts. The distinction between the "positive" and "subjective" religion; consideration of phenomenon of the "folk religion"; the distinction between morality and "ethical life", which enable historical analysis of the correlation between morality and religion.

The distinction between "positive" and "subjective" religion emphasizes the necessity of a reflexive attitude to the idea of religion and its embodiment. By this statement, Hegel demonstrates his theoretical closeness to Kant's positions, continuing his critique of non-reflexive external liturgical religiosity.

The early Hegel's idea of "folk religion" is one of the most successful assertions in the history of philosophy for theoretical fundamentals of national self-identity. Such an idea presently can be used for Ukrainian national and political self-identification.

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“Scientific Communism” and the Modern Political Science in Ukraine

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The article is devoted to the topic, which for the current generation of both Western and post-Soviet political science communities seems to be “Terra incognita.”

It delivers the detailed analysis of conditions and key determinants of the foundation of such representative for Soviet ideology study course as “scientific communism.” The author also takes into consideration the motivation of the Soviet ruling class (CPSU) and scientific authority of USSR. Article attempts to reveal several following issues on “scientific communism”: a) its theoretical and ideological essence as a meta-narrative in the socialistic countries; b) peculiarities of foundation, functioning, ideological, theoretical and methodological support of the system of professional training in the field of scientific communism in the Soviet Union and the Taras Shevchenko University of Kyiv in the period of the 60’s — 80’s.

Key Words: “scientific communism”, social science, political science, USSR, ideology, Ukrainian policy.

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Issues on foundation and development of “scientific communism” in Soviet times

For deep and adequate understanding of the causes of the appearance of such a direction in social science as “scientific communism” and understanding the motivation of its appearance as a compulsory discipline in the system of higher education of the USSR and Ukraine, some significant points must be outlined.

The first. The foundation of a separate study course “Scientific Communism” in higher education structure of the USSR is usually associated with the “Khrushchev thaw” in the early 60’s. Namely, it reflected the necessity, on the one hand, to overcome the major disadvantages in the teaching of the fundamentals of philosophy, history of the CPSU, socio-political knowledge, which usually had a low professional level. On the other hand, it was founded as the response to some crucial tasks, which were following:

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- a) Training of skilled personnel for science and culture;
- b) Formation of Marxist-Leninist worldview and high civilian qualities among the population and especially young people;
- c) Modernization of ideology, its reproduction and dissemination mechanisms under the conditions of confrontation with the “Maoist challenge” of the People’s Republic of China, confrontation with the leading countries of the West, a sharp rise of the anti-colonial and national liberation movement (revolutions) in Asian countries, Africa, Latin America;
- d) Ideological confrontation and argued, ideologically and theoretically grounded critique of “revisionism”, “nationalism”, “anti-radicalism.”

Development and implementation of “scientific communism” as a basic component of the Soviet social science usually associated with Nikita Khrushchev and Mikhail Suslov, as well as with the activity of new generation of philosophers, historians and sociologists Yuriy Francev, Michail Rutkevich, Alexander Kovalov, Peter Fedoseev and Aleksey Rumyantsev. In mentioned scholars opinion, “scientific communism” was equal to the theory of changes in socialist society, social science without sociological factology, but with the forecast of the near future. This, in their opinion, was what we needed to know about Soviet society to participate in its final transformation into a communist one.

To understand the reasons of the emergence of “scientific communism” and why it became compulsory discipline, its necessary to take into account that in the early 60’s “the request for political science in the Soviet Union used to come “from above”, namely from individuals closely connected with the practice of politics (interests of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, ideas and convictions of young scientists and initiative advisers of the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU and prominent political scientists such as Georgiy Shakhnazarov or Fedor Burlatsky, who took part in the preparation of a Communist party program of 1961). Scientific communism was considered to be a science that can make a “radical change in the state social and political life,” and alter the dictatorial, totalitarian state “of the Stalin era into a” modern civilized, democratic” [Vorobyov, 2004: 170].

