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Emotive Meaning in Political Language

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The paper is devoted to emotive language using as one of a real argument characteristic. The real argument is regarded in the context of informal logic approach to argumentation. The topicality of considered problematic relates to the bright cases of emotive words used in the current political life. In the paper, I analyze, firstly, the specific features of a real argument which is used in everyday and public communication. Secondly, I review the sense of "emotive meaning" notion proposed by Charles Stevenson in relation to "descriptive meaning." Thirdly, I consider the distinction between a good argument and an effective argument in the theoretical and practical perspective. Further, I describe and analyze certain practical cases of real political speech trying to understand the specificity of the audience's conviction depending on emotive words used by the speaker. The result of this research is making clear the notion of emotive meaning and its place in communication, inter alia in political life.
Keywords: emotive meaning, emotive language, real argument, good argument, effective argument

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Introduction

The contemporary argumentation theory widely extends beyond the borders of purely logical analysis of arguments. It aims to give instruments to deal with real arguments people make in their ordinary life. Political speech, as one of the real argument kinds, is also the subject of its research.

As each of the natural language kind, political language is characterized by ambiguity and emotive character of used arguments. Thus, the political discourse language is a part of real-life argument discourse, also called real argument or ordinary-life argument. The real argument is used to change the point of interlocutor's view in different communicative situations (Fisher, 1989: 57-61). Thus, the specific feature of a real argument is the dependence of conclusions from the context and circumstances of each communicative situation on which an argument occurs. That is why it is possible to evaluate a political argument, only taking into account the context of its use.

It is appropriate to consider Hamblin's thesis about the argument. He notes hypothetical and real arguments are manifested in our experience. The first one appears in logics textbooks, and the second — in real communication (Hamblin, 1970: 234). The term "real argument" refers us to argument understanding closely related to its real functioning.

With regard to argument understanding in this paper, I consider an argument as the sequence of premises and conclusions, which can become the intermediary conclusions and be the premises on the next stage of the conversation. Therefore, one of the specific features of a real argument is the complexity of its structure.

The next real argument's feature is the presence of not only deductive and inductive reasoning in it (Fisher, 1989: 57). Really, it is impossible to make judgments by only deductive reasoning in practical life. Furthermore, it is also possible to use so-called "case-by-case reasoning" in real communication. As Govier admits, such reasoning occurs in the situations where criteria used for the inference are not clear enough to make deductive reasoning. I would like to admit, and John Wisdom argues that namely case-by-case reasoning is the subject of informal logic. Logician notes such reasoning is used when conclusion is archived by analogies with several similar cases. Such reasoning is not deductive nor inductive one because, on the one hand, it presupposes empirical data as the ground. On the other hand, it does not presuppose analogies with many cases of such a kind (Wisdom, 1991: 159-160).

Carl Wellman calls this reasoning type "conductive" and describes it as reaching a conclusion by the ground on-premises, which do not appeal to other similar cases (Wellman, 1971: 36-40).

Underlying all the above, I would like to note the essential features of a real argument. There are:

1. Functioning in the people real-life discourse which is emotional.
2. The ambiguity of propositions which is related to natural language using.
3. The possibility of missing premises.
4. Its effectiveness dependence on the context.
5. The complexity and sophisticated structure.
6. The possibility of using non-deductive and non-inductive reasoning called case-by-case reasoning or conductive reasoning.
7. Involving of the value, normative and other non-empirical propositions for which it is impossible to cast logical meaning.

Nevertheless, a real argument understanding is not as clear as it looks like.

For example, argument theorist George Goddu defines four of the main senses on which the term "real argument" is used by logicians. He argues this term is used to illustrate the oppositions between (Goddu, 2009: 3-7):

1. Genuine argument as opposite to non-genuine.
2. Everyday argument as opposite to specialized, i.e., practical as opposite to theoretical.
3. Actual as opposite to hypothetical.
4. Natural as opposite to contrived.

George Goddu analyses these notions' specifics by argumentation theorists and argues that each opposition cannot be separated clearly from each other. It lets the author conclude that a real argument notion has only a pedagogical function. At the same time, it has no theoretical sense (Goddu, 2009: 12).

Therefore, a real argument is a vague concept used by argument theorists to mark their research subject. However, to my mind, the specificity of real-life argument actually needs analysis by an informal logic method, which is useful to understand the specifics of everyday and public discourse, partly, a political one.

Thus, the real argument is the specific type of inference, and it is the subject of informal logic. It lets us provide the analysis of the argument of political discourse by the methods of informal logic.

Emotive language

Besides the described features, it is even more important in the context of the issue considered in this paper. I mean to appeal to emotion and, more exactly, emotive language. Real communication is full of the emotional spectrum. The real argument as argument people use in their communication is not the pure structured propositional set. Thus, the emotive aspect of a real argument takes place.

Primarily, in this aspect, I would like to admit that appeal to emotion is a well-known logical fallacy considered in formal logic. Actually, logic as the method aims to eliminate the ambiguities from clear reasoning. However, this way has led to well-known paradoxes of material implication. The analysis of natural language arguments, therefore, needs the other methodological grounds which informal logic provides.

There are three utterances related to emotions in argumentation.

Firstly, it is “appeal to emotion” (argumentum ad passiones), which is a logical fallacy, which occurs when a proponent manipulates with an interlocutor’s (audience’s) emotions. There are many kinds of this fallacy related to different passions, such as appeal to pity, appeal to ridicule, appeal to consequences, appeal to fear, and others.

Secondly, it is “emotive language,” which deals with the speaker’s tone, expressions, and phrases chosen by him. This aspect is rather psychological, although plays a role in the conversation. Furthermore, it creates the specific meaning of some communicative intention.

Thus, thirdly, it is the notion closely related to emotive language — emotive meaning which is the main subject of our analysis. Charles Stevenson, a famous philosopher and ethics investigator, who also was interested in the linguistic theory of meaning, is the author of this term.

The researches of emotive, or ethical, language appear between argumentation theory, cognitive psychology, linguistic pragmatic and pragmatic of non-verbal communication.

When we use emotive language in everyday arguments? The clearest case is using words, e.g., negative “liar,” “shameless,” “villain,” or “crucial,” “brave,” and so forth. For example, most words are emotive in the sentence “This terrorist attack is a horrible offense and has to be severely punished” (Macagno & Walton, 2019: 231). Fundamentally, most conversations in practice involve emotive language.

Let us drill into the essence of emotive language and emotive meaning. Charles Stevenson describes the emotive meaning in comparison with a descriptive one. Two sides of the meaning — descriptive and emotive — form together with the word’s holistic meaning or utterance. Descriptive meaning relates to all cognitive aspects of the message, such as knowledge, beliefs, or supposition. Meanwhile, emotive meaning relates to psychological aspects of communication and a word as a sign. It is necessary to admit, the descriptive and emotive meaning of the proposition mainly relates to each other, and can even coincide (Stevenson, 1944: 71).

However, the relation between meanings of the proposition is more difficult than it seems. Thus, they have some degree of independence from each other (Stevenson, 1944: 73). For example, the emotive meaning of some proposition can be used even after forgetting its descriptive side.

Moreover, Charles Stevenson notes emotive meaning is more independent from descriptive than vice versa. He describes it in the example with ethical words, such as "good" or "bad" (Boisvert, 2015). These terms can be used in many contexts and have the same emotive meaning; thus descriptive meanings will be different.

As Douglas Walton admits, Stephenson's term "emotive meaning" expresses very clearly the connection between the property of using words (despotism, terrorism, war) and emotions.

Charles Stevenson describes emotive words in the thesis: "instead of merely describing people's interests, they change and intensify them. They recommend an interest in an object, rather than state that the interest already exists" (Stevenson, 1937: 18-19). Actually, the role of emotive language in political life is the same.

To my mind, Stevenson's pragmatic conception of meaning can be an addition to Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson post-Gricean pragmatic theory of communication called 'relevance theory." So-called informative and communicative intentions as two levels of every conversational message correlate to some degree with the descriptive and emotive meaning of the sign.

Levinson notes, communicative intention, on the one hand, becomes understood only in the context of the dialogue (Levinson, 1983: 16-19). On the other hand, it strongly depends on the sentence meaning. However, the decoding process is changed in the case of the speaker's emotive language.

The pragmatic linguistic representative, Diane Blakemore, calls the emotive meaning of the words "expressive meaning." She argues that such a meaning sometimes has descriptive ineffability, for example, with regard to the words like "bastard." It is remarkable that Blakemore investigates the pragmatics of non-verbal communication, and her conclusions involve finding out the similarities between linguistic and non-verbal expressional instruments. The author describes the reason for which expressive meanings have no descriptive possibilities. Namely, it relates to the audience's assumption that efforts to understand the word's expressive meaning are disproportionate to the cognitive effects it leads to (Blakemore, 2011). By the way, I should admit that cognitive effect is the relevance theory notion that means changing the audience's cognitive environment. The last one is a set of an audience's assumptions, notions, and beliefs that determine the possibility of a speaker's thesis understanding (Sperber & Wilson, 1986).

To describe such a communicative model better, let me drill into Sperber and Wilson's pragmatic "relevance theory" (Sperber & Wilson, 1986). According to it, each linguistic and non-linguistic message has two levels. There are levels of informative intention and level of communicative intention. Every message has at least one of them — informative. However, a communicative one achieves only if the hearer really understands what the speaker actually wants to say.

Thus, namely, communicative intention includes as descriptive as emotive words. Nevertheless, using emotive language leads to the violation of the whole decoding process. Emotive language expresses the stable psychological attitude of the speaker towards the discussed question (Hom, 2010). That is why the speaker's emotive word understanding becomes less rational but more affective.

In this context, it is useful to appeal to Walton's approach, on which he proposes to represent effects of emotive words as inferences, which considers as micro-arguments (Macagno & Walton, 2019: 231).

Argument effectiveness and argument goodness: what is the difference?

As understood from emotive words description, their using conflicts with a traditional logic view to what an argument has to be. However, emotive words help achieve the aim, which is changing the audience/ interlocutor's point of view to certain issues.

Thus, the question is, how does a good logical argument correlate with a rhetorically effective argument?

Primarily, let us concern ourselves with the "good argument" notion. To do this, I have to begin with strong and weak argument distinctions.

Thus, a strong argument is one that is capable of convincing the audience that the conclusion is acceptable. Weak argument, conversely, is not capable of doing this. Therefore, political speech with emotive language using can be strong in the sense that it achieves the aim to persuade the interlocutor/ audience to accept the thesis/ conclusion.

Logical argument evaluation aims to decide if an argument is logically good. Such a good argument has to meet three main requirements: to have a relevant relation between its premises and conclusion, to have acceptable and sufficient premises (Blair, 2004). However, a logically good argument actually differs from a rhetorically effective one.

Firstly, a good argument can be, anyway, unconvincing. For example, if an argument premises, although relevant, sufficient, and acceptable, but an audience's opposite beliefs are strong enough to defend itself against the proponent argument.

Secondly, an argument that fails logical evaluation, nevertheless, can be convinced, for example, in the case of using emotional language in an argument.

Therefore, a logical evaluative procedure is necessary to avoid falling into the trap on the practice of argumentation. On the other hand, it lays the ground for making good arguments. Thus, a strong argument is a proponent's purpose.

However, we should understand that strong and weak arguments are only extremes of possible real arguments variations. As is noted in (Groarke & Tindale, 2004: 134), there is such a strong argument which cannot be stronger than it is, and there is a strong argument which, however, can be stronger. The same thing is with weak arguments. There are many grades of a weak argument, and the weakest and almost strong arguments are among them.

All noted above let us argue that the notion of a strong argument needs more requirements satisfying because, as was mentioned, a good argument can be a weak one.

Remarkably, convincing is one of the effectiveness' conditions, needs including pragmatic and rhetorical aspects of argumentation. That is to say, an argument's effectiveness relates rather to the way of its using correctness, not to an argument's goodness itself.

This point is closely related to the issue of the dialectical character of each argumentation. A logically good argument has no practical sense if it is outside of real communication. Moreover, all fallacies, traditionally called logical fallacies, are actually the failure of correct argument using in the dialectical situation.

With regard to emotive language, it is notable that emotive words often become so only in certain contexts.

Emotive meaning in political speech

Whereas Charles Stevenson concerns the ethical problem, I would like to analyze emotive language in political discourse. As an ethical one, it demonstrates dealing with not merely facts; for example, science does. Political speech is emotive in most cases, especially in the election season.

I want to admit there are many reasons politicians use emotive words and sentences more or less regularly, such as educational level, temper, the specificity of the situation, etc. That is why one of the politicians demonstrates a high degree of emotive language using, and the other — low level.

The brightest representative of the worldwide stance politician who frequently uses the emotive language is the USA ex-president Donald Trump. As Fabrizio Macagno and Douglas Walton note, in the 2016 election season, Trump rejects the correct and habitual image of the presidential candidate. His loaded language became the discussing subject in global media.

Namely, this type of language is called emotive or ethical in philosophical discourse. Using emotive words aims to influence the audience's point of view and elector's decisions. Thus, it is a strong rhetorical instrument frequently used in political life.

Using slur words is a common tactic for some politicians. For example, Donald Trump said about the press during the presidential election campaign in 2016: “They're scum. They're horrible people. (…) I would never kill them, but I do hate them. And some of them are such lying, disgusting people. It's true” (Hampson, 2016). As Macagno and Walton note, “scum” (very bad or immoral person) is a lexicalized metaphor. It is a slur which captures the subject matter evaluation (Hom, 2008). Meanwhile, the words “horrible” and “disgusting” logicians call purely evaluative. Finally, the word “lying” Macagno and Walton consider as properly ethical words (Macagno & Walton, 2019: 233).

Let us analyze some Ukrainian politicians' speech in which emotive language is used. For example, during Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy's visit to Boryspil, he said to the official: “Go out, God. I don't like bandits just. (…) Get out of here, bandit. Can't you hear?” Here we see words “bandit,” “God,” “go out,” which are non-correct in traditional political discourse (Go out of here, 2019; Poroshenko, 2020). If we analyze these words following Walton's analysis of Trump's speech, it is clear that purely emotive is the word “bandit,” while “God” and “go out” become so in the concrete situation as the context.

Besides slurs, often used are metaphors and similes. For example, Trump calls the USA “dumping ground,” where migrants are garbage (Hampson, 2016). He associates these words also with opponent Hillary Clinton and ex-president Barack Obama. In addition, he calls his opponent Marco Rubbio “weak like a baby” (Macagno & Walton, 2019: 234). Thus, such in-direct lexical constructions let him consider offenders as the subject of anger or ridicule, reducing the chance for them to be elected.

What relates to Ukrainian politics, in September 2019, Volodymyr Zelenskiy drew the analogy in the thesis “Bandits must be in prison, not in the Maldives.” This sentence is intended for the Ukrainian ex-president Petro Poroshenko, who rested in the Maldives during the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Therefore, Tramp and Zelenskiy's vocabularies show us that the term "emotive language" includes many subtypes of such words. However, such words act on the same schema — skip the step of rational audience's judgment about the sentence content.

It is remarkable that the practical use of emotive language leads to the possibility of mixing the descriptive and emotive meanings of the words. As Macagno and Walton note, this situation is dangerous because the emotional use of the word which is normally used in neutral meaning, can lead to misunderstanding and obfuscation.

