

Crimean Tatar Diaspora: Who They Are and What They Mean for Ukraine

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Aydın, Filiz Tutku (2021) Crimean Tatar Diaspora: Who They Are and What They Mean for Ukraine. *Ukrainian Policymaker*, Volume 8, 11-25. <https://doi.org/10.29202/up/8/2>

The Crimean Tatar diaspora has supported Ukrainian sovereignty since 1991 and contributed to conflict resolution among Crimean Tatars and Ukraine and homeland Crimean Tatars' well-being. They also advocated for the Turkish strategic alliance with Ukraine due to their traumatic historical experiences with Russia. In this article, we investigate the relations between the Crimean Tatar diaspora and Ukraine, based on our long-term comparative historical analysis of Crimean Tatar historical transnationalism and by drawing up some comparisons with Ukrainian and other diaspora communities. We suggest that Ukraine cannot take the Crimean Tatar diaspora for granted and must engage with it as it constitutes its political and legal diaspora. Ukraine does not sufficiently 'tap' or 'embrace' its diasporas, but more importantly, it needs to develop an approach of 'governance' in which Crimean Tatar home and diaspora organizations, nation-state institutions of Ukraine, and host-states such as Turkey and Romania and international organizations take part.

Keywords: Crimean Tatar diaspora, Ukraine, Turkey, transnationalism, governance, diaspora policy, homeland-diaspora relations, identity

Received: 5 May 2021 / Accepted: 19 May 2021 / Published: 29 May 2021

Introduction

The first emigrants left the Crimean Khanate and Hordes in the 16th century and settled in what is today Poland, Lithuania, and Belarus. However, the majority of the Crimean Tatar diaspora today is mainly composed of those Crimean Tatars who were forced to leave Crimea after the Russian annexation and settled in the Balkan and Anatolian parts of the Ottoman Empire. Both the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian diasporas are old diasporas that mainly emerged as a result of waves of emigration, which began in the late 18th century and continued throughout the 19th century.

According to Karpat, Ottoman registers show 1,800,000 Crimean Tatars entered the Empire by 1923, but many others were unregistered or lost their lives in the stormy Black Sea or under the miserable circumstances of emigration and settlement (Karpat, 1985). Turkish censuses do not categorize ethnicity, but we can extrapolate that there are a few million people of Crimean descent in Turkey. At least 150,000 Crimean Tatars did not return from places of deportation in Central Asia. Although Romania and Bulgaria registered 20,000 and 7,000 Tatars respectively, the scholars argue that the real number can double as many Crimean Tatars register as Turks for various reasons. A few thousand Crimean Tatar refugees (1930s and WWII refugees) also reside in the United States, and smaller numbers in other countries.

The Crimean Tatar diaspora contributed to Turkish nation-building greatly. When ethnic and other identities were politicized in Turkey in the 1970s, and the Crimean Tatar identity also began to rejuvenate. Today, the Crimean Tatars are perhaps the most active diaspora in Turkey, with its organizations, journals, lobby, transnational links, and educated and professional cadre represented in the bureaucracy, army, and service sector. The diasporas in Romania, Bulgaria and the US also rejuvenated. The Tatars in Poland, Lithuania, and Belarus lost their language, but they maintained their religious identity and began to reinvigorate their identity after the fall of the Soviet Union (Lederer, 1995).