Some Western and Russian scholars consider Mykola Suslov’s speech at the All-Union Meeting of Heads of the Departments of Social Sciences on January 30, 1962, to be the initial administrative impulse in the process of the emergence of “scientific communism.” The following statement was proclaimed in this speech: “...the Ministry of Higher Education the institutes of the Academy of Sciences, (philosophy, history, economics), Academy of social sciences under the Central Committee of the CPSU, with the involvement of the departments, is now must be practically engaged in preparation for teaching in the higher educational institutions the course of scientific communism” [Sochnev, 2015].

The final administrative step for implementing of the study course “Scientific Communism” was the order of the Ministry of education on June 27, 1963: “Introduction to higher educational institutions in the USSR the course of fundamentals of scientific communism.” Seventy study hours were planed on this study course in the curriculum.

The second. Despite the commonly spread opinion about totalitarianism of the Soviet system of governance and its political regime, the omnipotence of party structures it would be erroneous to believe that the discipline of “scientific communism” easily, without problems “entered into” the system of higher education and has rapidly gained institutional support for the implementation of its teaching at the philosophical faculties. In fact, during the first years after the introduction of the course as a mandatory discipline, “there was in a volatile situation,

even the possibility of its abolition was discussed.” “The study course was eventually approved and fixed after 1967.” Mentioned fact is evidenced by the decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU “On Measures for the Further Development of Social Sciences and Increasing Their Role in Further Communistic Construction” (1967), which in fact approved in the system of higher education the teaching of the course on “Fundamentals of Scientific Communism.” [Sochnev, 2015].

The third. In Soviet times, the structure of Marxist social science was often explained by quoting the Lenin’s works. Especially the works “Karl Marx” and “The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism” [Lenin, 1977: 21-28], where Lenin formulated the ideological and theoretical origins and basic elements of the Marxist doctrine on the world-historical process, social life and expressed ideas for its further development and conceptual arrangement. And in fact, such a model of the theoretical triad through the introduction and development of “scientific communism” was finally formatted in the middle of 60-ties. I propose to consider a semantic explanation on this issue in one of the guides of the period of “perestroika”:

Marxism-Leninism is a coherent system of ideas and philosophical, economic and socio-political views, that reflect the objective regulations of the development of the world and serves as an effective spiritual weapon of the revolutionary transformation of social life on Communist principles. According to this, it includes three closely interrelated parts, which are: dialectical and historical materialism, Marxist-Leninist political economy and “scientific communism” [Tadevosian, 1986, 12-13].

The fourth. As noted above, “scientific communism” served as a “matrix”, namely, the source and systematic meta-model of social and socio-political cognition. That happened because, firstly, on the basis of the general course or “scientific communism” several separate thematic blocks were formed, and secondly, this study course and research field became a meta-narrative in the Soviet Union and some other countries of the “Communist bloc” (mainly — DDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria).

As it is known, scientific communism is not just a paradigm or the only correct theoretical model, but is a concept that “is claiming universality, domination in culture and “legitimizing” the knowledge, various social institutions, a certain way of thinking, as well as ideology, which imposes a complex of ideas on society and culture, limiting, organizing, controlling and violating a personality” [Korotchenko, 2001, 459].

The fifth. The first (“scientific communism”) stage of the political research formation and its methodology manifests itself by the fact that the curriculum was completely determined centrally, unified and standardized. Mentioned standardization was provided by the Ministry of education of the USSR (under the supervision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party) and implemented by the local administrative institutions in order to disseminate the orthodox principles of Marxist philosophy. Undoubtedly, all this significantly influenced the training of professionals in the field of social and political science.

Since 60’s — to the middle of 80’s only normatively-approved, authorized by the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Special Education of the USSR Russian textbooks were published and duplicated. The authors of this textbooks were academicians of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Such textbooks were often translated into the languages of the main Soviet republics or of the countries of the socialist community.