All noted above is also justified by Arnauld and Nicole — Port-Royal Logic representatives — thesis: "As a result, the same thing can be expressed decently by one sound and indecently by another, if one of these sounds is connected to some other idea that conceals the shame, and if the other, by contrast, presents it to the mind in an immodest manner" (Arnauld & Nicole, 1996: 13). Thus, using the words normally indicated some shameful or offensive action in the other sense — when there are no such actions — always presupposes some emotional character of the thesis on which they are used.

To say more exactly, in practice, the danger of the word's meaning change is that the hearer can understand a certain word in the ordinary meaning, while the speaker uses this word in emotive meaning.

It is noteworthy, Fabrizio Macagno and Douglas Walton interpret emotive and descriptive meanings of emotive words as different types of inference. Thus, they try to describe this problem in a logical way (Macagno & Walton, 2019: 238-239).

Let me describe their approach. Firstly, the authors define descriptive meaning as an inference attributing a predicate to a subject based on specific features and definitional premises (in other words, it is the "naming" process) (Macagno & Walton, 2019: 239). Secondly, they define emotive meaning as "an inference leading from a description of a state of affairs to a value judgment thereon (evaluation), and in some cases the proposal of a commitment to a course of action (decision-making inferences)" (Macagno & Walton, 2019: 239).

The authors propose an argumentative scheme:

Premise 1: If some particular thing *a* can be classified as falling under verbal category *C*, then *a* has property *P* (in virtue of such a classification).

Premise 2: *a* can be classified as falling under verbal category *C*.

Conclusion: *a* has property *P* (Macagno & Walton, 2019: 239).

Macagno and Walton note, this argumentative scheme expresses emotive words, as inferences can be drawn from it (Macagno & Walton, 2014).

Referring to the distinction of descriptive and emotional senses of the word, it is useful to compare Stevenson's model of the word understanding and the model proposed by Port-Royal logicians. Thus, Arnauld and Nicole distinguish two different parts of the notion (term, proposition) meaning. There are denotations and connotations. The first one deals with distinctiveness used for classification purposes. The second deals with some extra features, which are, nevertheless, semantic features (Macagno & Walton, 2019: 246-247).

Besides this, Arnauld and Nicole describe the specific use of such extra (additional) semantic features in practice. In the perspective of emotive language research, it is remarkable that namely connotation is the "part" of the word's meaning, which is emotive (ethical).

Fabrizio Macagno and Douglas Walton note that the general category of "emotive words" can be separated into two groups: words that include an evaluative element into their definition, and words that include evaluative components only as additional, not essential features (Macagno & Walton, 2019: 247).

Such additional features appear as the result of using non-ordinary meanings of some words in certain contexts. This meaning does not directly relate to the features involved in the definition of the term. However, it contrasts to definitive meaning (or descriptive, using Stevenson's terminology), depending on the external conditions. Kerbrat-Orecchioni distinguishes five types of connotation, such as stylistic, rhythmic, phonetic, syntactic, utterance connotations, and also semantic and associated values (Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 1977: 167). For example, utterance connotations involve "the semantic features that characterize emotive meaning, namely ideological, axiological (value judgment) and emotive connotations, which can convey value judgments that can trigger emotional responses" (Macagno & Walton, 2019: 247). In other words, connotations that presuppose emotive elements including are characterized by extraordinary use, for example, using in non-trivial contexts of the term. In practice, such a usage can be met often in ironic sentences.

It is definitely understood in linguistics that certain connotations have taken hold in certain specific contexts. Their use is considered as usual, namely in that context. As Kerbrat-Orecchioni admits, the lexical items "carry context (prior context), encoding the history of their prior use (prior context) in a speech community" (Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 1977: 119). Therefore, we see that emotive meaning is woven into the cultural and linguistic context. Moreover, such a context can form, modify and save the connotation of some word.

Conclusions

Underlying all the above, I should mark several main results of this paper.

Firstly, most words have as descriptive as emotive meaning that can be mixed. That is the reason why the understanding of the interlocutor's thesis can be incorrect. Using emotive language, e.i., ethical words or terms with extraordinary connotations that depend on the context, in political speech, such as debates, interviews, and public statements, can actually make the politician (proponent) thesis more memorable and lead to the action.

Secondly, the distinction between weak/ strong argument, good argument, and effective argument is clarified. It let us capture the role of the emotive words in convincing the audience. It is found out that emotive language often helps to achieve the purpose of convincing even more easily than only in a rational way that is with only emotional neutral words meaning. However, the ethical problem of manipulating is hiding here, which, however, deserves special attention in other papers. Here I argue that emotive words, which are of two types: emotive itself and emotive in the context, relates rather to a way of argument using (this term refers to Blair's "Arguments and it uses") than to an argument itself (Ralph & Blair, 2006). In other words, logical goodness is not closely related to an argument's effectiveness. In regard to the question about emotive words, I should note that words with emotive meaning fit into logically good argument structure harmoniously enough. They, however, often become incorrect on the dialectical and pragmatic tiers of argumentation. Does that mean extensive use of emotive language by some politicians?

On the one hand, in some cases, conscious manipulation aims to change the audience's attitude to some persons or accidents in a rough way. On the other hand, in some cases, using emotive words is justified by the context. For example, they are frequently used to stress on the positive or negative side of the discussed subject. The danger of misunderstanding appears when the speaker (politician, for example) uses words with emotive connotations and the hearer (elector, for example) does not suspect it is sure that the word is used in ordinary (denotation) meaning.

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Charting A Distinctive Course: The Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Religious Pluralism, and Church-State Relations[1]

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Flake, Lincoln (2020) Charting A Distinctive Course: The Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Religious Pluralism, and Church-State Relations. *Ukrainian Policymaker*, Volume 7, 13-19. https://doi.org/10.29202/up/7/2

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church has a chance to be an outlier in a region otherwise inhospitable to religious diversity. Less than two years after gaining autonomy in the Orthodox community, signs are promising that church elites are neither frightened by religious choice or inclined toward state sponsorship. Such a posture would contrast glaringly with the ethos of its once overseer, the Russian Orthodox Church. I argue that, although the church's development is still embryonic, several factors suggest a more tolerant attitude toward the operations of other nontraditional may prove durable. Hopefully, the approach is not simply a matter of the church conforming to pro-democracy sentiments in Kyiv, but rather is rooted in experience and deep-seeded beliefs. If this proves to be the case, religious pluralism and constructive church-state relations has the chance to be irrevocably engrained in the country. Such a development would dispel the notion that Eastern Orthodoxy and authoritarianism are somehow inextricably connected. Even more importantly for Ukraine's future, a modern and transparent national church may help anchor Kyiv to its current democratizing orientation, preventing a cyclical return to autocracy.

Keywords: Ukraine, Orthodox Church, religious pluralism, church-state relations, civil society

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A New Birth of Freedom

Ukraine seems an unlikely candidate to be the standard bearer of religious freedoms in the region. It's a country at war, divided linguistically and ethnically, with notorious corruption, the weak rule of law, and religious rifts that tear at the social fabric. Ukraine just endured religious upheaval of almost biblical proportions. In a matter of a few years, centuries-old canonical associations have been annulled, patriarchs retired or appointed, thousands of parishes compelled to choose sides, and the allegiance of millions of adherents still hanging in the balance. Yet, of the twelve post-Soviet republics that remain outside of the EU, Ukraine is the only country where religious groups operate largely unfettered and where conditions approximate the separation of church and state (Pew, 2019). Numerous factors certainly contribute to this outlier status, including the desire by many past Ukrainian governments to strike a posture counter to Russia. But one often overlooked contributing factor to ecumenicalism is the role of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. While certainly in open conflict with her Russian Orthodoxy counterpart, the church has been unexpectedly open to inter-faith dialogue and surprisingly indifferent to nontraditional religious groups operating in Ukraine. Things had not changed since the historic day of autonomy almost two years ago, and signs are promising that the church has the potential to heal recent and ancient wounds and to be a force for good in the religious sphere and beyond.

In a remarkable turn of events, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church gained its self-governing status through an act of autocephaly by the Patriarchate of Constantinople in January of 2019. It was a long time coming, as the church had been under the administrative thumb of Russian Orthodoxy since 1686. The breakup was not particularly amicable. The Kremlin employed an array of measures, including its well-tuned information warfare, to thwart the move (Kuzio, 2019: 487). These actions failed, along with coercive diplomacy by the Russian Orthodox Church to retain Ukraine in its 'canonical territory.' Incensed, the Russian church broke communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate. This was no trivial move. For the Ukrainian church, life after independence has been no less tumultuous (Elsner, 2019: 9-13). Externally, the church must contend with thousands of parishes in Ukraine that remain loyal to the Moscow Patriarchate. Internally, the transfer of authority from a recalcitrant 91-year-old former Patriarch has been anything but smooth. Notwithstanding this turbulence, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is a fact of religious life in Ukraine. The state and public recognize it as such, and its reach grows by the month as parishes transfer into its fold (Goble, 2019).

Almost from the day of independence, there were auspicious signs that the church would chart a distinct course from the Russian Orthodox Church. Nowhere has that been more apparent than with its interfaith interactions. In January 2019, a group of likeminded laypersons and intellectuals presented new church leaders with 'Ten Theses for the Orthodox Church of Ukraine' a kind of Bill of Rights for the newly independent church. Among other progressive tenets, the articles of faith called for greater laity involvement, curtailing church involvement in politics, and fully embracing other Christian and non-Christian religions. The new Patriarch praised the principles and elevated several proponents to synodal bodies (Bey, 2020: 1-3). A month later, at his enthronement, he vowed: "cooperation and dialogue with other churches and religious organizations" (Luxmoore, 2019: 287-314). Other hierarchs of the church have made similar declarations. Rhetoric became action with specific reconciliation steps toward the sizable Latin and Greek Catholic churches in Ukraine. Those entities have long endured hostile treatment by state and Orthodox authorities, to put it mildly. The new church may very well turn a new page on troubled Orthodox-Catholic relations (Smytsnyuk, 2019), as it promotes religious tolerance more broadly in Ukrainian society.

Signs of Durability

There are counter-arguments to such optimism. The progressive posture might simply be a knee-jerk reaction to the perceived tyranny of the Russian Orthodox Church or momentary pragmatism in the face of pro-democracy inclinations within the population and corridors of power. When these variables change, so too will the church's policy towards other religions. Four points suggest otherwise.

1. Tolerance is already ingrained in church culture. Independence did not begin in 2019; it was merely codified and consolidated into a single church. Two of the three Orthodox churches that vied for influence in Ukraine since 1991 joined together. One struggled against the machinations of the Russian Orthodox Church for 100 years; the other for 30 years. Both are democratized as a result. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) spent decades underground and in the diaspora, diffusing authority to laity and cooperating with other religions (Denysenko, 2018). The Ukrainian Orthodox Church — Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) spent three decades building bridges with the community and with other faiths to achieve status. The two churches are now one, but their individual histories of interfaith dialogue endure.

2. Ecumenicalism has already been tried and tested. During the pro-Russian reign of Leonid Kuchma, and precisely when post-Soviet countries began backsliding on religious liberties, the UOC-KP created the most meaningful interfaith council in the region. Unlike more ceremonial councils in neighboring states, the All-Ukrainian Council of Religious Organizations has, among its seventeen members, many nontraditional entities such as Adventists and Pentecostals. The council is based on egalitarian principles with a rotating chairmanship.

3. The new Patriarch is cut from a different clothe. The aforementioned council came to be under the now retired Patriarch Filaret — a deeply conservative hierarch with autocratic proclivities. The effort, and ecumenical activities in general, are likely to flourish even more under the new, 41-year-old Patriarch Epiphany. Trained in Greece and not Russia, he was unique among candidates for Patriarch for having never had any connection with the Russian Orthodox Church. He openly espouses the more tolerant Greek tradition while disavowing the Russian mentality (RISU, 2019a). In 2019, he was given a human rights award in New York City in recognition of his work on promoting religious freedoms (RISU, 2019b). This is the man that may very well lead the church for the next half-century.

4. Ukraine is not a religiously homogeneous society. In contrast to most other majority Orthodox countries, Ukraine has a sizable non-Orthodox population — with over 10% claiming allegiance to Catholic churches and more than 2% to Protestant churches. The diversity is even greater when looking at actual parishioners. Half of all registered parishes in Ukraine are either Catholic or Protestant. And even within Orthodoxy, there is not one institutionalized church (Druzenko, 2011: 720). This diversity contributes to a particularly vibrant religious marketplace (Brik & Korolkov, 2019; Pew 2019) and impedes a single church from monopolizing that market through repression.

Authoritarianism and Eastern Orthodoxy

If the Ukrainian Orthodox Church holds its present course, it would certainly be bucking a trend in the region, not to mention within its own confession. One would be forgiven for conflating Orthodoxy with authoritarianism in light of recent developments in Russia. Collaboration between the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church, always a historical reality, reached unparalleled levels after the 2014 seizure of Crimea. Concurrently, and likely not all together unrelated, religious pluralism has been drastically curtailed. Groups labelled 'nontraditional' have effectively been under lock and key since the Duma passed 'anti-extremist' measures in the summer of 2016. The situation in the Orthodox nations of Georgia and Belarus is no less disconcerting.

There is undeniably a tendency towards intolerance within many of the various self-governing churches of the Orthodox community. Apart from examples already cited in Russia, Orthodox representatives across the confessional landscape have long been the most intransigent members of global ecumenical organizations. The impulse is to to ascribe all this intolerance to Eastern Orthodoxy tradition, especially as the Russian church alone accounts for half of all believers. Indeed, the authoritative line on Orthodoxy for years has been that it is inherently anti-individualist, and therefore antithetical to human rights as well as ecumenicism (Pollis, 1993). This has been challenged of late by many inside the church advocating a more inclusive approach within wider Orthodox thought (Yannoulatos, 2003, Khodr 1971) and by outside academics cautioning against casual inference related to theology and totalitarianism (Stoeckl, 2009: 16; Stoeckl, 2020).

Socio-historical factors likely have greater explanatory value for intolerance within Eastern Orthodoxy than does an appeal to theology. For instance, doctrinal differences between Orthodoxy and Catholicism are not so significant as to explain why the latter has found it easier to operate in multifaith environments. Orthodoxy's historic isolation and introversion (Makrides, 2020), compared to Catholicism, may account for Orthodox churches being less inclined to engage comfortably with others.

Yet even within Eastern Orthodoxy, variation in approach among churches (Prodromou, 2004) further attest to development, not theology, as the common denominator. The few churches in the confessional found outside of Eastern and Central Europe have travelled different developmental paths that have led to greater openness. Ukraine's history is likewise unique as the connection between religion and national identity — so inextricably linked in nations like Russia, Georgia, and Greece — never ossified in Ukraine. The diversity of religious affiliation has resulted in Ukraine long lacking a 'national church' (Ishchuk & Sagan, 2020: 1). Choice, and in particular the option by adherents of disaffiliating from the majority church (Berger, 2005: 439), has been more historically present in Ukraine than most other Orthodox nations — certainly Russia. This, in turn, has produced a less dogmatic-canonical approach toward the activities of nontraditional religious entities. While there is little doubt that Orthodoxy, particularly in the post-Soviet space, struggles with modernity and religious tolerance, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church may yet prove that a viable alternative course is possible. At the very least, the example of the church suggests that the intellectual tradition of Eastern Orthodoxy is not homogenous or deducible to generalization.