Ukraine became a political (rather than ethnic) origin country to Crimean Tatars after 1991. While some political tensions existed between the Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians, the relations between them improved greatly after Euromaidan Revolution. As Ukraine officially defines itself as a civic state, the Crimean Tatars are considered as part of this civic nation while having a distinct national identity (Brubaker, 1996; Wilson, 2017). The size of the Crimean Tatar diaspora amounts to millions and surpasses the Crimean Tatars in Crimea greatly, and this makes this topic highly relevant for the future of Crimea and Ukraine. The economic, political, and cultural power of the Crimean Tatar communities abroad, especially their locations in Ukraine's regional neighbors such as Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria, makes this diaspora even more pertinent for Ukrainian foreign policy. Observing that Ukraine only regards the Crimean Tatar diaspora as an extension of the Crimean Tatar community within the country and relates them indirectly, we would like to introduce the latter as a political actor in its own right. Despite Ukraine's lack of interest or occasional suspicion, the Crimean Tatar diaspora has been relentlessly advocating for Ukraine for the last 30 years in Turkey and the world. The Crimean Tatar diaspora is predominantly empowered, united, democratic, secular, and pro-Western. They support pro-democratic forces in Ukraine. Their support must not be taken for granted because they could potentially support Russia as the pro-Russian foreign policy of Turkey became stronger in the last decades (Aktürk, 2015), or they could remain neutral between Russia and Ukraine. It was quite possible that Turkish foreign policy could be swamped by Turkish Eurasianist circles and Russia's hybrid efforts to control Turkey if it was not for the Crimean Tatar diaspora and a small number of liberals and pan-Turkists. We would like to ask what the potential role of the Crimean Tatar diaspora could be for Ukrainian domestic and foreign policy, particularly for the de-occupation of Crimea, and how Ukraine can create enabling environment (Brinkerhoff, 2009) for diasporas' contributions.

In recent years, more than half of the states developed policies to "tap" diasporas' economic and security benefits, to "embrace" their diaspora to define and strengthen their national identity, and to "govern" their diaspora for increasing human rights and democratization of immigrants, home and host societies in a spirit of cooperation and burden-sharing (Gamlen et al., 2019). While Ukraine is the country perhaps that suffered the most from the aggressive diaspora policy through

Russia, it has not “tapped” sufficiently, “embraced,” or “governed” its diasporas, particularly the Crimean Tatar diaspora. While the Indian diaspora’s major value is software engineers, or China’s diaspora is known for its students, the value of Crimean Tatar diaspora for Ukraine is its potential contribution for ethnic conflict resolution within Ukraine and the strategic alliance with Turkey as a basis of Eastern European security cooperation against major security threats in the region (Levy, 2006; Umland, 2016). Ukraine’s governance of its diasporas is required for the integration of Crimean Tatars and hence the enhancement of civil rights and democratization in Ukraine. This can reinforce democratization in Turkey so that Ukraine and Turkey can become a bastion of democracy through governing transnational forces that tie them together- diasporas, international organizations, and transnational advocacy networks.

Based on our 20 years of study of the Crimean Tatar diaspora through fieldwork, documental, and comparative historical analysis, and experience as an insider to the community, we examine the relationship of the Crimean Tatar diaspora and Ukraine in the last thirty years. In this article, we will not examine the case of the homeland Crimean Tatars located in Crimea and Ukraine (Fisher, 1978; Bekirova, 2004; Williams, 2001; Vozgrin, 2013) or eastern diaspora Uzbekistan. We will mainly focus on the western diaspora, located in Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, and the United States. After providing a theoretical overview of origin state-diaspora relations, we will offer a historical overview of the Crimean Tatar diaspora. Then, we will examine the period after 1991 by drawing attention to various contributions of Crimean Tatars in Ukraine’s and homeland Crimean Tatars’ economic and political development and foreign policy. Lastly, we will propose certain policies to fulfill potentials regarding Crimean Tatar diaspora-Ukraine relations.

1. Origin State-Diaspora Nexus

Diasporas are inter-generational transnational communities with a strong attachment to their homeland and national community (Cohen, 1997). There are several reasons for many migrants or former migrants re-identify themselves as diasporas: firstly, the image of diasporas as potential traitors began to change as the nation-state increasingly retreated vis-a-vis the global forces, such as multinational companies, international organizations, cultural flow, and advancements in communications technology and transportation (Tölölyan, 1991). Secondly, the diaspora was a response to global modernity in which livelihoods and identities of many ethnic communities are disturbed by increasing changes in global capitalism, modernization displacement, and nationalizing state policies. The developments in communications technologies and ease of transportation further enabled diasporas to form real relations with the homeland, in addition to symbolic, and to maintain regular flows, networks and relations among the homeland and various branches of diaspora (van Hear, 1998). Diaspora identity was constructed to provide a feeling of belonging for migrants or those of migrant descent (Aydın, forthcoming).