The most striking example is the textbook “Scientific Communism” edited by academician Peter Fedoseev (academician, Director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism at the Central Committee of CPSU), which obtained the leading position for more than twenty years.

The general tendency in the publishing of social-political literature showed the fact that most of the authors who were able to contribute to the textbooks composition were not allowed to do this until 70’s and even later up to “perestroika” period. The process of the scientific communism textbooks preparation and publication ceased at the 1990-1991 because of the USSR collapse (the collapse of the Soviet economic and political systems (“developed socialism”), constitutional changes (abolition of the 6th article of the Constitution of the USSR), which, in total, were deprived of the CPSU monopoly to “possess state power”, deprived the indisputable status of being “the governing and steering force” in the country and being a judge of all ideological and ideological issues. Under such conditions, the study course “Scientific Communism” was canceled, and replaced firstly by the courses “Political science”, “History of political doctrines”, “The modern theory of socialism,” “Political sociology,” “History of socio-political ideas,” “Theory of the world political process,” “Politics and ideology,” “Political processes and institutions”), and then by a single, standardized course “Political science.”

The sixth. The personnel of the philosophical faculties in the period of 60’s — early 80’s of the did not have the officially approved possibility to make adjustments to the structure, teaching and methodological support of the educational process, to the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the problems of theory and practice of political life and to the interpretation of various aspects of the functioning and development of social systems (first of all, socialist and capitalist).

For example, there are several works’ titles that would serve as auxiliary (with the exception of works of meters on the history of foreign philosophy) literature for teachers and future professionals in social science problems or scientific communism: *Criticism of the ideological foundations of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism* by V. Evdokimenko (Kyiv, 1967); *Political American Sociology: Essays* by A. Dmitriev (Leningrad, 1971); *Criticism of modern bourgeois philosophy. Tutorial* (Moscow, 1973); *Modern Revolutionary Movement and Nationalism* Edited by V. Zagladina and F. Ryzhenko (Moscow, 1973); *Criticism of Modern Bourgeois Concepts in the Course of Scientific Communism* Edited by A. Sheptulina, V. Aleksandrova, N. Dryakhlov, E. Troitsky. *Guide for teachers* (Moscow, 1974); *Criticism of the bourgeois theories of convergence of capitalism and socialism* (Kyiv, 1974); *Non-Marxist conceptions and socialism struggle for a social progress in African and Asian countries* by E. Troickij (Moscow, 1974); *Criticism on bourgeois falsification of the national policy of USSR* (Moscow, 1974); etc.

The structure and peculiarities of “scientific communism” studies

In addition to the mentioned above information, some following statements must be outlined.

1) The general amount of translated literature on political sciences, social and political philosophy, theoretical sociology, and even the world history constituted a small percentage of libraries of different levels of subordination.

2) Most of topics, problems and issues that are now traditionally related to the course on political science were taught within the framework of the “Philosophy” course. Philosophy

was a compulsory course for the whole system of higher education of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR (all faculties of higher education, and for a long time and specialized secondary institutions of the country) and consisted of two parts. The second one was called “Historical Materialism” (in fact — it is the Marxist version of “social philosophy” in addition with the conceptual elements of the theory of politics, philosophy of history, political philosophy).

3) The quantity of state publishing houses which had a social science specialization was extremely limited. At the same time, there were no private publishing houses at all. In Soviet times, the number of scientific journals specialized on philosophy or social science was insufficient to meet the needs.

4) Appropriate evaluation of essence and social role of “scientific communism” course requires a consideration of several key issues.

One of the most important issues is that “scientific communism” was not similar to the Western standard of political sciences. The studies on “scientific communism” and the similar study course were significantly wider than any western theory of politics or universal political theory.

The second of the two above-mentioned strategies for the development of political science (“scientific communism”) in the USSR was implemented, mainly through the system of higher education. Especially for this purpose, additional departments were founded on the philosophical faculties and the institutes of philosophy.