The Allure of State Sponsorship

Unfortunately, generalizations are a bit more apt when discussing Orthodoxy and church-state relations. Here the Ukrainian Orthodox Church may find it harder to resist the temptation to curry favor with authorities. Orthodox churches have a long tradition of 'symphonia' with the state in which they enjoy privileged access and benefits unavailable to other churches (Jianu, 2005). This is evident today, even in the EU, where four of the five nations with majority orthodox believers are having difficulty abandoning the 'symphonic' model of church-state interactions (Olteanu & de Neve, 2013: 180). Nowhere is this more evident than in Russia, where the church is now a fully assimilated cog in the Kremlin's whole-of-government approach to perpetuating domestic control and achieving its foreign policy objectives (Flake & Lamoreaux, 2018: 1).

Yet even with this seemly intractable dynamic, there is cause for hope regarding Ukraine. The country starts with a favorable baseline since prior to 2019, there was no clearly defined church with which the state could collude. Consequently, the level of state favoritism in the region to the dominant religion was measured highest in Russia and lowest in Ukraine (Pew, 2019). Religious demographics helps here as well. Unlike in Russia, where three-fourths of the populace nominally claim allegiance to the Russian Orthodox Church, in Ukraine, only a third identify with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Radio Free Europe, 2020). That is hardly a mandate for national church status. History also helped in de-politicizing church hierarchs. The church's subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate reduced its role in the political domain for centuries. The leader of the Greek Catholics in Ukraine, Sviatoslav Shevchuk, opined in 2019 that, "The Kyiv church was never a hostage to the political interests of state power and never served the mighty of this world — it remained the soul and conscience of its people" (Luxmoore, 2019). Furthermore, the clergy of the former UAOC — the smaller of the two churches that merged last year — are likely averse to collusion with authorities since they suffered under unholy alliances for years. Finally, there is self-awareness. After his appointment, Patriarch Epifaniy acknowledged that his church is not immune to temptations such as 'symponia,' and called for widespread reforms to rid the church of "Russian imperial traditions" (RISU, 2019a: 1).

Favorable Portents for Ukraine

Such rhetoric is reassuring, especially as it has thus far been backed with action. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church does not appear to view other religions, be they traditional or new entrant evangelicals, as competitive threats requiring remedial actions such as petitioning the state for restrictions. This is something to celebrate and affirm. The sanguine assessment carries corollaries beyond the religious domain. In particularly, it bodes well for Ukraine's hitherto rollercoaster experiment with democracy. Civil society, in which religious institutions factor, has proven a fairly good barometer for the ideological course of a country. Inclinations in civil society can strengthen the political and social direction of a nation (Requena, 2019: 249-266). The more influential the institution, the greater the pull. Orthodoxy is a significant force in Ukrainian society, and a tolerant, transparent course set by the new autocephalous church could prove beneficial for the nation as a whole. Incidentally, the same could be said for Russia — but in the reverse. The totalitarian appropriation of almost every non-governmental institution in Russia, most recently

Russian Orthodoxy, all but ensures that Putinism will outlive Putin. In Ukraine, Patriarch Epifaniy and his band of reformers may very well have much to do with determining an entirely different arch for their country's future.

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Cyber Threats and Asymmetric Military challenges In the Context of Nuclear Security: Ukrainian and International Cases Analysis

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In the modern period,world politics is significantly influenced by the threats posed by the virtual space and asymmetric military challenges, where an important issue is devoted to nuclear safety. From the asymmetric threats, we can single out several types that directly pose risks to global security: hybrid warfare, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and cyber terrorism, the creation and proliferation of nuclear weapons.Global security is facing many threats and challenges that are becoming increasingly difficult to combat and control. The paper discusses the dangers posed by virtual space and its role in global politics. The article discusses the main threats to cybersecurity in Ukraine. Significant attention is also paid to the asymmetric threats and the dimension of nuclear safety. The issue of nuclear security has become increasingly important since the violation of various international treaties on nuclear disarmament and arsenal reduction.

Keywords: Cyber terrorism, asymmetric threats, NATO, Russia, Ukraine, hybrid warfare, weapons of mass destruction.

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Introduction

The development of technology has not changed the priorities of state defence as much as it did during World War II — the main tactical strikes are aimed at energy facilities. Currently, most of the severe cyber-attacks take place on fuel and energy complexes, followed by the financial sector. The digital world has given rise to new types of threats. Most facts around the world are based on assumptions. Traces often lead to some aggressor state, but often there is no evidence. It is an important fact that many countries not only carry out cyber espionage activities, intelligence and investigation, but also create cyber warfare capabilities themselves. At the end of the 20th century, no one could have imagined that real war would become an adjunct to war created in a detached dimension, or, conversely, that surreal space would merge with real social and cultural space. Perhaps no one could have imagined that a dimension would emerge that would be almost impossible to control and limitless, that humanity would face an invisible threat.

Virtual Threat and Asymmetric Military Challenges

The trend of cyber wars and cyber-attacks has recently taken on a larger scale and is transforming. Russiais known to have great potential in terms of cyber warfare, and some suspicions and events confirm this. Russia used cyberweapons against Georgia during the 2008 war, and in 2019 used the same method to launch cyber-attacks on Georgian government websites and television infrastructure. According to foreign media, at the closed session of the UN Security Council in 2020, the United States, Britain and Estonia assessed this fact as a cyber-attack carried out by Russia. The same scenario was observed during the attack on Ukraine in early 2014 (Georgian Public Broadcaster, 2020: 1).

It should be noted that cyber threats do not only include cyber wars, psychological terror, digital viruses and hacker attacks, the virtual threat also includes information and misinformation manipulations, as well as the global Internet market known as the *Black Market (Darknet)*. Let us first highlight information warfare, which involves the use of information technology and management to gain an advantage over an adversary. It can be used to gain tactical information, disseminate misinformation and propaganda to demoralize the public or the adversary. It can be used for manipulation as well as to prevent the dissemination of real information.

The phenomenon of the information-propaganda war is not new. It is as old a method as the most ancient craft. It was just changing and will probably change (progress) in the future with technology development.Propaganda means the planned use of any form of communication to influence people's minds, behaviours and emotions. This is considered by many to be the most effective and common means of persuading people to engage in political activity. Intelligence services have historically used propaganda for a long time.

In this regard, we can say that Russia has a long history of information, propaganda and disinformation, but in the era of technological revolutions, this activity has become more effective. Russian propaganda is not truth-oriented, but that does not mean that everything is a lie. Here we have a mixed method when mixed misinformation is spread in truth. There are cases when we are dealing with complete disinformation and "fake news." For example, a fake report on September 11, 2014, informs us that a chemical plant in Louisiana had exploded (Manufacturing, 2015: 1).At the time, this information seemed credible; it covered almost every social network. Generally, fake news spreads quickly and is easily believed, primarily when the data is distributed by not one, but several media outlets. In this case, it is essential to warn the public about impending misinformation. We are generally called upon to verify the facts, to look at several sources, but concerning the masses, it is ineffective — verifying the facts requires time and knowledge. When it is proven that the information was false, self-justification or simply denial is relatively inefficient, it is useless. However, there is no other way. The mainstay of Kremlin propaganda in Georgia is the media and social networks. At least one TV station, several Internet TV stations, a print edition, and a website feature anti-Western "message boxes" that rely heavily on Russian sources for information.

The active use of social networks by Russian propagandists is also noticeable when viral dissemination of disinformation or anti-Western narrative material is viral. Numerous public opinion polls show that the primary source of information in Georgia is television. According to a 2016 poll by the National Democratic Institute (NDI), 77% of the Georgian population names television as the primary source of information on politics and current events. Surveys also show that almost half of the Georgian TV viewers (47%) watch foreign channels in addition to Georgian ones. The most popular foreign channels are Russian (NTV, ORT, and RTR) (IDFI, 2016: 5-23). It should be noted that there are countries where the Internet and communication networks are actively controlled, for example, which also controls television and social media. A study by Gary King, Margaret Roberts and Jennifer Pan was also published, based on leaked government e-mails (Waddell, 2017: 1).

What should we do to counter misinformation, fake news, false news, information warfare? Defining this is not so simple. In this case, it is crucial to catch up, that is, to disseminate real information. In case of delay, it is necessary to spread an alternative variant. As mentioned above, the threats in cyberspace are multifaceted — one of which is the black market, which is not available to everyone on the Internet. In this case, we need to distinguish four areas of the Internet:

1. *Surface Web* means a surface network. It is also referred to as the *Clear Web*. This network is searched by standard web search systems. The network is indexed by search engines. This network includes Google, Facebook, Yahoo, Wikipedia, Instagram, etc.

2.*Deep Web* — its content can be found directly in the URL or IP address. However, you may need to go through a password or other security mode to browse websites; however, it implies normal use. For example, when a user has limited access to various websites that require registration to view content, to sites where payment is required to download an e-journal or an e-newspaper. This space includes PayPal, Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, Gmail, etc.

3. *Dark Web*. This is a system that is not indexed by web search engines. A special program, configuration, or authorization is required to get here. It is possible to communicate anonymously, protect privacy, communicate privately, obtain illegal information, trade illegally, for example, in drugs, weapons, etc.

4. *Darknet* is also known as a "hidden network." This is a system available using non-standard ports. Darknet differs from other networks in that file sharing is done anonymously, i.e., IP addresses are not publicly available. Communication in this space is uncontrolled and contains various threats. We can draw a parallel between illegal underground activities that take place in real space and Darknet, which takes place in virtual space. Getting into this system is not easy; you need specific software and authorization. Darknetcan also be considered as an alternative internet, or the dark side of the Internet. It is a huge network that brings together thousands of unlicensed and illegal websites. There are many things available here — buying weapons illegally, buying cloned cards, buying fake passports, subscribing to slaves, buying

drugs, renting a killer, and so on. Darknet has many illegal forums, social networks and non-standard websites. We do not consciously discuss the instructions for entering this system in the paper. It can be understood as an incentive.

We can say that the black market is one of the significant shortcomings of the software. There is a lot of research on the Darknet, and overall, it is clear that the defences of cyberspace users usually lag behind those of cyber-attackers. It is difficult to obtain statistics on *black-markets* for vulnerable users and their related operations. Still, various experts agree with observations and research that various black-market forums are likely to be used by hackers, criminals and criminal organizations, who trade in a variety of products. Their ultimate goal is to steal personal data.Therefore, we can say that along with cyber wars, cyber-attacks and various threats, the black market in cyberspace also poses a serious threat, both on a personal and global level. It is known that using the black market poses a serious threat to the protection of personal information. Hackers also use cyber-attacks against specific users and specific sites to launch cyber-attacks on browsers and websites.

When discussing cyber wars, cyber-attacks, information warfare, and virtual threats in general, we must consider this issue in the context of the North Atlantic Alliance — security and cyber defence are directly linked to NATO. NATO member states first discussed the need to strengthen defence against cyber-attacks at a summit in Prague in 2002. Since then, cybersecurity has become an essential component of NATO's agenda. In 2008, the first cyber defence policy document was adopted. The process of integrating cybersecurity into the NATO defence system has been active since 2012. At the *Wales Summit* in 2014, the Allies made cyber defence a crucial part of their collective defence, saying that a cyber-attack could lead to the application of Article 5 of the Collective Defence Treaty set out in the NATO Treaty. At the 2016 *Warsaw Summit*, Alliance member states recognized information and communication network security as one of their crucial defence areas. They agreed that NATO must defend itself as effectively in cyberspace as it does on land, sea and air. NATO's leading partner in cybersecurity is the European Union, with which the Alliance signed a technical agreement on mutual assistance and cooperation in February 2016 (RIAC, 2016: 1).

The main issues discussed at the *Warsaw Summit* were how to allocate resources on cybersecurity to achieve the best effect — recognizing that considerable resources were needed to address this problem. Also, there were questions about how much money should be spent, what would be the minimum level of investment? For example, since 2014, the budget of *PacteDéfense Cyber* in France has included 1 billion euros for cyber defence. In 2016, the UK announced it had allocated 1.9 billion pounds sterling to strengthen its cybersecurity program (Reuters, 2014: 1).

At the 2018 *Brussels Summit*, the Allies agreed to set up a new cyberspace operations centre. Taking into account common challenges, NATO and the EU are strengthening cooperation in the field of cyber defence, especially in the exchange of information. Joint pieces of training and studies are conducted (NATO, 2018: 1).

Of particular note is the merit of the United States, which spares no effort to develop new regulations on cybersecurity and also spares no funds. Expenditures on cybersecurity in the US budget increase every year, in 2015, the Barack Obama administration officially allocated $ 14 billion, and then there was information that much more would be spent (CNet, 2015: 1). Worldwide defence spending is rising day by day, but US finances are impressive. It is already known that by 2021 this sector will be funded with $ 18.8 billion (Homeland Security, 2020: 1). Fighting cyber threats is quite a challenge for many states. In this regard, they have to allocate significant financial resources to make security mechanisms more effective.

Ukrainian and International Cases Analysis

Cyber-attacks, cybercriminal activities around the world have entered an active phase. Some cases deservedly have the status of cyberwar. The Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014 was accompanied by elements of hybrid warfare and hacker attacks were actively used, causing significant damage to the state. The cyber-attacks were carried out on Ukrainian government agencies and critical infrastructure. One such fact became known on March 4, 2014, and it was reported that the Ukrainian telecommunications system was attacked. At the same time, telecommunications with Crimea were being degraded, with pro-Ukrainian websites and messages being permanently blocked by Russian social networks. It is not new that Russia has a high level of cyber capabilities; numerous studies confirm this; there are real facts around the world.

As for Ukraine, a few years after the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war, namely in 2017, the internal system of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine was attacked by hackers. At that time, not only the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine was the object of attack by hackers, but also the work of energy companies and the National Bank, Kyiv Metro, Ukrainian Post, Boryspil Airport system, etc.

It should also be noted that cyber-attacks in Ukraine have been actively launched since 2017, using malware. Recently, similar cyber-attacks have been reported in France, Germany, Italy, and other European countries. Many facts of cyber-attacks are debatable, often failing to establish real traces. However, the examples presented by us show that Russia continues to harm both Ukraine and Georgia actively.

Russia is in the top three with its cyber capabilities, and its actions towards Ukraine are a good example of how cyber operations can be integrated into conventional military operations. Cyber-conflicts alone, where the action takes place only in the digital world, are less likely. It is much more realistic to add a cyber-dimension to wars, crises and conflicts, and Ukraine is a perfect example of this. Cyber operations fit neatly into the concept of so-called hybrid warfare, where the parties use traditional and unconventional means to achieve military goals. In cyberspace, the enemy's location is difficult to determine, cyber-attacks carry less political risk, and international law considers the cyber world to be a still uncontrolled space.

Unusual cyber activities of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict are cyber espionage and anti-state propaganda campaigns carried out through DDoS attacks against Ukrainian media and government organizations, as well as NATO websites, non-governmental organizations. Manipulation of information and videos, campaigning focused on election fraud, the publication of confidential e-mails, telephone tapping, dissemination of disinformation on forums and social networks, infiltration of information system — this is the direction of cyber-conflict in Ukraine. Also, Russian communications intelligence used Internet data to locate Ukrainian military units in eastern Ukraine (The Cyber Dimension of the Russia-Ukraine War, 2016: 1).