In the last decade or so, diasporas were re-claimed by origin-states for their economic, strategic, social, and cultural values. The literature underlines three ways states relate to their diasporas: tapping, “embracing,” and governing (Gamlen et al., 2009).

Tapping security and economic benefits

Authoritarian states such as Russia and China utilize their diasporas as a pretext for invading and interfering with other countries, and in these contexts, home-state vigilance led to the re-securitization of diasporas (Brubaker, 1995). Without seriously breaching the sovereignty of

host-states, Israel, Turkey, Armenia, and Egypt tried to use their diasporas to increase their soft power and for public diplomacy and lobbying. Ukraine's diasporas became especially active during and aftermath of Euromaidan, but Ukraine does not seem to engage them very effectively, despite the relatively significant size, power, and location of its diasporas. It is also the case that host-states utilize diasporas as foreign policy agents. The US and Canada utilized the Greek and Italian immigrants to turn these home countries' regimes pro-Western and to defeat communists during the Cold War (Glick Schiller, 2005: 573). Great Britain also charged its diasporas to enhance its image in its home countries after Brexit (Başer, 2021). Thus, instead of being a victim of Russia's aggressive diaspora policy, Ukraine can potentially utilize its Russian diaspora to induce democratic change in Russia.

Beyond the role, diasporas play in international relations and foreign policy, the UN, ILO, and many other organizations underline the positive potentials of diaspora for economic and political development, particularly for transfer of wealth and skills to the Global South (Zapata-Borrero & Rezaei, 2020).

Embracing

Diasporas are also viewed to enhance the national identity of home states since the latter tried to shape the diaspora organizations, reinforce friendly segments of their diasporas and neutralize those who do not fit their national agenda. Diaspora policies across the world involve cultural policies that imply de-territorialized visions of the nation. External voting is encouraged as expatriates tend to support the government in power and nationalist parties. Thus, some argue that states seek to organize racism transnationally (Jaffrelot & Therwath, 2007; Conversi, 2012). However, the state's encouraging national cohesion does not have to take a racist form. "Nationalizing" diasporas is a futile attempt as diasporas are by definition encompass more 'hybridity' than any given nation. Ukraine's own "ethnic" diaspora is multifaceted, let alone the Crimean Tatars which claim to be a nation within Ukraine (Magocsi, 2015; Wilson, 1998). Germany and Korea are good examples for Ukraine here as they reached out to legally and politically, not ethnically defined diasporas (Brubaker & Kim, 2011). There is evidence that maintaining transnational ties does not deter from integration they facilitate integration (Zhou & Liu, 2016; Dhingra, 2008). At this juncture, the state must be proactive to provide the legal framework for conducting transnational ties instead of trying to suppress them.

Governance

Between the extreme of co-option of transnational elements by the state and the other extreme of transnationalism replacing the state power (Portes et al., 1999), Chin and Smith argue the middle ground that nation-states can serve as "catalysts and active agents in various global and transnational processes by generating the initial impetus for such flows and activities," and in turn "their active engagement in global and transnational processes transforms states and national institutions" depending on capacity and economic factors (Chin & Smith, 2015: 79). As we accept diasporas as stakeholders, it is necessary to transit from "government" to "governance" about diaspora politics. Governance generally involves "any mode of coordination of interdependent activities," and it is neither hierarchical nor anarchic (Jessop, 2008: 43). More specifically, it refers to the coordination of differentiated institutional orders or functional systems, "each of which has its complex operational logic such that it is impossible to exercise effective overall control of its development from outside that system" (Jessop, 2008: 44).

In the context of diaspora politics, we must pay attention to the state and non-state actors, policies, and institutions populating the transnational public sphere (Liu & van Dongern, 2016: 806). States' participation in migration-focused international organizations (Gamlen et al., 2019) and learning best practices from international organizations and other states is vital (Iskander, 2010). Working with the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2017), the Ukrainian government recently developed a strategy for engaging its diaspora, targeting investment, the promotion of trade and strengthening remittance flows, but it must include Crimean Tatar diaspora in this strategy (IOM, 2017).