A clear indication of the wideness of the subject field of “scientific communism” is the structure of the course reflected in the curriculum.

The typical scientific communism course consisted of four general sections.

The first section was devoted to: a) theoretical and methodological issues of the course (subject, place in the system of sciences, methods of cognition); b) the history of social and political thought (pre-Marxist “utopian” socialist doctrines, theoretical sociopolitical views of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Leninist stage in the development of socialist and communist ideas and project guidelines for their implementation).

The second section was devoted to a) the overview of the problems of the “socialist revolution theory”; b) the analysis of the present condition of the social revolution; c) the historical logic of formation of the global socialist system and the main contradictions and the causes (economic, social, political, ideological and spiritual) of the crisis of the global capitalism; d) the roles of the revolutionary workers and national liberation movement; e) comprehension of the problems of war and peace.

The third section was focused on the careful consideration and study of the Soviet Marxist-Leninist variant of communism — various aspects of theory and practice.

The fourth section proposed the consideration of Marxist-Leninist theory, with substantial ideological additions of ideas and views of the ruling party on the ideal of the future non-state condition of humanity — namely — Communism. According to party doctrine, it seemed that the Soviet society, the Communist Party and the people have already entered the communist era. The chronological lower boundary of the fourth section was defined as the stage “developed socialism.” The content of this section (manuals, curricula and plans), its topics and the questions, ideas, categorical and conceptual apparatus were completely detached from the reality and ideological. As a result, ideas, which contained the ideological prejudices, were taught by scientific communism teachers were often rejected by citizens and caused unbreakable irony of scholars, colleagues-teachers of humanities and students.

“Scientific communism” and philosophy

The study on the specialization “scientific communism” required a fundamental philosophical education. The system demanded from students an obligatory mastering of philosophical knowledge standardized due to the standards of higher specialized education of the USSR. They were also obliged to carry on an educational, scientific and research activities. The list of study courses in the curriculum for scientific communism was quite similar to the curriculum of philosophy. Here is a list of study courses of “scientific communism” in Taras Shevchenko State University of Kyiv 1988. “The History of Philosophy” (foreign, nations of the USSR, Marxist-Leninist), “Dialectical Materialism,” “Historical Materialism,” “History and Theory of Atheism,” “Ethics,” “Aesthetics,” “Psychology,” “Pedagogy of higher education,” “Statistics,” “Soviet law,” “Foreign language,” “Political economy,” “National economic planning,” “World History,” “Methodology and technique of sociological research.” In addition, the standards of professional education required a completion of “sociological” and “pedagogical” practices, writing and defense of the three course papers (4th, 6th and 8th semesters), and a final thesis, the compilation of two state exams on such subjects as “Marxism-Leninism and “scientific communism.”

The history of political science education in a period of the 70’s-80’s shows that despite the numerous problems, the informational “iron curtain” and ideological prejudgments, scholars who were interested in independent and objective political scientific information had a chance to get it. Traditions of “scientific communism” widely influenced the teaching and research methods in the field of humanities. All social and political sciences were under ideological control and pressure. A lot of information on totalitarian heritage impact on the contemporary condition of those sciences can be found in recent scholarly publications [Fatkhutdinova, 2015; Gomilko et al., 2016; Yosypenko, 2018]. Such impact on the history of philosophy was well described in the paper by Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv Vadym Tytarenko and Sergii Rudenko. “The Soviet ideology expansion over Ukrainian intellectual culture caused fundamental changes in the topics and the way of providing of philosophical inquiries and research within all subfields of philosophy. The variety of topics and methods of philosophical research was reduced to Marxist-linked topics and Marxist-Leninist dialectics. Aim and scope of any philosophical research were strictly determined by a general communist party strategy of social development. Moreover, one of the fundamental intentions of the Soviet totalitarian science and philosophy was to destroy a national authenticity and cultural distinction of USSR members and its research in Humanities. Consequently, History of philosophy was not an exception” [Tytarenko & Rudenko, 2018: 109].