Cyber operations will likely define the combat environment in future wars and conflicts, although they will not be decisive for military action. There will also be states that can combine their conventional and cyber capabilities to achieve military and political goals more effectively. The Russia-Ukraine conflict is not over, and we may witness a new wave of cyber-attacks.

The Cyber Security and Nuclear Security Dimension in the Face of Modern Challenges

Against the backdrop of growing asymmetric threats in global politics, as increasingly new threats and challenges from cyber terrorism and nuclear security emerge, it is essential to consider several possible scenarios of potential threats. We can consider several strategies of how terrorists will be able to acquire nuclear weapons.First, they will be able to do this through internal help, which is less possible but is not ruled out. If they get information about where the appropriate weapon is stored, they will try to master it by any means. Even during the Cold War, nuclear material was kept at the Incirlik Air Base near the Syrian border in Turkey and the vicinity of Brussels, and it was not very difficult to master it. According to the second scenario, we can imagine that terrorists are stealing the components needed to make weapons in the form of plutonium or enriched uranium. At such times, they will be able to create a powerful bomb that can destroy a small city. ISIS had the potential to make similar weapons in its time, but this is unlikely because the bomb requires a fairly well-maintained material infrastructure and territory. In the third scenario, we can consider the use ofthe so-called Dirty Bomb. It is a conventional weapon that can be said to be a dynamite-like explosive device containing radioactive substances (caesium or strontium), the use of which in densely populated areas or crowded places can cause considerable damage to living organisms. We can also consider a direct attack on a nuclear reactor by terrorists or a direct collision of a plane with a reactor. It is possible for a suicide bomber to blow himself up with his nuclear device or to carry out a non-physical attack when a cyber-attack causes a nuclear reactor to fail.

It is crucial to consider the role and involvement of international organizations in cybersecurity, asymmetric threats and nuclear non-proliferation. It is also an important issue with what policies they pursue and their readiness to defend themselves against such threats. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is working quite actively in this direction. Noteworthy in this regard is the NATO Summit held in London on December 3 and 4, 2019, dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Alliance and also the 30thanniversary of the fall of the Iron Curtain. Following the NATO summit, the leaders of the Alliance member states issued a joint *London Declaration*. The declaration noted future threats from Russia, China (for the first time in NATO history), as well as terrorism, cybersecurity and the provision of secure technologies.

All the main challenges and threats mentioned in the third paragraph of the declaration, which the Alliance is facing:"We, as an alliance, face many threats and challenges that arise from all strategic directions. Russia's aggressive actions pose a threat to Euro-Atlantic security; Terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, remains a constant threat to all of us. State and non-state actors oppose the rule-based international order. Instability beyond our borders also contributes to irregular migration. We are facing cyber and hybrid threats" (London Government, 2019: 1). The Alliance does not rule out more open dialogue and constructive relations with Russia if Russia's policies allow.

Russia has been mentioned several times, according to an official statement from the Alliance. His withdrawal from the Medium-Range Missile Nuclear Forces Agreement poses a significant threat to the Euro-Atlantic Alliance's security. In response, the Alliance is stepping up its actions to secure their land, seas and airspace. NATO will increase its defence capabilities against nuclear and missile weapons. The statement also said that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. At the same time, the member states of the Alliance continue to fully implement the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Due to the need for secure systems, NATO will work actively in this direction in the modern period. In an age of new technologies, when technological development plays a key role, NATO is still going to maintain and increase its technological advantage, which is really welcome. Concerning 5G technologies, NATO is further developing and ensuring the security of communication networks.

The Alliance has recognized China's growing influence in the world and its role in international politics as both an opportunity and a challenge for them. About cybersecurity, NATO intends to strengthen and respond by increasing the security of cyber systems. NATO has recognized the importance of space to tackle and neutralize global security challenges.

The global world needs to unite in the fight against common threats. States taken separately from asymmetric threats cannot protect themselves and the security of their people without cooperation. Although some states have conflicts with each other, they must cooperate in the fight against terrorism and also in the issue of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Because these threats are global, and if any state today considers itself so protected from these threats, it does not mean that it will not face this threat and will be able to protect its population from the emerging threats and challenges fully.

Conclusion

In the modern period, the field of international relations faces many challenges and at the same time, faces significant problems in the form of "strategic asymmetric challenge" threats to the global security environment. States need to work together and increase cooperation mechanisms to ensure protection and security from growing threats in global politics. Even the world's leading nations are failing to defend themselves against the threats posed by cyberspace entirely. Globally, there is a problem of lack of legal framework and international standards in the world, which, given the globalization and the current world order, complicates the process of developing a regional and national cybersecurity strategy. Nevertheless, cybersecurity mechanisms largely depend on the experience of individual countries and their cooperation. The same can be said for combating asymmetric threats and nuclear safety. States alone cannot protect the security of their population, and a clear example of this is the occurred and ongoing terrorist acts in the world, cyber terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the threats posed by it. It is vital to increase the security of nuclear facilities so as not to damage these facilities or steal various substances. International organizations take measures for global security to play a significant role in ensuring world peace. It is crucial to develop a unified action policy and plan in this direction, to refine and improve the existing mechanisms to make the global security system more reliable. As for Ukraine's question, it must strengthen its cybersecurity in light of the current threats and risks from Russia.

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Aggressiveness in Interpersonal Arguing from Multimodal Argumentation View

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The modern theory of argumentation is an interdisciplinary field of research. The sphere of interest of argumentation theory embraces the most effective tools of persuasion in interpersonal communication. At the same time, the focus is on studying not only how the argumentative process is built but also the areas where argumentation is used. Such interest contributes in particular to the study of cultural features, which in turn influence the development of the argumentative process. A key feature of this process is multimodality, which consists of the use of verbal and nonverbal modes. This paper is devoted to the analysis of our research project focused on the multimodal view on aggressiveness in interpersonal arguing.

Keywords: multimodal argumentation, aggressiveness, interpersonal arguing, Ukrainian identity, controversy, empiricalization

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Introduction

Argumentation theory is an integral discipline that uses the scientific achievements of logic, philosophy, rhetoric, ethics, psychology, linguistics, and philosophy of language to study the rules and create modern, effective communication methods. Today in this field, not only theoretical developments but also practical recommendations are used. And the latter is often emphasized. In this regard, among the main trends can be identified empiricalization and multimodality.

Let us begin with empiricalization, which can be defined as collecting empirical material to analyze better and structuralize theoretical achievements. It became one of the most significant directions in modern argumentative studies. According to Frans van Eemeren *‘three major developments in the treatment of argumentation have begun to materialize that open new avenue for research. Although they differ in shape, these developments can be observed across a broad spectrum of theoretical approaches. The three developments I have in mind can be designated as empiricalization, contextualization, and formalization of the treatment of argumentation’* (Eemeren, 2015: 5).

To compare, we can refer to the works by Maurice A. Finocchiaro, who studies controversy and instruments, which can be applied for its analysis. Among the latter, he emphasizes empirical evidence: *‘I elaborated an approach to logic and argumentation theory that studies arguments in a manner characterized as pragmatic, comparative, empirical, historical, naturalist, and both normative and descriptive. It corresponds to Toulmin’s idea of applied logic, as well as to the historical-textual approach, which I have advocated previously’* (Finocchiaro, 2013: 178). Approaches investigated by Finocchiaro can be called historical-textual, and meta-argumentation and they serve as a methodological basis for research (Khomenko, 2018; 2020; Khomenko & Hample, 2019).

Considering empiricalization, we should emphasize cross-cultural studies, in which the direction that interests us is involved. In this regard, it is necessary to mention Dale Hample`s contribution (Hample, 2003; 2005; 2018). The scholar seeks to investigate how the cultural characteristics of different national groups affect the attitude of respondents to interpersonal disputes. After completing the stage of collecting empirical data, the researcher compares them, from which he makes conclusions about the influence of such features on how the dispute occurs (Hample, 2018).

Argumentation theory is closely related to the art of controversy and explores arguing from different points of view. Controversy can have various causes. As Dale Hample points out, people quite often *argue for fun*. Winning a dispute can be the basis for self-affirmation, and the process of controversy itself helps to better investigate and understand the opponent`s point of view (Hample & Irions, 2015). In turn, Douglas Walton describes an eristic dispute, the cause of which is the desire of the proposer to humiliate the opponent and *prove his rightness* on any issue. In such a dispute, there aggressive manifestations of the debaters are often observed (Walton, 1998). According to Dale Hample the third type of dispute aims to *display someone’s identity* (Hample & Irions, 2015).

It should be noted that today the theory of argumentation is no longer a purely theoretical discipline. Scholars are increasingly focusing on applied research (Walton, 1998). The essence of the new approach, called *empiricalization*, is to collect empirical evidence and use it to generalize theoretical material. Such research tools are often sociological surveys based on questionnaires that contain several questions and are used to collect information about members of a particular sample (usually, the questionnaire method is used to work with a large number of respondents). The obtained results can be interpreted both quantitatively and qualitatively. To do this, you should alternate open and closed questions in the questionnaire (open questions do not limit the respondent in the answer options as opposed to closed ones).

From the above, we can conclude about the relevance and necessity of such a direction as empiricalization for modern research within the framework of argumentative issues.

Another approach that can be identified as a trend in the modern theory of argumentation is called multimodal argumentation. Its essence is to involve all modes of argumentation (verbal, visual, gustatory, audible, etc.) simultaneously to increase the effect of persuasion. This approach involves the desire to develop practically oriented aspects of argumentation doctrine. Multimodal argumentation is considered in practical application in the conditions of communicative practice. The concept of multimodality involves complex research of the basic ways of argumentation (Bura, 2020).

This approach is innovative and is currently in its infancy. According to Leo Groarke, this approach is still questionable. The answers are being sought: '*though some attempts to construct a 'multimodal' theory of argument are criticized, it advocates for an argumentation theory that makes room for visual arguing and for other non-verbal modes that have not been explored in depth*' (Groarke, 2015). However, there is no doubt that this search is doomed to success, and its results will be applied in everyday discourse.

There are several 'modes' of arguing that deserve attention while analyzing the argumentation process. Argumentation theory should emphasize studying non-verbal components such as sounds, music, taste, smell, etc. To accomplish this, scholars such as Leo Groarke and Michael Gilbert resort to 'modes of arguing' to clarify the non-verbal aspect of argumentation. Multimodal argumentation should be developed to apply standards (pragma-dialectics, informal logic, rhetoric) to acts of argumentation that use non-verbal means of argumentation (Groarke, 2015; Gilbert, 1994). In fact, arguers often use non-verbal components to confirm their standpoint. Multimodal theory noticeably extends what is semantically meaningful while considering an argument (Bura, 2020).

Toward the history of the project

The method of empirical research can be effectively used to study cross-cultural differences and reveal the identity of a particular community during interpersonal communication. In 2018-2019 we launched the project related to the attitude of Ukrainian youth to face-to-face arguing. We used the tools elaborated in logic, the theory of argumentation, linguistics, and cognitive sciences (Eemeren, 2015; Finocchiaro, 2013; Groarke, 2015; Gilbert, 1994; Hample, 2003, 2005, 2018; Hample & Irions, 2015; Santibanez, 2020; Walton, 1998).

Our project's main goal was to clarify the attitude of Ukrainian youth to aggressiveness in interpersonal arguing. The research was divided into three stages. The *first stage* of the project focused on studying verbal argumentation. In particular, we were interested in verbal aggressiveness as a cause of misunderstanding between the arguers. The *second stage* of our project was focused on non-verbal tools concerned with aggressiveness.

We conducted the survey that involved 14 respondents on both stages. There were 11 women and 3 men; 3 bachelor students and 11 Ph.D. students (aged 18-25). All respondents have been studying at the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. The participants have been the representatives of the Faculty of Philosophy and the Faculty of History. Respondents represented all regions of Ukraine and Kyiv's city, except for the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the uncontrolled territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The study was conducted in the Main Building of the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. The statistical error of the survey did not exceed 0.3%.

The findings received on the first and second stages were described in our paper (Khomenko & Bura, 2019).

Research objectives, sample and instruments

This paper is devoted to the *third stage* of our project. It was aimed not only to define the attitude of Ukrainian youth to interpersonal arguing but also to determine what factors (modals) affect the dynamics of aggressiveness in this process. We looked at face-to-face arguing as a type of multimodal argumentation. Both verbal and non-verbal modes (visual and audio) were studied in the third stage.

There were three research questions:

(RQ1): Are there any types of verbal or non-verbal aggressiveness in the debate-experiment and how do they manifest?

(RQ2): What are the reasons for the increase of verbal or non-verbal aggressiveness in interpersonal arguing?

(RQ3): How do the audio tracks affect the level of respondents' aggressiveness?

Participants were divided into three groups. The first and second groups (6 people in each group) participated directly in the debate, and the third group (3 people) were judges who evaluated the speech and answers to questions. Two women 24-25 years old, three women 18-20 years old, and one man 25 years old, were among the participants of the first group. Three members of the group were from Kyiv, one from the North Ukraine, one from the Eastern Ukraine and one from the Center of Ukraine. Three women aged 18-20, two women aged 24-25 and one man aged 24-25 were among the participants of the second group. Four out of six participants were from Central Ukraine. The other two were from Kyiv.

The debate took place on a specific topic, which all participants supported. After the debate, the participants of the first group were invited to listen to the calm, lyrical track *'Dust in the wind'* by *'Kansas'* (only melody, no lyrics), and the members of the second group — *'Evisceration Plague'* by *'Cannibal Corpse'* (only melody, no lyrics), which belongs to the musical direction *'Death metal'*. Afterward, the participants answered the questions suggested in the questionnaire.

Findings

All six participants of the first group noted that during the debate, there was aggressiveness, which was expressed in *destructive verbal criticism of the opponent's point of view, aggressive verbal defense of their position, aggressive poses and gestures (throwing a pen on the table, punching the table).* At the same time, 3 participants noted that aggressive behavior was observed by members of another group. All participants in the first group argued that aggressiveness during debates is a *natural phenomenon*.

Of those participants in the first group who took an active part in the debate (expressed their own point of view, criticized opponents` statements), two people felt personal irritation (aggressiveness) during the process. At the same time, both participants explained this by the fact that they were *provoked by counterarguments and questions* from the members of the second group.

Two participants who took an active part in the debate claimed they did not feel irritated in the process. Among the two participants who took a passive part (*listened, perceived, mentally disagreed, but did not express their point of view aloud*), one was irritated by the lack of time to express his position. The other one did not feel aggressiveness during the debate. After listening to the musical track (*'Dust in the wind' by 'Kansas'*), two members of the first group felt less irritated, the other two — remained at the previous level, two more said they did not feel any irritation during the debate. All six participants of the first group liked the proposed musical track. Half of the participants were familiar with it before; the other half were not.

At the end of the survey, participants were offered a scale that described different feelings and emotions. Respondents had to determine how they felt while listening to music. Almost all members of the first group (5 out of 6) reported that they felt a strong or very strong *interest*. Four out of the six participants noted that they felt a strong or a very strong *elation*. Half of the participants felt a strong or very strong *joy, enthusiasm, pleasure, and inspiration* while listening to the musical track. At the same time, almost none of the participants felt dissatisfied, afraid, aggressive, indifferent, and angry (five of the six members of the first group noted that these feelings were very weak or almost absent). The modern track *'Dust in the wind' by 'Kansas'* helped to reduce the feeling of aggressiveness in only two of the six cases. At the same time, it caused a feeling of interest and elation for almost all members of the first group.