2. Who is the Crimean Tatar diaspora?

The Crimean Tatar diaspora developed a homeland-centric nationalism despite their separation from Crimea at the turn of the 20th century (Williams, 2001; Aydın, forthcoming). A number of Crimean Tatars, born in diaspora settings, went to their homeland to serve in the burgeoning modernization and nationalist movement there (Altuğ, 2005). Emigres from Crimea, such as Çelebi Cihan and Cafer Seydahmet, organized their movement in Istanbul and transplanted it to Russia (Kırımlı, 1996). Had the Crimean Tatar Republic survived, it would return a certain number from diaspora to homeland. The Crimean Tatar national development followed the pattern of other nationalities of the Russian Empire, such as the Ukrainians: they constructed a national identity while under Tsar's oppression, they declared sovereignty when the Empire collapses, their republic fell in the hands of Bolsheviks, their leaders were killed, those escaped organized counter-Soviet movement under the Promethean League in Europe, and later tried to save their people from cross-fire between Nazis and Soviets during WWII, they once again tried to establish national state during the WWII but the Soviets re-occupied their homeland. While Crimea shared the fate of Ukraine in famine (Kırımlı, 2003) and suffered greatly, the Crimean Tatar diaspora developed historic collaboration with the Ukrainian diaspora in the Promethean League (Palij, 1995; von Zur Mühlen, 1984; Snyder 2005).

As the Ukrainian diaspora, the Crimean Tatar diaspora was replenished by the arrival of new waves of political emigrants such as Cafer Seydahmet, an exiled second man of the Crimean Tatar Republic of 1917 (Kırimer, 1993). Apart from Promethean and WWII activism, the Crimean Tatar diaspora organized its more resonant diaspora movement in Dobruca (Romania) with widespread associations, a major diaspora journal, cultural activities, good relations with Romanian society, and transnational links to the community in Turkey and the Promethean League in Europe. This community too projected the return of some Crimean Tatars to their homeland, but WWII disrupted those plans (Aydın, forthcoming).

While the Ukrainians mobilized politically before the 1990s for independent Ukrainian nationhood and relatively calmed down after the nation-state was established and focused on the cultural realm (Holmes, 2007: 146), the Crimean Tatar diaspora had the inverse trajectory. Though emigre movement existed before this period, due to the limited liberalization of their host countries before the 1990s and the slow modernization of Crimean Tatar peasant communities, there were not many who developed a political diaspora identification.

In the 1970s, rapid modernization and urbanization brought a loss of language and culture and created a threat of assimilation. The Crimean Tatar younger generation of the 1980s educated by emigres began to recruit a growing number of participants from the Crimean Tatar community, established actual connections with the homeland and defined a national agenda distinct from Turkey (Aydın, forthcoming).

Unlike exile nationalism in the former USSR, the diaspora nationalism did not project a collective return to the homeland, but it positioned the diaspora community as facilitators of the co-ethnics return to Crimea and their construction of the national institutions there. The diaspora in Turkey formed networks with the community in Romania, Bulgaria, and the United States, each of which also developed diaspora nationalism in the 1990s. The community in Romania developed a robust national identity, even though this identity could not be openly connected to Crimea until the end of communism (Aydın, forthcoming). A segment of the US diaspora had linked with the Crimean Tatars in Uzbekistan settlements already in the 1970s, published *tamizdat*, conducted hunger strikes to support hunger strikes in the USSR (Sevdiyar, 1974), and strove to save Mustafa Cemilev from Soviet persecution by aiding his emigration effort (Altan, 2001; Eren, 1998). The diaspora in Bulgaria, admittedly, could not maintain a very distinct identity from the large Turkish diaspora in Bulgaria, but their identity movement is also on the rise (Eminov, 2000; Erolova, 2010). The Tatars of Eastern Europe also demonstrated greater interest in their identity and connected to the Crimean Tatars in the homeland (Lederer, 1995; Raciuc, 2002; Norris, 2005).