The institution that made in the Soviet Union possible to get the latest and high-quality information in the field of all social and political sciences (philosophy, sociology, cultural studies, law, economics, global and regional problems) was the Institute for scientific information on Social Sciences (INION). The highly skilled staff of the institute published abstracts and analytical publications, informational reviews, etc., in which in detail, without bills were covered articles materials or monographs by Western authors.

Nowadays Ukrainian political science is being modernized due to the present strategies for higher education modernization. Denys Svyrydenko basically outlined this strategy in his recent writing. The necessity of such modernizing changes is caused by the modern calls. “The main goal of this process is to transform higher education institutions to make them adequate to the modern stage of social development. The result of this modernization should be a new

form of institutional organization and updated education content at the universities which current state is described as critical” [Svyrydenko, 2014: 259]. Many reforms are already done, nevertheless, there is still a lot to do.

Conclusions

Analysis of the implementation of “scientific communism” study course in USSR that was initiated by the supreme party leaders revealed that its content components became intensively diffused during “perestroika,” particularly on philosophical departments of leading universities. Within the framework of the same standardized program of training the diversity of meanings, ideological pluralism in the interpretation of problems and concepts has intensively raised. First and foremost, through reinterpretation and substitution of Marxist-Leninist dogmas and ideological prescriptions by the ideas, precepts and theoretical constructs propounded by the European and American political science communities.

Such modernization or rather radical reform became an incentive and constructed a bridge in order to fill the gap between the Soviet theoretical and ideological matrix of “scientific communism” and Western, democratically oriented models of knowledge on political processes and phenomena.

Thus, in the history of the theoretical and empirical political studies, a unique tendency emerged: refuse to take a long journey full of own “trials and errors” and throughout several years structurally format a self-sufficient “science on politics.”

Such a modernization of political research, as well as the reorganization of the professional training system, has caused a sharp improvement in the quality and effectiveness of study on political processes and phenomena.

The ideological liberation of political studies (including the education system) provided conditions in each of the post-Soviet countries for the further development of the traditions of their national political science schools. Scientists and real policymakers have become able to provide the following activity: a) analyze and assess the contradictions of their national and world political history; b) to identify the most urgent problems, goals and objectives of the strategy for reforming the economic, political, legal and, especially, state institutions of the socialistic era; c) to understand the trends and prospects for transformations of the world order at regional and global levels.

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Is a New Generation of Managers Likely to Come to Small Towns of Ukraine? (An interview with Mykola Liashenko)

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There are about 350 small towns in Ukraine what makes around ¼ of the total number of towns. Small towns comprise approximately 13% of the Ukrainian population, with about 20 million citizens related to them. Small towns are divided by districts and regions almost equally — 61-75 of small towns, or 17,4-21,4% of the total number of towns. The greatest number of small towns are located in the regions of Lviv — 39, Donetsk — 35, Luhansk — 26, Kyiv — 19, Ternopil — 17 and Vinnytsia — 17 small towns.

The decentralization reform has opened to Ukrainian small towns new opportunities and development prospects. Today, to realize these opportunities small towns badly need a new generation of managers capable of unlocking their political, economic, social and cultural potential. Yet, do young Ukrainian managers, politicians and public leaders want to work in small towns of our country? The answers to these questions are given by Mykola Liashenko, a public deputy of Kyiv regional council (VII convocation) in an interview to Sergii Rudenko.

Key Words: Ukrainian small towns, decentralization reform, manager, Ukrainian political elite, new generation.

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Dear Mr. Liashenko, first of all, we would like to know your opinion as an experienced specialist and practicing manager concerning the future of small towns of Ukraine and the key problems of their current development. It is the small towns that are peculiar “indicators” of country’s development and the life level of its citizens.