Five out of six members of the second group stated that they noticed aggressiveness during the debate, which was expressed in *raising their voices, an ironic attitude to what their opponents said, in an aggressive manner of formulating questions*. Two participants who took an active part in the debate felt personally irritated during the negotiations. Other participants (three active and one passive) did not feel aggressiveness during the debate.

Only one member of the second group had known the musical track *'Evisceration Plague'* by *'Cannibal Corpse'* before. At the same time, only two participants liked it, three had a neutral attitude, and one did not like it. One participant, who took an active part in the debate and felt aggressiveness in the process, said that the feeling of irritation subsided after listening to the music.

At the end of the survey, participants were offered a scale that described different feelings and emotions. Respondents had to determine how they felt while listening to a musical track. Half of the participants felt a *strong sense of satisfaction, vigor and energy*. None of the members of the second group felt *indifferent or sad, angry or frustrated*. At the same time, the respondents had a *low level of elation, enthusiasm, inspiration and satisfaction.*

Conclusion

The beginning of the 21st century is characterized by the focus of research on empirical investigations, which suggest the applied nature of scholarly achievements in the field of argumentation theory. The third stage of the study conducted in 2018-2019 is an example of an empirical discovery of multimodal argumentation. During this experiment, verbal and nonverbal, namely visual and sound modes of argumentation, were examined.

The results of the study show that Ukrainian youth are not prone to interpersonal disputes. Most respondents agree that it is better to avoid open conflicts. When the latter is not possible, Ukrainians do not behave aggressively. Survey participants emphasized that they do not insult, provoke, or abuse their opponents during interpersonal disputes. On the contrary, their behavior is friendly. The research results in 2018-2019 allow us to draw the following conclusions: Ukrainian youth has a *sharply negative attitude* to disputes in which aggressive emotions prevail. Aggressiveness is seen as *unacceptable human behavior.*

All of the above factors lead to a quarrel rather than a constructive dialogue aimed at a consensual solution to the conflict of views. Survey participants believe that aggressiveness only deepens misunderstandings and does not lead to positive results. Calm, lyrical music, in most cases, does not help to reduce the level of aggressiveness. On the contrary, it increases the irritation because of being perceived by the participants in contrast to their emotional state. In contrast, aggressive musical tracks tend to weaken the level of aggressiveness.

Based on the survey data, it can be claimed that the majority of Ukrainian students are mostly *tolerant, friendly, and peaceful*. They prefer respect and compassion in dealing with people and tend to engage in constructive dialogue. If this is not possible, respondents prefer not to start a dispute at all.

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Political Franchising as a Modern Political Technology

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The article deals with the discovery of instruments of modern political franchising that means a practice of a political brand using for electoral campaigns. There are investigated the technologies of political franchising as a special kind of political technologies of informational influence. There are determined the main mechanisms of political franchising for political election.
Keywords: political franchising, brand, electoral campaigns, political technologies, political election

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Introduction

Transformation of the political process into the political market determines the growing role of market technologies in organizing of political campaigns. It means a growing need to study the political market (marketing research) and promotion of goods by means of communication (advertising). Accordingly, we can transfer to political realities such as modern marketing categories as “franchise” and “franchising” and consider them in the context of a charismatic strategy of creating a political image.

Political franchising is the technology of transferring political charisma from one politician to another. In general, charisma is a set of special features of a politician, through which one can explain his special right to power. At the same time, charisma can be transferred to other objects. We can consider the traditional for the Christian church ritual of the laying on of hands. By ordaining a candidate for the priesthood, the ritual participants impart to him a part of “grace,” that is, essentially charismatic qualities.

By analogy, a politician can also share part of his own charisma towards other people who may be his allies or just like-minded. In fact, a similar effect of the charismatic technology of creating a political image is realized in the technology of "political franchising," which is based on the transfer of the properties of the political image from one political object to another. In essence, franchising is the transfer of "someone else's charisma" to another object, as a result of which this object acquires specific features.

The franchising instrument of political marketing

In general, franchising is based on a marketing concept that can be adopted by an organization as a strategy for business expansion.

The word "franchise" is of Anglo-French derivation from "franc," meaning "free," and is used both as a noun and as a (transitive) verb. For the franchiser, the use of a franchise system is an alternative business growth strategy, compared to expansion through corporate-owned outlets or "chain stores." Adopting a franchise system business growth strategy for the sale and distribution of goods and services minimizes the franchiser's capital investment and liability risk.

The growing role of brands in the industrial production of economically developed countries has turned the association of small producers of homogeneous goods into a single network. This task was successfully solved by creating a single multi-brand, which gave permission (franchise) to small producers, who maintained economic and legal autonomy but transferred to the owner of the brand functions of marketing and advertising.

Using marketing instruments for political campaigns includes franchising as a universal political brand for local and general elections. We can imagine a modern political party as a brand that included local "partners" and national franchisers. Recent analyses point to a series of changes that appear to characterize the parties of the classic Western systems. The puzzle is that the most dramatic of these changes point in contradictory directions. Thus, most parties in developed systems are facing sharply declining memberships while individual party members are winning increased decision-making power, especially on crucial personnel choices. At the same time, party leaders, especially those of the party in public office, have enhanced their power and autonomy by increasing their dependence on outside professionals such as pollsters and media experts (Carty, 2004: 5). By joining a nationwide political project, local politicians act as a kind of "political distributor" on the ground, representing the party's interests and using a powerful brand to carry out their own political tasks.

The links between different levels of the party change in nature, becoming a relationship between the "central office" (production of ideas, image creation, advertising campaign, positioning in the political space, etc.) and regional offices (team building, recruitment, financial solutions, tasks, the formation of election headquarters, ensuring the conduct of the election campaign).

In general, franchising as a marketing technology is "granting a license to trade or manufacture goods and services under a trademark (brand) in a strictly defined market. Franchising as a network scheme of business reproduction based on the use of the brand is one of the main mechanisms through which the global unity of business practices and everyday consumer standards in the modern world, the relative "longevity" of trademarks" (Filippov, 2009: 22).

The key aspect of production is not a commodity but a symbolic aspect associated with the brand. The brand is a set of associations of public consciousness. A successful brand is a certain, socially significant idea. In the modern world, the brand is more important than goods.

The economic model of franchising ensures the appropriate use of resources of small producers of homogeneous products or services. The franchise scheme allows you to enter the national advertising market, to act under a powerful brand (which allows you to start a new business not to start from scratch, but to have a certain basis in the form of public perceptions; in addition, a powerful brand is a means of balancing risks and overcoming crises).

However, the franchise scheme's potential opens new opportunities and prospects for its use in other, alternative areas of public relations. For example, it can be a phenomenon of "educational franchising" form of doing business with the transfer of rights to sell educational services on behalf of the franchiser (Kovalenko, 2004: 3).

In this case, educational franchising is the creation of an extensive system of branches of well-known universities in different regions of the state, operating under the same name and according to standardized operation principles.

There are different positions on the possibility of using the concept of franchising to describe the political process. E. Lassan considers the concept of "political franchising" as one of the "economic metaphors" to denote the process of finding "political patrons." This metaphor reflects the growing role of marketing in modern society but does not describe real political phenomena (Lassan, 2010: 30). The different position for describing political franchising is declaring its a political model of party constructions. In general, the use of marketing technology in politics remains tabooed for publicity. If franchising is always declared and enshrined in the relevant documents in the economic sphere, then in politics, franchising models are never publicly recognized. However, this does not mean that it is impossible to apply the concept of franchising to descriptions of modern political phenomena.

This phenomenon was facilitated by a number of social conditions:

1. The growing role of the media, especially audiovisual. Every political party must be represented in the national communicative space, which can be realized only on the basis of a strong party center.
2. The lower level of ideology of political parties. The political subject is transformed from an ideological expression of the interests of social groups (classes, ethnic groups, professional communities) into a tactical union of elites, created to gain and retain power.
3. The growing role of political leaders as "faces" of political parties. Modern political parties transform from an ideology union of confederates into a group of peoples who believes the leader.

"A comparison of party "franchise contracts" ought to provide a more unambiguous basis for developing typologies of party organization and activity than those that rely on differing programmatic appeals, social bases, or origins in particular historical moments. Tracking changes in franchise structures over time will help identify just how and how much party organizations have changed and evolved in response to changes in their institutional and/or socio-political environments. Unlocking the puzzle of party organization is a central issue for understanding democratic politics, and franchise models provide an important key to the puzzle" (Carty, 2004: 24).

Construction of political charisma

Charisma is a specific situational political technology that has a significant effect. At the same time, the charismatic basis of leadership opens up opportunities not only to create an image but also to turn it into a kind of symbolic capital that can be transferred to other objects. This effect opens up opportunities for new political technologies, which are becoming particularly common in modern world politics. In particular, charisma can not just be created. It can be produced and sold, turning it into a certain political "commodity," which, in turn, can be the object of mass demand and consumption.

The transformation of the political process into a market determines the growing role of market technologies in organizing political campaigns. As noted above, charisma can be transferred to other objects.

By analogy, a politician can also share part of his own charisma towards other people who may be his allies or just like-minded. The similar effect of the charismatic technology of creating a political image is realized in the technology of "political franchising." This technology is based on the transfer of the political image from one political object to another. In essence, franchising is the transfer of "someone else's charisma" to another object.

The technology of political charisma transferring is difficult to implement. It can be used the concept of "pseudo-charisma" to denote the situation of staging the bureaucracy of the crisis and overcoming it through the connection of a charismatic leader (Freik, 2003: 6). The technology of creating political charisma involves staging two main aspects of charismatic domination: the leader's personality and the situation in society, which must be "corrected" by the leader. The implementation of this strategy should be ensured by the controlled media, which are designed to provide support to the government through the representation of meanings.

This creates a basis for distinguishing between true and fabricated artificial charisma. The main characteristic of true charisma is the focus on social change. True charisma is focused on revolutionary social transformations, while pseudo-charisma only mimics social transformations, leaving the political system unchanged.

Accordingly, the form of pseudo-charisma is systemic political forces (parliamentary parties, legal, political associations, etc.), while true charisma is realized through the so-called "anti-system parties." Charismatic leadership often arises in the weakness of existing political parties (Freik, 2003: 15).

Charismatic leadership is formed as an alternative to traditional ideological parties in the modern world of media cartoons and the personification of politics.

The biographical narrative in political franchising

The biographical narrative of a politician can organize the construction of political charisma. In general, a narrative, story, or tale is any account of a series of related events or experiences, whether nonfictional (memoir, biography, news report, documentary, travelogue, etc.) or fictional (fairy tale, fable, legend, thriller, novel, etc.). Narratives can be presented through a sequence of written or spoken words, still or moving images, or any combination of these. The word derives from the Latin verb narrare (to tell), which is derived from the adjective gnarus (knowing or skilled).

Along with argumentation, description, and exposition, narration, broadly defined, is one of four rhetorical modes of discourse. More narrowly defined, it is the fiction-writing mode in which the narrator communicates directly to the reader.

The transition to the era of mass media dominance in political communications has led to the transformation of election discourse into media discourse, which accordingly affects the formation of modern political narratives. Therefore, the main object in the study of political narratives is the media and other mass culture objects.

The basis for compiling a biographical narrative in politics is the creation of a "model biography," close in structure to the structure and pathos of the heroic myth, which, in particular, captures the most important events in the life of a mythical character (e.g., a descendant of a deity and mortal man). This myth suggests that the hero's life serves as a model to follow and is a source of life wisdom and moral guidance for other members of this society.

All heroic myths include the following elements-episodes: 1) a miraculous birth; 2) trials by older relatives or demons (initiation); 3) search for a wife or marriage trials; 4) fighting monsters and other feats; 5) the death of the hero.

Accordingly, acting as one or another variation of the heroic plot, the biographical narrative performs a presentation function and plays an important role in creating a politician's image. Paradoxically, successful politicians are usually people who know how to tell stories: "The best way for a politician to describe his position, his beliefs, is to convey his ideas in the form of history" (Sheigal, 2007: 90).

Thus, the biographical narrative in politics is a story about a politician's life, which represents him as a heroic figure and thus becomes the basis for the candidate's image strategy.

Simultaneously, the essence of a biographical political narrative is not limited to the heroization of a political figure.

Combining himself with history, the politician appears in the political discourse as an expression of certain ideas rooted in the historical process, through the appeal to which the election strategy is implemented.

The political narrative is one of the main forms of political communication. In terms of content, the political narrative is a modern variation of the traditional folklore-narrative form of communication. A political narrative is a structured, orderly form of presenting political information, designed to explain certain politically significant events to the public.

The analysis of political narratives opens perspectives in studying the political-communicative process's main ideas, the direction and intensity of political discourse (in particular, to discuss key issues of society), the positions of key political players on certain key issues.

The most important aspect of political narrative, which distinguishes it from other textual forms of social communication, is its immersion in conditions of polyphony and pluralism, which leads to a situation of constant interaction (and discussion) with other narratives. Accordingly, the analysis of the political narrative provides a comprehensive immersion in the studied political discourse.

Because the narrative is meaningfully connected, the latter can relate to a variety of social objects, including political phenomena. The essential difference of the narrative, as a form of dissemination of information, is its integrity. Narrative acquires its meaning only as a complex combination of words, sentences, ideas. In a general narrative, analysis is based on the fact that in terms of social communication, the unit of analysis can not be words, sentences, or phrases because they do not contain some useful information.

The general scheme of political narrative using can be explained as construction of charisma with biographical facts using for political promotion. It it the construction of symbolical capital for using in elections and sharing with other politicians in a political franchising mechanism.

Political franchising in modern Ukraine

Political franchising is one of the most popular technologies of party buildings in modern Ukraine. Ukraine has not such a long tradition of democratic election because of the totalitarianism of the USSR. The modern party systems of Ukraine include more than 100 political parties, which play a low role in public politics. The Ukrainian party system is weak and chaotic.

The process of formation of Ukrainian political forces had its own peculiarities. For 70 years, there was a mono-party system both in the Soviet Union and in Ukraine. The multiparty system was restored in the late twentieth century. The peculiarity of the names characterizes the process of the party building in Ukraine; the odiousness of the figures of leaders (some of them managed to create several parties); a difference of programs, ideologies; a radical change of names; pro-Russian orientation of a number of political forces; associating the leader with a party he has never led; the world's only anarchist political force, buying and selling and, finally, an unformed party system. During the years of independence, there were almost 300 parties in Ukraine (Bevz, 2014).

Franchising technology is especially popular in politics at the level of the local election, where political forces on a regional scale are forced to act, staying away from the general political discourse. The franchising mechanism allows reaching the level of discussion of general political problems. For example, a candidate for mayor, representing at the same time a well-known political force (or acting as a "proxy" of a well-known politician), can rely on the authority of the national party leader, the social base of the political force, to implement its own advertising campaign in the national context.

In general, the brand as an ideological and symbolic entity is very unstable and can be destroyed as a result of a serious political crisis, scandal, the spread of rumors and gossip, the direction of powerful "compromising" information flows, and so on. Accordingly, the franchise scheme turns politicians hostage to their own brand.

Political franchising is rapidly developing in Ukraine.