3. Post-1991 Crimean Tatar diaspora movement's relations with Crimea and Ukraine

In the 1990s, the Crimean Tatars returned to Crimea from places of deportation. Crimea remained a part of Ukraine through a referendum which returning Crimean Tatars helped tilting the balance towards Ukraine. Whereas Ukraine is not an ethnic origin-state for the Crimean Tatars, and tensions existed between the Crimean Tatars and Ukraine about the recognition of indigenous self-government; Cemilev, Meclis, and Crimean Tatars in the homeland and diaspora threw their lots to Ukraine. They staunchly supported Orange and Euromaidan Revolutions, Ukrainian nationalist parties, and Ukraine's NATO and EU bids. Both for the returnees and the diaspora, Ukraine as a post-colonial nation offered the better potential of ethnic relations than Russia, which still had a hard time acknowledging the injustice of deportation of the Crimean Tatars, let alone atrocities before that. The diaspora and the Crimean Tatar National Parliament (Qırım Tatar Milli Meclisi- shortly Meclis) did not allow any discourses of ethnic separatism from Ukraine.

In this period, the mutual flows and relations exponentially increased thanks to the technological advancements in communications and the liberal visa regime of Ukraine. Even though Ukraine did not develop a diaspora policy of “tapping” or “embracing” its diasporas deliberately, diasporas voluntarily provided economic and cultural contributions and buttressed the security, conflict resolution, and nation-building in Ukraine.

Diaspora's economic contribution to the homeland

Financial flows from Crimean Tatar diaspora to Crimea has been largely informal, but several multi-year donation campaigns such as “Give us Back our Home” (“Evimizi Geri Verin”), “Sponsor a Child's Education” (“Kırım'da bir çocuk out”), and donation drives during Eids across last thirty years have been clearly observable. However, attempts such as establishing a development bank and several business partnerships in the 1990s failed. In the 2000s, with further development of Turkey's economic power, the diaspora could convince the Turkish authorities to direct aids to Crimea. Crimea received aid comparable to independent states of the “Turkish World.” For instance, Turkey promised 1000 houses for the Crimean

Tatars (which fell to 500 due to inflation of housing prices) and restored many heritage sites. Meclis had a say in how the Turkish aid would be distributed in Crimea. Through Crimea Foundation (Qırım Fond), funds were sent to operate the Meclis building and activities. The Crimean Tatar diaspora financed printing presses, book publishing, especially transition to the Latin alphabet, which could potentially make diaspora and homeland communities closer. Turkish pious foundations also donated greatly (Aydın, forthcoming). After the occupation of Crimea, The World Congress of Crimean Tatars' permanent council, which was composed of citizens of different countries, implemented projects, transferred diaspora and host land aid to Crimean Tatar IDPs and Crimean Tatar prisoners in Crimea, supported Crimean Tatar cultural institutions in Ukraine, and organized public diplomacy campaigns (Dünya, 2017).

The factors that limited the contribution of diaspora to Ukraine were lack of professionalism in the Crimean Tatar diaspora, Ukraine's non-recognition of contributions of even Ukrainian diaspora (Lapyshyna, 2019), and problems in building up a legal framework for business and protection of property rights (Nikolko & Carment, 2014). Even though Ukraine did not take any steps to limit the Crimean Tatar diaspora's activities, Ukraine viewed it at worst with suspicion and at best with lack of interest. If Ukraine, Turkey, and Crimean Tatar diaspora could cooperate more closely in the window of opportunity of the 1990s and 2000s, it was possible to bolster the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian political and cultural institutions in Crimea firmly as an antidote to possible Russian expansion. Some lessons are needed to be learned from history.

Diaspora contribution to security and soft power through lobbying and transnational advocacy

The Crimean Tatars and their diaspora strove to align Turkish policies towards Ukraine with theirs. Firstly, after the occupation of Crimea, the Crimean Tatar diaspora took to the streets, sometimes in cooperation with the Ukrainian diaspora and organized several protests in front of the Russian consulates (Köstence'de, 2017; Magocsi, 2014; Aydın, forthcoming; Kaya, 2019). Existing traumas of both Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diasporas were "turned into a narrative and strategically deployed to create swift action" (Nikolko, 2018; Aydın, forthcoming). The World Crimean Tatar Congress (WCTC, convened between 31 July-2 August 2015)), which institutionalized relations between diaspora and homeland community, promoted solidarity in the current situation when Meclis is banned in Crimea, and Meclis leaders and Cemilev are exiled (Baybeke, 2019; Mustafa, 2015). The body also offers an alternative representative institution for the Crimean Tatars in case it is needed in the future. In the post-occupation period, as the Ukrainian diaspora, the Crimean Tatar diaspora organizations gained confidence and developed a new global vision by strengthening transnational nationalism while seeking to transnationalism the Crimean occupation issue recruiting more by-standers and non-Crimean Tatars to their cause.