No doubt, it is the small towns that are peculiar “indicators” of country’s development and the life level of its citizens. Therefore, the developed social infrastructure, available pre-school educational institutions, schools, medical institutions and the rest of communication transportation infrastructure give a citizen an opportunity to comfortably provide for his or her vitally important needs. A person who is not overloaded with family life problems feels freer, has wider opportunities, more space time to be spent for positive emotions. This makes him feel happy and feel a part of society and state.

Very unfortunately, small towns do not have sufficient managerial power. A great misbalance of responsibilities and opportunities, imperfect legislation as to realization of managerial decisions at local level has a negative impact on a community’s development.

In fact, a small town has its own government body, with a state district administration controlling a number of social objects and public utility companies. There are cases when such a town also has communal property objects and enterprises of regional importance that cover the citizens’ needs but are not controlled by local self-government bodies. All the Soviet past superstructures complicate the processes of taking necessary managerial decisions and using budget funds. For example, a town of Vyshneve, Kyievo-Svyatoshyn district, Kyiv region, has been constructing the second building of general secondary school No 1 for twelve years. The school is controlled by the Kyievo-Svyatoshyn district state administration that passed the employer’s functions to Kyiv regional administration. The bureaucratic red-tape, in particular sessions of the local council, the district council, the region council, signing three-level order documents and the purchase procedure cause the inefficient use of funds and a delay in building of this socially important object. And this is only a small example.

Inefficient use of budget funds and corruption hamper the small town development. According to the 2017 statistics of Ukraine’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, there were brought to administrative account for corruption offences 332 local self-government officials. There were started criminal proceedings against 124 local self-government officials. The amount of damage to the state and the territorial community according to completed criminal proceedings makes 14833248207 hrn., of which 249566639 hrn. was reimbursed [Zvit, 2017; Bazaluk, 2017]

Creation of united territorial communities (UTC) is aimed at leaving more funds at local level, as well as receiving additional budget transfers. At the same time, this involves taking a responsibility of supporting the local infrastructure. Irrational use of local natural resources and mineral resources in particular, receiving lower rent payment for their use and illegal mining cause receiving lower local budget funds which could be used for further development.

There is lack of financial resources and a complicated order of engaging credit funds for development of local economics and infrastructure. Though the opening of credit resource involves risks, attracting additional funds, with actual deficiency of investment inside the country and investments from abroad, could improve the economic situation in small towns, if the funds are directed to development of the real economic sector, improvement of management quality, tourism and power engineering growth. Money return is guaranteed by tax receipts and funds from realized projects.

Small towns have low-developed water supply and drainage systems, as well as heat- and power supply systems. Low-developed is the social and cultural base — lack of recreations, such as cinemas, theatres, museums, trade and entertainment centres, lack of sport and other clubs providing opportunities for young people's development. Instead, there is club culture which does not always have a positive impact on health and development of social relations of the youth.

Small towns have almost no job places for highly-qualified specialists. Attempts to create technological parks could give a positive result, if there are funds and desire of local authorities to launch a project.

We should not forget about labour emigration. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, about 5 mln. Ukrainians are working abroad [Za kordonom, 2017]. The survey by the Research & Branding Group in February, 2017, has shown that emigrating for work more often were 30-39-aged men than women, rural citizens and west-Ukrainian citizens. Labour emigrants were more frequently at the age of 18-39. Much more frequent emigrants were people from central and western regions than those of eastern and southern regions. In the near time, 14% of Ukrainians are planning to leave abroad, of which 11% are going to come back, whereas 3% are going there for permanent residence. Around 80% of Ukrainian citizens are not planning to go abroad in the nearest future. We should take into account that 18-30-year-old young people are potential labour emigrants [Ukraintsy, 2018].

Small towns have a number of advantages. They are a controlled pace of life, closeness to nature, potential green tourism, better ecology, opportunities for alternative power source development, possible funds attraction to agriculture since there is free land in suburban area. The use of these advantages can help small towns to partially solve their problems.