Thus, it should be noted that in the current conditions of political market development, franchising schemes of building political parties (or other political actors) are becoming more common, during which political forces unite around a powerful brand, based on which the tasks of gaining support are realized. and obtaining representative mandates. Under the franchise model of building political structures, the whole essence of the relationship between different political levels is reduced exclusively to the principles of efficiency and optimization of expenditures and revenues. Accordingly, it transforms political forces into amorphous entities organized to convert capital into political dividends, which becomes the dominant factor in the functioning of political parties with the growing political role of the media, personalization, and visualization of the political process.

There are different forms of political franchising technologies in modern Ukraine.

1. Construction of political parties named after politician. For example, there were personal parties of Y. Tymoshenko, P. Poroshenko, O. Liashko. These parties are a mechanism of transformation of personal popularity in political rating.

2. The party can be named after a TV show as a party "The servant of the people," which was organized by the president of Ukraine V. Zelenskyi. This party won the general election 2019 in Ukraine and converted the personal popularity of V. Zelenskyi into the biggest fraction of the Ukrainian parliament.
3. The party can also be a construction of local political elites to united their ratings into one result. It can be a local political project for a region or a city. In this case, a political franchise cannot be personal.

Ukrainian politics is still unstructured and unformed. It means that parties exist one more than two election campaigns. Then the political field will be reconstructed, and new parties will be formed. In this case, political franchising technology can be the best way to organize a new political party for popular lieder with a strong biographical narrative and charisma. Other politicians can join this political project for one or two elections.

The way of political franchising in Ukrainian party building is an example of the beginning of political pluralism in the medium's age. Traditional democratic political institutes are not constructed in Ukraine because of totalitarian influence. And the modern political institute's contraction transformed into a media project making. "The strength of the franchise model is that it recognizes that the strategical impulses of polities work unevenly over space and time and it provides a framework for ordering very diverse organizational solutions to the party-building challenges that politicians face" (Carty, 2004: 24).

Conclusions

The results of our research are as follows.

1. Modern image technologies are designed to generate charisma for a politician, which, in fact, becomes a pseudo-charisma. It means an information technology construct for political influence.
2. The peculiarity of modern image technologies in politics is that the image created for one political entity can be transferred to other entities within the framework of "political franchising" technologies. This political technology of informational influence means that the image created once can be attracted to another politician through "transfer" in the form of joining a political force or mutual support.
3. The narrative serves as an ideological basis for building an image as a holistic formation, in which biographical history is the basis of history-based views.
4. The image of a popular politician or political party can be used by a less popular politician who joins them and gains some of the popularity through such connections. Franchising creates a kind of information field that influences politics by transferring a particular politician's features to a political party or other politicians.

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The Specifics of the Formation of Think Tanks' System in Asia (the Case of Japan) and Australia

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The article deals with the analysis of the specifics of the formation of a think tanks' system in Asia (the case of Japan) and Australia. It is noted that Japanese think tanks increase their influence on public policy and important public decisions. Initiators and sponsors of think tanks — enterprises, foundations, government agencies, local governments, political parties and individuals. In general, a network of competing think tanks is being formed. It is argued that Australia's think tanks occupy a specific niche in the country's political system and help the government to develop a balanced and optimal public policy in all spheres of public life. It is pointed out that the dominant types of think tanks in Australia are autonomous and independent, quasi-independent and university. The emergence of Australian think tanks is generally in line with the global dynamics of growth in the number of think tanks.

Keywords: think tanks, public policy, policy analysis, expert analytical activity, political analytics

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Introduction

Today, there are 1676 think tanks in Asia or 20.7% of the total number of think tanks on the planet. This is the third step after North America and Europe. The top three in the region's number of think tanks include China — 512; India — 293; Japan — 116 (McGann, 2018).

In Asian countries — Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China — think tanks are often located within corporations. Chinese — work with the government's support, and their scientists are often involved in patron-client relationships with political leaders. Many institutions in Southeast Asia are semi-independent, often in close contact with the government, with individual politicians. The notion that think tanks need independence from the state to be "free-thinking" is an Anglo-American norm that does not fit well into other political cultures. Therefore, think tanks increasingly understand the functions of policy research and many analytical and policy advisory practices, rather than a specific organizational and legal structure as a non-governmental, non-partisan, or independent civil society institution (Stone, 2005).

Analytical centers in a number of Asian countries appeared after the World War II. These are organizations such as the Japan Institute of International Affairs established in 1959 (Japan Institute, 2020), or the Singaporean International Institute of International Relations, established in 1962 (SIIA) (Singaporean Institute, 2020). A number of Asian institutions that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s were modeled on the Royal Institute of International Affairs in the United Kingdom or American think tanks. For example, the Singapore Institute of International Relations and the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta (CSIS) can be considered an analytical center (Center for Strategic, 2020). During the 1990s, Asian research institutes relied on the American tradition of think tanks in their organization and work. However, some have sought to export the American model and adapt it to the cultural and institutional context of a particular Asian country (Stone, 2005).

The number of think tanks in Southeast Asia is small but growing. However, although the first think tanks in Asia appeared in the 1960s, they became widespread only in the 1990s, so the diversity of think tanks and their specialization in Asia is less pronounced.

The first generation of think tanks was elite, governmental institutions in most Southeast Asian countries. For example, the Indonesian Institute of Science Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIPI) (Lembaga, 2020), the Philippine Institute of Development Studies (PIDS) (The Philippine Institute, 2020) were established as non-standard, nonprofit state corporations. That is, that generation of Asian think tanks was closely associated with the state. Their main goal was to provide information to the government and to act as its mouthpiece. Analytical centers were not independent of the state, so some researchers call them state-oriented entities. Their significance lay in their ability to amplify and convey top-down messages to other sections of society. According to researchers, Asian think tanks tend to operate in a "gain mode" rather than a "criticism mode" (Yamamoto & Hubbard, 1995).

Compared to similar American institutes, Australian think tanks are less independent. The lack of comprehensive information and tactical resources encourages them to cooperate with a wide range of different research and intellectual organizations.

Geographically, Australia belongs to Oceania. According to the study "Global Go To Think Tank," Oceania accounts for 0.8% of all think tanks in the world, i.e., — 55 organizations, Australian — 39 (McGann, 2018).

Features of the formation and operation of think tanks in Japan

For a long time, dependence on the government and corporations excluded think tanks from Japan's public and political field. But the complex socio-economic problems facing the ruling elite necessitated the improvement of the quality of government program management by integrating the scientific potential of think tanks. Japan's main think tanks are for-profit organizations set up by corporations. Funding for think tanks by large foundations, companies, and individuals is an exception. Geographically, Japan's analytical centers are concentrated in Tokyo (80% of researchers and 90% of studies). They are not very active in making public policy proposals (only 18% of all think tanks are independent, and 80% of research is commissioned). Approximately 22% of all results of their activities are made public. The focus is on corporate and research, analysis and development of optimal corporate strategies. A tiny part of the work relates to an international life, lifestyle, and environmental issues (Modern analytical centers, 1998).

Researchers from the Agency for Humanitarian Technologies note that most think tanks are small, with a narrow field of research controlled by the government and corporate structures. 70% of think tanks in Japan — institutions that employ less than 20 people. Institutions with more than 100 people — only 5% of the total. Accordingly, their activities are dominated by short-term research. Such think tanks cannot afford to work on long-term, broad-based interdisciplinary projects. Since they cannot conduct thorough, large-scale research, these analysis centers fall out of the general picture of think tanks (Modern analytical centers, 1998). Thus, it can be stated that the public resonance of the work of think tanks in Japan is small.

Analytical centers in Japan began to appear in the 1970s. These include the Nomura Research Institute (Nomura, 2020) and the Mitsubishi Research Institute (The Mitsubishi Research Institute, 2020), which dealt with the problems of state development, transport development, environmental protection; Nippon Institute for Research Advance (NIRA) (Nippon Institute, 2020), which became a financial sponsor and center for coordination of policy research on the complex project "Challenges of the 21st century," The organization of modern integrated research, created to support the implementation of structural reforms, headed by Ed Saburo; Forum of political concepts. There were also small think tanks of local significance. The government's program of accelerated economic development gave a qualitative impetus to this. Analytical centers acted as subordinate governmental organizations, which provided the preparatory basic research necessary for public administration decisions.

In the '80s of the 20th century began the formation of think tanks by financial and industrial circles. They focused on increasing profitability and stabilizing corporate governance and also provided consulting services. An example is the Nomura Research Institute (Nomura, 2020).

In the 1990s, think tanks began to emerge, supported by local governments. Then there was a discussion about the need to ensure the independent operation of think tanks as modern tools of democracy. In 1995, the International Forum of Analytical Centers was held in Tokyo. It contributed to the awareness of the importance of think tanks in the life of a democratic state. After the Forum, two more important think tanks emerged — the Japan Center for International Relations in Political Studies and the Foundation for the Promotion of International Studies (later the Tokyo Foundation).

In the late 1990s, a new boom in think tanks began. The following were established: Center for Political Studies of the 21st Century; The concept of Japan — an organization created by former ministers; Future Fujig Management Research Center; Organization of public lawmaking; Forum of political concepts of the 20th century. There were other similar organizations that conducted independent policy research on a nonprofit basis. They differed greatly in funding sources, size, organizational form and composition. In addition to such organizations, special departments were also established at universities and graduate schools, and relevant associations of scholars emerged: the Japanese Society of Scientists, which studied public policy, the Japanese Evaluation Society. The development of their activities were facilitated by the adoption of certain legislative acts, in particular, the Law on Special Non-Commercial Activities and the Law on Openness of Government Information.

Every year, Japanese think tanks increase their influence on public policy and important public decision-making. Initiators and sponsors of think tanks — enterprises, foundations, government agencies, local governments, political parties, and individuals. In general, a network of competing analytical centers is being formed (Filippov, 2007: 26-28).

To better understand the peculiarities of the analytical centers of Japan, it is worth considering their work on specific examples.

The Global Industrial and Social Process Research Institute (GISPRI) was founded in 1988. His focus is on the development of a global society. The Institute's structure is built to optimally combine research tasks and tasks related to the promotion of expertise to government agencies and the Japanese business community. The structure of this analytical center includes: 1) the board of directors; 2) the board of trustees; 3) auditors; 4) the Chairman of the Board of Directors; 5) senior advisers; 6) advisers; 7) the executive director; 8) Secretariat (Department of Global Environmental Problems; Department of General Affairs; Department of Planning and Research); 9) international forum for industrial and social development policy (research committees) (Global, 2020).

The research is based on the analysis of trends in global resources, environmental issues, international relations, and the links between industry and the economy, culture and society. The institute provides its research-based proposals, both in Japan and abroad, to enhance the international exchange of information and ideas. The main activities of the institute: 1) research activities; 2) development and nomination of political proposals to government and business structures; 3) joint research with other centers of expertise.

The Institute maintains close contacts with 1) government agencies of Japan, including the Ministries of Economy, Trade and Industry; Environmental Safety; Environmental Protection; International Cooperation; Foreign Affairs. As well as the official residence of the Prime Minister; 2) leading business associations: the Japan Foreign Trade Organization (JETRO); Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren); Organization of development of industrial technologies and new energies; 3) expert structures: the National Institute for the Promotion of Research. This institute also cooperates with foreign partners: the International Energy Agency, the World Wildlife Fund.

The main project of the Institute is a forum of global industrial and social policy. The forum's mission is to prepare draft proposals for the Government of Japan based on GISPRI research and development. Other key products of the Institute include research materials covered in symposia, seminars and publications in the GISPRI Bulletin, in the Institute's annual report (Global, 2020).

The National Institute for Research Advance. Founded on the initiative of leading representatives of the industrial and scientific community of Japan in 1974. The Institute's main goal is to conduct independent research that can help solve numerous and diverse problems in politics, economics, sociology, international relations, new technologies, and local government. The center has more than 40 employees permanently. The income of the Institute is about 300 000 US dollars. The Institute receives part of its funding from the Government of Japan, provincial administrations and private businesses.

The institute plans and implements complex research projects that will contribute to Japanese citizens' prosperity in the long run. It is emphasized that Japan must become a leader in the 21st century, based on the new philosophy of the future adopted by the world community and on the national strategy. According to the Institute, the most important element of the strategy will be information technology, the political potential of which will be realized only if they are not isolated from the world. An important factor in Japanese society's development is considered creative innovation — Japan's response to globalization's challenge.

The structure of the Institute is formed by Board of Directors; co-chairs of the Board of Directors; president; vice president; auditors; financial committee; auditor committee; Planning and General Affairs Department (General Affairs Department; Finance and Accounting Department; Planning and Public Relations Department); Department of Political Studies; Department of International Cooperation; information research center. The work of research groups is autonomous. They exist in the Departments of Political Studies and International Cooperation, as well as in the Center for Policy Research Information.

The institute has extensive governmental relations at the national and regional levels. The Institute also develops direct contacts with business structures (for example, with the Japanese business support organization JETRO) (Nippon Institute, 2020).

Features of the formation and operation of think tanks in Australia

Historically, Australia's first think tank was considered to be the Australian Institute of International Affairs, which emerged in 1924 and was then a kind of quasi-state "think tank." The emergence of the first independent centers occurred in the postwar period and was due primarily to the need for big business to legitimize their activities. At that time, think tanks sometimes served as interest groups and lobby groups. They have created an extensive network of interrelated interest groups that have worked hard to lobby and influence the Australian legislature and executive. The dynamics of growth in the number of centers in Australia completely coincides with the global dynamics. Australia's specificity is that significant growth occurs in the '90s of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century. The business was replaced by private donations, which usually had the same business origins. Successful businessmen who created their empires moved away from the real management of affairs and focused their efforts on charity, sponsorship. Today, Australia's think tanks are funded by large corporations and wealthy individual donors who have realized the simple fact that generating ideas is the right and promising direction for investment (Zhurbey, 2011: 109-111).

The following think tanks have become quite active in Australian public policy: Chiefly Research Center, Menzies Research Center, The Lowy Institute for International Policy, Center for Independent Studies, The Australian Institute of International Affairs, Strategic and Defence Studies Center (SDSC) of Australian National University.

Chifley Research Center — seeks to develop and improve the format of public policy debate and encourages the Australian public to think progressively. The Center facilitates policy discussions at universities and at all venues suitable for political forums in the country and provides strategic advice on a wide range of policy issues of the Labor Party of Australia.

The Chifley Center is almost entirely funded by the state budget. The share of income from private investors, compared to other similar centers, is quite small. The fact is that the development of political discourse and raising the level of citizens' political consciousness is a function of the Chifley Research Center, which is actively approved by the state. That is why the government has been providing large grants to the center every year (Chifley Research Center, 2020).

Menzies Research Center — provides analytical support to the activities of the Liberal Party of Australia. Menzies Center addressed the representatives of the Liberal Party with a proposal to create a public forum for the citizens of the country, in the format of which everyone could bring up important topics for discussion. By accumulating appeals from citizens who come to the forum, the Center's specialists get an increasingly complete picture of public preferences. With such information, the party can successfully increase its rating and win the election.

It is worth noting that the format of addressing an official with a complaint, request, proposal, etc. — is widely developed in various government agencies in almost all countries. In this sense, nothing supernatural Menzies Center did not invent. The point is in the media positioning of this project.

The news of the creation of the "forum" swept through all the leading media in Australia. Citizens were actively encouraged to take part in it. It was emphasized that the center wants to hear both the voices of its ideological partners and opponents. The head of the Center said that it is important for specialists to know what political decisions irritate the public and how its representatives would like to change the situation. To help the party and the citizens of the country achieve common goals, the Center aims to obtain an objective and complete picture of public sentiment.