The Crimean Tatar transnational community emerged as a bridge between Ukraine and host countries. For instance, the representatives of the Turkish government also attended the second WCTC to reiterate the Turkish position regarding the inviolability of Ukrainian territorial integrity. Subsequently, diaspora members are invited to foreign policy meetings about Turkey-Ukrainian relations. With the rapprochement of Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians after the Euromaidan (Sahin, 2018), the Crimean Tatar diaspora established close relations with Ukrainian Embassy in Ankara. Crimean Tatars participated actively in celebrating the national days of Ukraine, from *vyshyvanka* day to *Holodomor* anniversaries and independence day. Turkish- Ukrainian Business Association was founded with the initiative of the diaspora members.

Diaspora's contribution to ethnic conflict resolution

The second WCTC (2015) was also an instance of Ukraine “embracing” the Crimean Tatars. The Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin participated in the Congress and expressed Ukraine’s taking Crimean Tatar diaspora seriously by presenting a roadmap for providing national-cultural autonomy. In the Congress, even the prospect of double citizenship was mentioned for Crimean Tatars abroad (Aydın & Şahin, 2019). Since 2017, Ukraine extended the “Status of Ukrainian Living Abroad” for the Crimean Tatars who can document the departure of their ancestors directly from Crimea to Turkey (which will be a small number since Ottoman registers do not exist), and offer them with “Diaspora Identity Card” (Kaya, 2021).

Diaspora’s main political contribution is towards conflict resolution in Ukraine and follows the examples of diasporas such as Irish diaspora in the US in contributing peace in Northern Ireland, and diasporas of Haiti, and Liberia in playing a positive role in truth commissions. The Crimean Tatar diaspora predominantly supported Ukrainian sovereignty and integration of Crimean Tatars as well as secularism and moderate Islam. The Crimean Tatar diaspora also registered a civic model of Crimean Tatar nationhood (Wilson, 2021).

Diaspora contribution of cultural rejuvenation

Culture is not an ephemeral area for the nations undergoing nation-building. Both the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diaspora affected interpretations of history in present-day nations (Konon & Skrebnjeva, 2016). The Crimean Tatars’ search for transitional justice for several historical injustices became an issue that reinvigorated the diaspora identity as in the case of Jews, Armenians, and others (Pohl, 2004; Başer, 2015: 9). Long-term anti-Soviet diasporic narratives and shared trauma were deployed for rapid and strong response to Russian occupation both for Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians diasporas (Nikolko, 2019).

Both the Ukrainian and the Crimean Tatar diaspora contribute to cultural invigoration through the preservation of cultural artifacts (Holmes, 2007: 133). The Crimean Tatar diaspora compiled an oral history of *sürgün*, and architectural and cultural heritage of Crimean Tatars (Kırımlı & Kaçal-Ferrari, 2016; Kaçal-Ferrari, 2017). They also contributed Crimean Tatar history writing by researching the Crimean Tatar immigration (Karpat, 1985; Kırımlı, 1996; Aydın forthcoming; Atmaca, 2020), Khanate, national history (İnalçık, 2017; Kırımlı, 1996, 1998, 2012; Aykol, 2018), and Turkish-Ukrainian relations (Kırımlı, 1998; Aydıngün & Aydıngün 2020; Şahin, 2018; Aydın, 2017). Diaspora taught Tatar language classes in Romania and Turkey (Bayramaliyev, 2008).