Statistically, every fourth citizen of the Earth lives in a million-plus city. According to experts' prognoses, at the end of the 21st century more than 80% of our planet's population will live in large cities. By the year 2030 the Earth will have got around 40 city agglomerations, with more than 10 mln. people each [Serhiyenko, 2017].

What managers do Ukrainian small towns of today need, what competences are they to have?

With extended rights and obligations, a local self-government authority does no longer need a statistician, a party careerist manager. Small towns call for a new manager meeting the criteria of today, not only for a young-aged manager, but for a manager having new world outlook, new views on development of modern society and community. At the same time, he or she should be a diplomat, a financier and a business executive, able to manage the community's resources and to attract and use outside opportunities.

A manager is to have the following competences and qualities:

- a) Managerial work experience, at public service, and experience of attracting servants competent in business and project management, legal education, competence in regulatory and legal acts and mechanisms of their adoption to be able to follow the "letter of the law";
- b) Political and economic competence enabling to understand better the economic situation and political arrangements, since social and economic transformations require not only wish but political will as well;
- c) Knowledge of finance and budget business, budget code in particular. A manager will administer the town's funds and is required to be able to set priorities and balance

- the resources available. He or she should understand that without supporting the local business, revising the production, developing and facilitating innovations, it will be impossible to increase town's tax receipts;
- d) A good command of the national language;
 - e) Basic knowledge and skills in psychology. Working with people requires searching for ways of dealing with them. However, a manager should not be just a psychologist, but also a diplomat, able to accommodate the confronting parties and find a compromise, to hold negotiations as well;
 - f) Image of a manager and a public servant as a whole, what is very important in conditions of Ukraine's EU integration. A manager of today is not only a specialist but a man of wide horizon, a man of high moral and business qualities;
 - g) Knowledge of etiquette, which will help to behave with dignity, both in negotiations and in everyday life.

The above features should be added with such important factors as ability to take decisions and be responsible for them. And, what may be the most important, to be able to gather a team and consolidate it around himself. Not always one person can have all perfect skills, but it means that he or she should be at least good at them. Here one needs a team of experts.

Is there a candidates' pool of managers in small town communities, taking into account the fact that talented young people prefer for their own development the capital city and large cities of Ukraine?

Yes, there is a very big problem of not only candidates' pool but of human resources in general. Young people able to take responsibility migrate not only to the capital and million-plus cities but also abroad. The young who need changes and local accommodation improvements right now, naturally strive for the best. Talented, spirited and communicable young people leave towns what has a negative impact not only on communities' development but also on formation of public opinion and the state.

According to the Central Civil Service, as of January, 1, 2001, there were under 30-year-old male civil servants, including local self-government authorities — 18,4 %, female civil servants — 24,5 %. In his monograph “The Staff in Regions of Ukraine: Formation and Development”, Vitaliy Oluyko noted that females under the age of 30 make only 26 % of district and 20,9 % of regional state administrations, 17,6 % of females work in local self-government bodies and 25,5 % of them work in territorial bodies of ministries and departments. As of January, 1, 2000, out of 244268 civil servants (not including law enforcement agencies and tax administrations) only 54452 were civil servants [Oluyko, 2001].

According to the Central Civil Service of Ukraine, in early 2004 young people in state authorities made around a quarter of their total number [Plakhotnyuk, 2005].