Crimean Tatar diaspora succeeded in decreasing social distance between themselves and the homeland community through making deliberate cultural changes in the diaspora. Business partnerships, marriages, friendships emerged among diaspora and homeland, and temporary returns. The internet removed spatial limitations for networking between homeland and diaspora and internet lists, websites, and online journals, Crimea News Agency serves the purpose of continuous news and information flow from Crimea and Ukraine to the diaspora (Altıntaş et al., 2001; Karahan, 2019). As Ukrainian students studying in Canada (Satzewich, 2002), the large number of students coming from Crimea developed close links with the Crimean Tatar diaspora. Today a tight-knit transnational space exists among the communities in Crimea, Romania, Turkey, Bulgaria, and recently the Ukrainian mainland.

4. Policy proposals

Whereas diasporas and origin states have strategic and economic values for each other, which is characterized as “tapping,” political agency is the most important factor to turn diaspora politics towards a direction of synergic governance and inclusive identity-formation.

The Ukrainian diaspora’s most important value for Ukraine is pulling towards democratization. The Crimean Tatar diaspora can contribute most to the question of what kind of a nation Ukraine aspires to be. Without having to repeat the mistakes of earlier nations in seeking ethnic purity in vain, Ukraine might prefer to be a ‘multiculturalist’ nation by intention as Canada and Australia (Brown, 2000; Kymlicka, 1995). The Ukrainian diaspora, enjoying the benefits of multiculturalism in Canada, also recently began to emphasize an inclusive and multiethnic Ukraine (Kozatchenko, 2017). Both Crimean Tatar repatriates and diaspora have not viewed their nation-building juxtaposing to Ukrainian nation-building. From a multiculturalist paradigm, self-government for Crimean Tatars can be a way of integrating Ukraine better.

Ukraine may also embrace transnational citizenship (Basch et al., 1994). Even for the relations with the Russian diaspora, transnational ties cannot be banned, but they can be channeled and governed. Future integration of Turkey and Ukraine in a transnational space can also be imagined not only due to Crimean Tatars, but the increasing volume of intermarriages, tourism, and economic partnerships between Ukrainians and Turkish citizens. Ukraine must integrate the Crimean Tatar diaspora in its diaspora institutions (state offices dedicated to the affairs of emigrants). Ideally, the Crimean Tatar diaspora must be included in defining Crimean Tatar future in Ukraine, such as national cultural autonomy for the Crimean Tatars, presently on the agenda. Transnationalism and working towards Crimean Tatar self-government is not an ideological issue for the Crimean Tatars or diaspora, but they are regarded as ways to preserve their national identity. These are constructive methods to address their common trauma of forced dispersal from Crimea and ways to seek justice. What Ukraine must do is legislating the rights and obligations of diasporas as any other groups in society, rather than outlawing them.

Brinkerhoff (2012) argues that diaspora must invest in social capital rather than consumption to be most effective (Brinkerhoff, 2012). The Crimean Tatar diaspora must ally with the Ukrainian diaspora more clearly and formally, and official recognition of the Crimean Tatar diaspora will improve that. The Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian diasporas and embassies can cooperate more clearly (perhaps formally) in propagating common causes such as de-occupation of Crimea, international recognition or *holodomor*, and *surgun*, and limiting Russian neo-colonialist propaganda and policies in the international sphere.

The World Crimean Tatar Congress must be invited by Ukraine in the Crimean Platform (The Crimean Platform, 2021) or any other political initiative regarding Crimean Tatars and Crimea de-occupation. This will give more confidence in Meclis in Kyiv to incorporate the Crimean Tatar diaspora into Ukrainian domestic affairs and foreign policy. In the future, Meclis can be partly elected from the diaspora and World Crimean Tatar Congress can play a larger role.

The Crimean Tatar diaspora can contribute to developing Turkish and Ukraine strategic partnerships. Both Ukraine and Turkey need the EU and the US support to balance Russian power in the Black Sea and better integration into European institutions to entrench their democracy as an antidote to the Russian and Chinese version of authoritarian government (Aydin, 2017). In the spirit of the Promethean League, Ukraine, Turkey, and Eastern European

countries need to build a form of a strategic alliance to balance Russian power in the region. This inner circle can be supported by an outer circle of Germany, Georgia, Turkic states of the Caucasus, and Central Asia (Umland, 2016; Blank, 2021). Towards this path, a free trade agreement can be achieved among Turkey and Ukraine, such as Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) (Carment et al., 2019, 2020).

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