According to the Central Electoral Commission, after the 2015 regular local elections, following the Revolution of Dignity, the posts of chief executives in towns, settlements and villages were held by young people under 20 years old — 0,01%, aged 21-30 — 4,96%, aged 31-40 — 15,19%, aged 41-50 — 38,04 %, aged 51-60 — 37,08%, aged 61-80 — 4,68%. As we can see, the main part of them are people from 40 to 60 years old, while young and middle-aged people under 40 make 20,15%, which means that local authorities have not become younger [Tsentralna, 2015]. Our country currently needs people with new world outlook, people who are not afraid of new things, since it is very important in our dynamic world —

what was significant yesterday may become history today [Rudenko et al., 2018]. As it can be seen, there is local staff available, but the age disproportion is evident: young managers under 40 think differently if compared to the elder generation. As to the young people under 30 years old, they are a new generation, the future of the Ukrainian political elite. They were born and grew in the independent Ukraine; they went through a number of economic, social and political shocks. Those who apply for government authorities realise that they are the future of the state and the nation as a whole. As time passes, the Ukrainian political elite will be renewed but the problem is in quality and qualification of the staff to come. Therefore, it is necessary to start training future managers right today, attracting the young not only in word. The main part of future managers should be both local executives and additional non-local staff, to support the country's integrity: a vivid example is Catalonia whose government started decentralization tendencies and territorial separation from Spain.

To raise the management quality at local level, one needs to start staff training and re-training and training. The local candidates' pool does not meet the requirements of time and social and economic conditions, both at local level and in the country as a whole. A way out is re-training courses, teaching modern theory of management, economics, banking, accounting, project management, the English language courses, budget code studies, etc., as well as gaining practical experience and getting traineeship both in Ukraine and abroad. It is necessary to improve the education system which trains the managerial staff by bringing it down to earth [Liashenko & Rudenko, 2018].

Do young people want to work as small town managers?

Here, as it says, we should “sort the wheat from the chaff.” There are people, especially young ones, who are busy with the so-called political populism. They cannot really manage a town; they go to government for personal reasons, for personal enrichment. They are not able to develop a town. In addition, capable young men hesitate in taking town management decisions.

Why do not young people having political, managerial and leadership abilities want to realize them in small towns of Ukraine?

The problem is that talented young people, patriotic people, able managers, are not morally ready to take a responsibility, regarding the imperfect legal mechanism of managerial decision realisation. There is a person, who, with his own mind and ambitions, is able to realise real decisions, but “the system” prevents him from doing this. These are cases after which a person feels depressed, unprotected, wanting to leave not only his native town but the country as well.

One should also take into account the world tendency of absorption by large cities of small towns, since large cities can offer more career and business opportunities, more comfortable living conditions — transportation, public utility services, medicine, education. The larger the number of people is, the larger the potential market is, if speaking about business. Regarding innovations, this is an opportunity to create a team launching a start-up and find the funds. Small towns cannot currently offer such opportunities and this is a problem [Naumenko, 2018].

Can this problem be solved today, if yes, in which way?

Yes, it is possible. One needs only to set clear “game rules.” To my mind, all the issues concerning town’s life support should be controlled by a local manager with confirmed rights and financial resources guaranteed by tax receipts. It is necessary to simplify decision realization mechanisms, with legal deregulation. There should be given an opportunity to solve problems with simple and understandable decisions. It is important to solve at government level the problems with monopolists, to improve a town’s life support, for example, by creating a power supply market enabling a community and its citizens to choose service providers, what will positively influence the service payments and service quality.

According to the survey made by the Research & Branding Group in February 2018, the main criterion in job selection was a good salary (58%). The five most important job selection criteria also included timely salary payment (23%), comfortable working schedule (21%), convenient workplace location (17%) and a social package (16%) [Ukraintsy, 2018].

As one can see, the main job selection criterion is salary. A person who is going to work as an official and who receives a very little salary, will operate million-worth amounts of money or will get other enrichment opportunities, as it says to “settle the issue”. Of course, there are populist managers, who work for minimal salary, hiding behind the fact that they had left their business and do not need finance, but still solve their own problems. A burning issue is salary charging, since under law a town’s chief salary is assigned by the local council, adding premium to his fixed salary.

With time, small towns are to turn into large cities, urbanization cannot be stopped, and that is why it needs to be “headed”. People need salary, social infrastructure and support of innovation business projects. Then small towns will grow into large cities with not only opportunities but also the number of people living in them.

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