The moderators of the forum initially announced various topics for discussion, but soon the number of users increased significantly, it became more difficult to keep the discussion within the previously announced topics — this was the first sign of public response. The most reasoned manifestations of positions on key popular issues are now presented in the form of separate notes on the official website. The center's experts enter into a dialogue with the visitors of the forum on some issues (Chiefly Research Center, 2020; Akopian, 2010).

The Lowy Institute for International Policy. It was created in April 2003 by Australian businessman Frank Lowy. The organization soon gained a reputation as a respected think tank for Australian politicians, businessmen and the general public. The institute specializes in international politics. It generates new ideas and engages in dialogue on international development and Australia's role in today's fast-paced world. Realizes its purpose in two ways: 1) conducting unique research and new policy options; 2) promoting a broad discussion of Australia's role in institute-initiated discussions, seminars, lectures, dialogues, conferences, etc.

The Institute emphasizes its independent and non-partisan status, which allows it to be an open platform for discussing various political ideas. The Lowy Institute is governed by a Board of Directors, which is made up of well-established people in public policy, science, and business (The Lowy Institute, 2020).

Center for Independent Studies. Founded in April 1976 by G. Lindsay. Today, the center is a leading independent organization in the study and initiation of public policy in Australia. In principle, the center does not use state financial assistance. Actively supports freedom of enterprise and free society, provides government authorities with critical knowledge on an ongoing basis, and stimulates debate among leading scholars, politicians, journalists, and the general public in Australia and the Oceania region (Center, 2020).

The Australian Institute of International Affairs. It was founded in 1924 and became an independent, nonprofit organization whose activities aim to promote the interest and understanding of Australia's foreign policy and its place in the modern system of international relations. The Institute is a discussion forum, organizes programs of lectures, seminars, symposia, conferences. The Australian Institute of International Affairs is the only such nationwide organization in Australia, with offices in all Australian states. This think tank is funded by membership fees, small government grants, and other sources. Its peculiarity is that it does not officially express its own opinion on certain international issues. This position is enshrined in its statutory documents.

The Institute develops four key areas of activity: 1) providing a discussion platform at the federal level by organizing lectures, seminars and workshops; 2) dissemination of ideas (first of all, thanks to publications on key issues of international relations); 3) training in the field of international relations (socialization, education); 4) active partnership (development of cooperation with related institutions and other organizations in Australia and abroad) (The Australian Institute, 2020).

Strategic and Defence Studies Center (SDSC) of Australian National University. It was founded in 1966. The purpose of the Center is to promote the study of strategic issues affecting military security in the Asia-Pacific region. The Center's research covers military, political, economic, scientific and other aspects of strategic development in the region, as well as military security and the peaceful settlement of current and potential conflicts. The government actively involves the Center's staff in consultations on strategy and defense, as well as for numerous lectures and seminars in government agencies. In the activity of the Center it is possible to eradicate three main directions of work: 1) scientific researches and expert-analytical activity; 2) education and training; 3) advocacy and political communications (Strategic, 2020).

The Brisbane Institute. Since its founding in 1999, it has established itself as an idea generator and discussion organizer. It has become a major driver of intellectual exchange between senior officials and practitioners in industry, commerce, government, institutions, and the rest of society, both in Australia and elsewhere. The institute employs about 330 experts. The Corporation's structure is mixed and is built on both sectoral and territorial grounds and consists of a secretariat, publications department, research programs, sponsorship and business development department, website and information.

The Institute maintains close contacts with Australian government agencies and several municipalities: the Queensland government; Ministry of Roads; managing the affairs of the prime minister and the cabinet; public works management; Queensland Department of the Treasury. The Institute's main sponsors are educational institutions: the University of Queensland, Queensland University of Technology, Griffith University, Queensland State Library. Contacts have also been established with Australian business such as Castlemaine Perkins, RNH Consulting, Gadens Lawyers, Queensland, Newspapers (The Brisbane Institute, 2020).

Conclusions

Analytical centers in Japan began to appear in the 1970s. Every year, Japanese think tanks are increasing their influence on public policy and important public decision-making. Initiators and sponsors of think tanks — enterprises, foundations, government agencies, local governments, political parties and individuals. In general, a network of competing think tanks is being formed.

Australia's think tanks occupy a specific niche in the country's political system and help the government to develop a balanced and optimal public policy in all spheres of public life. The dominant types of think tanks in Australia are autonomous and independent (Center for Independent Research), quasi-independent (e.g., the Lowe Institute) and university (Center for Strategic, 2020). The distribution of Australian analysis centers corresponds to the global dynamics of growth in the number of think tanks.

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Sustainability Assurance in Online University Education: Chinese experience for Ukraine

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Until March 2020, online learning had not been a common practice in Ukrainian universities. Typically, Ukrainian universities used online learning as an auxiliary tool only in a blended form. After the introduction of quarantine measures in Ukraine to prevent the spread of coronavirus disease, online learning has become the dominant form of teaching and learning in Ukrainian universities. However, the introduction of online learning in university practice has led to several problems related to the sustainability assurance of online educational services.

This paper presents the main results of the authors' research of critical problems that arose in the management practice of Ukrainian universities after the full transition to online education and ways of solving them using the experience of the People's Republic of China Universities. Based on the analysis of the successful experience of organizing online university education in China under quarantine restrictions, the authors proposed a three-level (e-learning software, quality assurance, ethical standards) management model of sustainable online education in Ukraine, justified the effectiveness of management experience in sustainable online education of China for Ukrainian universities.
Keywords: higher education; sustainability assurance; e-learning; quality assurance; online education; online teaching; educational ethics, China, Ukraine.

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Introduction

On March 12, 2020, Ukraine imposed restrictions on the activities of almost all spheres of the economy in public life, aimed at preventing the spread of coronavirus COVID-19 in Ukraine. Some of the most severe restrictions have inevitably been imposed on educational institutions, in particular universities. In terms of educational activities, the main restriction was the ban on students attending higher education institutions, which meant the complete transfer of the educational process online. This requirement has become a significant challenge for Ukrainian universities, as the vast majority of them have used e-learning exclusively as an additional tool in the classical classroom learning model. One of the authors of this article co-developed and implemented this model of e-learning at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv in 2016 (Rudenko 2017a; Rudenko 2017b).

However, with the experience of using online learning as an auxiliary tool to classical classroom learning, in March 2020, the vast majority of Ukrainian universities were not prepared for the full transition to online learning. One of the facts that it confirms is the numerous appeals of universities to the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine with requests to provide clarifications and directives on the full transition to online learning due to the epidemic situation. However, the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine provided answers to these inquiries relatively late (at the end of April 2020). Moreover, the explanations of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine were recommendatory and did not contain unambiguous instructions and a straightforward management concept of the full transition to online learning by Ukrainian universities. The Ministry of Education and Science, referring to the autonomy of universities, provided fairly general recommendations, which provided for decisions on the transition to online learning by each university (Guidelines). In other words, each university in Ukraine had to make an independent decision on the academic policy of online learning, software selection, quality assurance methods and ethical regulation of the educational process. This situation has, in our opinion, led to a loss of sustainability in the management of Ukrainian universities and, most importantly, a loss of sustainability in the provision of educational services, managerial sustainability and quality assurance in education. That is why, at the time of preparing this paper, the problem of ensuring the sustainability of university online learning remains unresolved. Ukrainian universities conduct online learning chaotically, using only their own experience and decisions of their administrative bodies, which has led to a loss of stability and quality of higher education in Ukraine.

The position of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine on the autonomy of universities, of course, corresponds to the current legislation of Ukraine, however, proved ineffective in terms of ensuring the sustainability of university online learning in the current emergency epidemic situation. We believe that in an emergency, the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine should approve *centralised* decisions and academic policies that would undoubtedly have *temporary* nature, but would avoid a significant reduction in the sustainability and quality of university online learning.

In our opinion, one of the productive steps to solving the problem outlined above is to study the experience of its solution by other countries at the national and local levels. In our opinion, the experience of the People's Republic of China in ensuring the sustainability of university online learning in the event of an epidemic is valuable for Ukraine. Chinese universities have been able to quickly and efficiently make the full transition to online learning and ensure the sustainability of educational services, making their experience valuable for Ukrainian universities.

That is why the purpose of our study was to develop an optimal management model to ensure the sustainability of online learning for Ukrainian universities based on the analysis of the experience of universities in the People's Republic of China. Undoubtedly, the authors of this paper do not claim a complete solution to the above problem. Our tasks were, first of all, a comparative analysis of the management experience of the universities of Ukraine and China in terms of making management decisions on 1) online learning software; 2) methods of ensuring the quality of online education; 3) regulation of ethical issues of online learning. An equally important task of our study is to identify those management components of Chinese universities that can be implemented and applied to Ukrainian universities. The authors of this article are aware that a complete solution to the problem of ensuring the sustainability of online university education in Ukraine requires additional research. However, we believe that the analysis of the experience of Chinese universities is an essential step in solving the above problem.

One of the primary documents, which contains recommendations for ensuring the sustainability of online university education in the context of banning students from attending higher education institutions, is the "Recommendations for the introduction of blended learning in vocational higher education institutions" (hereinafter — "Recommendations"). Members of the working group developed this document with the participation of Scientific and Methodology Committee 302 Distance Learning Scientific and Methodological Council of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine. This document was provided to the universities of Ukraine only on June 24, 2020, as evidenced by the letter of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine No1 / 9-344 dated 24.06.2020 (code 7161432452) (Reccomendations 2020). The recommendations were provided at the end of the academic year, three months after the introduction of the quarantine mentioned above restrictions, which, in our opinion, significantly worsened the state of ensuring the stability of online learning in Ukrainian universities. In fact, by June 24, 2020, i.e. the entire spring semester, Ukrainian universities solved the management problem of a full transition to online learning autonomously, which led to the chaotic provision of educational services and sometimes breaks in the educational process and inevitably led to reduced stability and quality of educational services.

Based on the experience of the authors of this article, who are practising representatives of the administrative and teaching staff of universities in Ukraine and China, the critical problems in ensuring the sustainability of online education in the first days of quarantine restrictions were 1) the problem of choosing software for online learning; 2) methods of monitoring and improving the quality of online education; 3) ethical conflicts in the process of online communication of participants in the educational process.

E-learning software

Ukrainian universities have actively used online learning tools and related software up to quarantine restrictions. However, in the vast majority of cases, e-learning was used exclusively as an additional tool to traditional teaching and learning methods. That is why the presence of many platforms and software for e-learning in many universities of Ukraine could not ensure the sustainability of the organization of online learning in terms of a total ban on students attending higher education institutions. As a rule, various software products for e-learning were used by teachers of Ukrainian universities to provide additional access to sources of information, communication during students' independent work, for better presentation and evaluation of written works, as well as for the organization of current control activities. As a rule, lectures, practicals, laboratory, and other classes were not conducted online. There was no practice of defending dissertations by students, passing comprehensive final exams. Prior to the emergency described above, e-learning tools did not have a strong legal basis in Ukrainian universities. It was manifested in the fact that, for example, the attendance of students attending classes was carried out exclusively on paper, and the fact of student attendance was considered only his physical presence. The electronic journal, the electronic page of the course, the messages within one or another online learning platform did not have the status of the fact that the student performed his / her educational duties. The use of online learning was not mandatory, so all teachers at Ukrainian universities did not use it. Similar examples can be continued.

Accordingly, despite the extensive experience in the use of e-learning, Ukrainian universities have not been able to use it in an emergency epidemiological situation.

The critical issue in ensuring the sustainability of university online learning in Ukraine has been the choice of the appropriate platform and software. Its content is that from 1991 until the time of this study in Ukraine was absent *national* e-learning system and related software. Teachers of Ukrainian universities have used and continue to use e-learning software products that have been developed in other countries. The most common e-learning software products in Ukraine are Moodle (Modular Object-Oriented Dynamic Learning Environment), Google Classroom, iTunes U and others. However, each of them has several features of use, organizational advantages and weaknesses that have made it impossible to ensure the sustainability of online university education in Ukraine.

One of the authors of this article in 2016 introduced e-learning at the Faculty of Philosophy of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv (Ukraine) based on Moodle software. The results of this development have already been published in a particular article, which also analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of this software product (Rudenko). That is why we will not list them in this article. It should be noted that according to the results of our previous research, based on the software Moodle e-learning is functionally able to ensure the transition to online learning in a complete ban on students attending higher education institutions.

However, we consider it necessary to note that although Moodle is open source software, i.e., free for users, its use requires some financial and administrative resources, which are usually small for universities but quite expensive for individual users.

Using Moodle software is entirely free. However, its installation and use require the user to follow these steps. First, the user must have their hosting (own or leased server). Second, the user must own (or rent) a domain name. Third, the user must install and deploy the Moodle software product on their server, create an appropriate website that requires quite specialized technical skills, which the vast majority of teachers at Ukrainian universities do not have. Fourth, even if specialists meet the above conditions, university teachers must receive special training on the use of this platform. In other words, Moodle software is available to universities in general rather than to individual teachers. It is free to use; however, relatively high financial and organizational costs require maintenance of the host server, domain names, website development and maintenance, the presence of system administrators. Fifth, customizing and adapting Moodle to the needs of a particular university is a rather lengthy process that can take from 6 months to one year. Accordingly, if this software product has not been configured before, its installation would not solve the problem of a quick transition to online learning.

The complexity of individual (non-corporate) use of Moodle software, in our opinion, was one of the reasons why all universities did not accept e-learning on Moodle in Ukraine as a software product for online learning.

In contrast to Moodle, Google Classroom is an online learning software product that is easy for each teacher to use. Using it does not require the creation of a separate website, space on the hosting server, domain name and system administration. In essence, this online learning platform is free and accessible to teachers, students and other participants in the educational process, which is its significant advantage over others. However, the weak point of Google Classroom is the significantly limited set of tools compared to Moodle, which is hugely insufficient to provide even social and humanitarian courses. Google Classroom does not contain tools for taking various tests, demonstrating laboratory and practical work, performing mathematical calculations, etc. Without a set of such didactic tools, such a platform cannot perform a unifying function and ensure the sustainability of university online learning. Despite this, the availability of Google Classroom, its focus on individual use has led to its widespread use by teachers of Ukrainian universities.

The iTunes U online learning platform is used by a limited number of users, as it belongs to the group of “proprietary” software. Using the capabilities of iTunes U assumes that users have exclusively technical devices from Apple, which was the main reason for the low level of its use by teachers of Ukrainian universities.

The above situation has led to a tendency for Ukrainian university teachers to use online meeting programs (e.g., Zoom, Skype, Google meets, etc.) as an alternative to full-fledged e-learning platforms. We tend to assess this trend as unfavourable in terms of ensuring the sustainability and quality of online learning, as developers did not design the above platforms as software for teaching and learning in universities. Apart from video communication, these platforms, widely used by teachers of Ukrainian universities, are not able to provide a quality provision of almost any educational service, which has led to a decrease in the sustainability of university education in Ukraine.

The Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine in the “Recommendations” proposed the following algorithm for solving the above problem. First, it recommended that universities use blended learning, which is interpreted as a combination of direct and indirect forms of student-teacher interaction (Recommendations, 2020: 4). Second, the Ministry of Education and Science has placed the responsibility for choosing an online learning platform on each specific university with the subsequent integration of the chosen platform with internal information systems and providing teachers with software (Recommendations, 2020: 12). These recommendations are entirely rational and effective in a normal situation. However, in an emergency are ineffective. For example, following the recommendations of the Ministry of Education and Science, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv has developed its own full-fledged online learning platform “KNU Education online,” but for quite objective reasons could not use it to ensure the sustainability of online learning in March-May 2020. The development of the platform was completed only in June 2020, and the process of its integration into the internal information system of the university, customization of departments, training for teachers continues and is not completed at the time of writing. In other words, the implementation of the recommendation provided by the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine did not ensure the stability and stability of the educational process at the university in an emergency situation.

Chinese universities, their teachers and students have quickly adapted to the quarantine restrictions and conditions of the full transition to online learning. In the conditions of an emergency epidemiological situation, Chinese universities began the spring semester without delay, provided teaching courses without consequential losses, and organized an attestation process. One of the reasons for the practical sustainability of online learning in Chinese universities in emergencies is the dominant state-level Rain Classroom online learning platform developed by Tsinghua University and XuetangX for blended learning. The main features of this platform are accessibility for other users, ease of use, relative independence from technical devices, and a full set of tools for online learning. Having a dominant status in China’s university education system before the epidemiological emergency, this software was able to perform the function of ensuring the stability and stability of universities in emergencies.

We believe that this managerial experience of Chinese universities is worth analyzing and taking into account in the further development of a system to ensure the stability and stability of online teaching in Ukrainian universities. We are convinced that without instructions and unambiguous methodological recommendations of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, universities would not be able to solve the problem of choosing an e-learning platform on their own, as it is not so much didactic as organizational and managerial. The presence of a national (not mandatory) e-learning platform in Ukraine will significantly increase the resilience of the university education system of Ukraine to possible emergencies.

Quality Assurance

Monitoring and ensuring the quality of online education is one of the key components of ensuring the sustainability of online university education. This issue is crucial for Ukrainian universities and is quite thoroughly developed in modern education science (Huertas, 2018; Marciniak, 2018). In current research on the quality of online university education, scientists (Huertas, 2018) identify ten main components that should be taken into account by universities (Huertas, 2018: 6/16):

1) Policy for quality assurance;
2) Design and approval of programs;
3) student-centred learning, teaching and assessment;
4) Student admission, progression, recognition and certification;
5) Teaching staff;
6) Learning resources and student support;

7) Information management;
8) Public information;
9) Ongoing monitoring and periodic review of programs;
10) Cyclical external quality assurance.

In terms of the purpose and objectives of this study, the essential component is quality assurance as a policy for quality assurance. The essence of this element of quality assurance in online education is that "Institutions should have a policy for quality assurance that is made public and forms part of their strategic management. Internal stakeholders should develop and implement this policy through appropriate structures and processes, while involving external stakeholders" (Huertas, 2018).

As of March 2020, Ukrainian universities had virtually no academic policy to ensure the quality of e-learning. At the same time, in the "Recommendations" we mentioned, the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine proposed the following generalized provisions: "We recommend constant monitoring and analysis of all active processes by means of the training platform. This will identify potential risks and shortcomings at both technical and methodological levels. To ensure the quality of education, in addition to existing measures, we recommend the active use of surveys of students and teachers" (Recommendations, 2020: 20). However, in our opinion, the creation of the framework principles of academic policy to ensure the quality of e-learning would be a more effective measure in an emergency epidemiological situation.

The experience of Chinese universities shows that the presence of a centralized academic policy as an element of quality assurance of e-learning demonstrates greater efficiency in emergencies and allows to optimize and improve online learning in a short time. It is in this aspect that it can be used to develop the sustainability of online learning in Ukrainian universities.

Ethical issues

Ethical issues in online learning in contemporary literature (Satterfield, 2016; Garza Mitchell, 2009; Anderson, 2007) are considered in terms of the electronic environment, curriculum development, people with special educational needs, and so on.

In the "Recommendations," the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine did not take into account the experience of such research and wholly ignored the ethical issues of e-learning implementation, their relationship with quality assurance and software. However, the introduction of online learning in Ukrainian university practice has led to a number of ethically unregulated situations of the behaviour of students, teachers and university administration, which obviously have a negative impact on the quality of the educational process. It, therefore, should be analyzed and resolved as soon as possible.

Since March 2020, many cases and situations have arisen in the practice of using e-learning at the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, which are systematic and require ethical regulation.

They can be classified as follows. First, there are cases of "identification," when it is impossible to identify a student during online classes. Secondly, these are cases of "lack of access," when a student declares the lack of technical ability to attend classes online. Third, there are cases of "privacy violation," when the student, due to the requirement of identification and continuous communication, can not hide the details of privacy (household items, clothing, etc.).

The problem is that the code of ethics of the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv and the codes of ethics of most universities in Ukraine do not have norms that would provide for the settlement of such situations.

A positive component of the e-learning implementing experience in Chinese universities is the ethical issues that regulate the way all participants in the educational process work online. In this study, we would like to highlight this ethical aspect of ensuring the sustainability of online education in universities, which, in our opinion, is key to ensuring the sustainability of online university education, especially in emergencies. Ethical aspects of e-learning in the system of higher education in Ukraine should be the subject of a separate study.

Conclusions

As a result of the study of the main problems of ensuring the sustainability of online university education, the following conclusions can be drawn.

1. In case of emergency, Ukrainian universities should have a centralized and formed by the central executive body academic policy, a system of instructions and recommendations for the full transition to education in the ban on students attending higher education institutions. This policy may not apply to the regular operation of universities. The system of instructions and recommendations should be imperative, clear and unambiguous, which is a condition for the sustainability of national university education.
2. An essential condition for ensuring the sustainability of online university education is the availability of software for e-learning, which is nationwide. The existence of a state standard for e-learning software is a significant factor in increasing the sustainability of online university education in Ukraine.
3. The presence of a centralized academic policy as an element of quality assurance of e-learning demonstrates greater efficiency in an emergency and allows for a limited time to optimize and improve online learning.
4. Ensuring the sustainability of online learning in Ukrainian universities requires resolving relatively new ethical conflicts by improving existing university codes of ethics, introducing the practice of analyzing ethical cases that arise in the process of online interaction between participants in the educational process.

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Ukrainian Students' Perception of the European Union, Euro Integration and External Policy of Ukraine

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This article presents the original compilation of the data of the representatives of the generations of Ukrainian students after the Revolution of Dignity about the European Union, Eurointegration, and Ukraine's external policy. This data is lined by different empirical researches, which are significantly important for investigating external political orientations of Ukrainian students from unusual scopes. These articles also provide original analysis, comparison, and comprehension of this data according to the essential realities of Ukrainian politics and participation of students in it.
Keywords: perception of students, European Union, Far East, relationship with Ukraine, evaluative affirmation, interview, questionnaire

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Introduction

After 2014, the citizens of Ukraine returned external political independence of the country. They returned it after the period of full dependence on these questions from the Russian Federation during the rule of Yanukovych and Russia's direct attempts to destroy Ukraine's internal and external sovereignty in 2014. Ukrainian citizens reaffirmed the course of the integration of the country to the space of the European Union and Western World as a whole. Also, on the base of big manoeuvers, Ukraine tried to find allies against Russia's aggression or, at least, our country tried to strengthen its external position and authority on the background of weakening of them because of the events in 2014. Citizens of Ukraine themselves chose such independent external policy during the Revolution of Dignity. The fourth requirement with the biggest support of the participants of the Revolution of Dignity (75%) was signing the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement (Democratic Initiatives Foundation, 2013); and the exact refusal of Victor Yanukovich to sign the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement had become the second important motive for the Ukrainians to join the protests (53.5%) (Democratic Initiatives Foundation, 2013). According to the observers inside and outside, a part of the locomotion of these protests was the local youth. And the most active part of young people was students. Although the students were only 13.2 percent of the participants of the Revolution of Dignity (Democratic Initiatives Foundation, 2013), they were one of the most active protesters and participants of the most important events of that period. For instance, they are associated with the massacre of the protesters by special police forces "Berkut" on November 30, 2013. Students became one of the founders of Ukraine's new course after the Revolution of Dignity, including a marked course in external policy. And authorities of Ukraine have been implementing this course until nowadays. And it is very interesting and important to investigate the position of the inheritors of that generation of students about their attitude to the external course of Ukraine which has been chosen by their predecessors and their perception of Europe as a whole on this background. And it is important to understand that there are some changes in these positions that show the correctness of choosing and implementing this course by Ukraine. So, the target of this research is investigating the position of the generations of Ukrainian students after the Revolution of Dignity to the European Union, Euro integration and external policy of Ukraine.

The empirical basis of the article. Sample, and methodology description.

The empirical fundament of the article is based mainly on two types of research. This is the research "Youth of Ukraine-2015" organized by the Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine and the UN organizations in Ukraine from 18 of September to 7 of October 2015 and the research "Ukrainian Generation Z. Values and landmarks" organized by GfK Ukraine by order of the center "New Europe" and "Friedrich Ebert Foundation" from July to August 2017. Both interviews are very representative. The first research sample is 2852 young Ukrainians, including students from 14 to 35 years from every region of Ukraine (except for the temporarily occupied territories) corresponded by the age group, gender, settlement size, and share of Internet users. It is important to mark that "the sample design is based on the population distribution according to the data of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine as of January 1, 2014, and the data of GfK Ukraine on the share of Internet users in each administrative units of Ukraine" (Volosevych et al., 2015: 4), so the sample is based on accurate data. The second research sample is 2000 young Ukrainians from 14 to 29 years also from every region of Ukraine (except for the temporarily occupied territories). And this sample is also correlated according to the age group, gender and settlement size. It is important that we can deduct the number of students among the respondents. We know that there was 36 percent of people who were studying during the research among the respondents. And we know that among respondents, 41 percent of people had the opportunity to study like a student (23 percent of people with a degree of full intermediate education and 18 percent of people with Bachelor's degree of higher education). So, 36 percent of the respondents were students, that is 14.76 percent of all the respondents, the number of which was 295.

Although we see that the use of the original methods of researching in the cases of the investigation of the international orientations of students, which, for example, "comprises a social and scientific text analysis that highlights the structural patterns of the daily practices from the perspective of the author of the text" (Perez-Encinas & Rodriguez-Pomeda, 2017: 26), the organizers of the marked researches decided to use the examined methods of the data capture. The representatives of the Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine and the UN organizations in Ukraine used "the method of the online interview (for Internet users) and personal interview at respondent's home (for Internet non-users and village inhabitants)." The use of the method of the online interview was justified by the fact that "the share of those who used the Internet during the last month is 85% (according to the data of January 2015-September 2015 for the population of Ukraine of the respective age group)" (Volosevych et al., 2015: 4). The sample provided by such a method was certainly representative, especially with using personal interviews at respondent's home for people who do not have the opportunity to connect to the Internet. GfK Ukraine representatives applied the method of the personal interview at the respondent's home and focus group method used by four times at Lviv, Odesa, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv as an addition to using the main method.

The author has also provided his own empirical research, like an addition to the main empirical foundation of the article. It is based on the online interview among students of Faculty Philosophy of the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. This online interview is based on the method of a questionnaire provided by social scientist V. Yadov (Yadov, 2003: 55). A sample of 48 persons was involved for passing this interview includes students from all courses and specialties of Faculty of Philosophy of the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. The research based on such a sample is not independently representative, but it is a good complementarity in pair with two previous types of research. The author organized his questionnaire passing from 11 of January to Relationship of students to 25 of February 2020. The students were attracted to passing the questionnaire by spreading the link on Google-form with it on the different resources of the Faculty of Philosophy. The author decided to analyze students' position to the European Union, Euro integration, and Ukraine's external policy by measuring their choice between Europe and Asia in some directions of Ukraine's external policy and their own world viewing position. This justified the situation that Europe and Asia symbolized the two strongest alternatives in developing the public organization of countries of the world, including Ukraine. It is extremely important for Ukraine in case of two directions of changing our external policy in relationships with Asian countries after the Revolution of Dignity. These are two dominant directions of contacts and relationships with countries of the Far East. The first direction represents contacts and partnership with countries in the questions of contraction of Russian aggression — with the State of Japan and Republic of Korea. These countries take permanently anti-Russian and pro-Western positions because of the Kuril Islands' question and aggression from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which is supported by the Russian Federation. The second direction represents contacts with the countries that demonstrate the high economic development and enforcing of political influence in the world. This direction of external political contacts can be profitable for Ukraine's economy, and it can strengthen Ukraine in the world society. It is a first partnership with the People's Republic of China, which takes the impressive position of the first national economy in the world, and it was a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. And secondly, it is a partnership with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which is an influential country with fast economic growth. Of course, these directions may come across like in the examples of Ukraine's economic partnership with economically high developed Japan or efforts of Ukraine to convince the People's Republic of China not to give voice in United Nations session similarly with Russia.

So, according to this, Europe and Asia were determined schematically from defining generalized positions of students about countries of the European Union and some expressive and important for the external policy of Ukraine countries of Far East — exactly State of Japan (further — Japan), the People's Republic of China (further –China), Republic of Korea (further — South Korea), Socialist Republic of Vietnam (further — Vietnam) within the questionnaire.

The author's questionnaire is separated into three parts. The first part aims to define independent students' positions in countries of the European Union and the Far East's expressive countries in the main directions with the help of some leading questions. The second part aims to define features of real involvement and concernment of students to culture and policy of countries of the European Union and expressive countries of the Far East. The third part aims to compare students' perception of countries of the European Union exclusively with their perception of the Far East's expressive countries. Also, at the end of the questionnaire are some questions with the goal to get from respondents some statistical information. That is like researcher V. Yadov said, "information that is called a "passport data questions" within sociology: gender, age, education, work experience, marital status, income and so on" (Yadov, 2003: 55). Questions with such character are intended to see that respondents of this poll are students from all specialties and of all ages. So, let's look at the results of every part according to the research's target.

Organizing such additional research among students of Faculty Philosophy of the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv is especially justified because of their predecessors' extreme participation in the Revolution of Dignity. According to the recollections of graduated students from the generation of these predecessors, there were times during the Revolution of Dignity then, for example, 60 percent of students from the separate course for example from the specialty of political science from Faculty Philosophy of the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv were on Maidan Nezalezhnosti participating in protests.

Specification of the results of "Youth of Ukraine-2015" research.

Within the research "Youth of Ukraine-2015" of Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine and the UN organizations in Ukraine, only one but the significant question is connected with investigation of Ukrainian students' attitudes towards the European Union, Eurointegration, and external policy of Ukraine. It is the question from the section of the interview about civic position and activity, national identity, and respondents' political consciousness. It is exactly a question about the respondent's attitude to Ukraine's external policy, which sounded like "In your opinion, Ukraine should" (Volosevych et al., 2015: 58). The respondents' answers to this question are as follows:

Evaluate affirmation	Percentage of support among the respondents
Join the European Union	49%
Ukraine should be a not-aligned independent state	31%
Join NATO	28%

Make the Union with Russia	6%
Ukraine should create its own geopolitical Union	7%
Do not know	10%
Other	1%

Specification of the results of "Ukrainian generation Z" research

Within the research "Ukrainian generation Z" of GfK Ukraine by order of the center "New Europe" and "Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Values and landmarks", there is a considerable "External policy" section, the biggest part of the questions of which is connected with the investigation of the attitudes of Ukrainian students towards the European Union, Eurointegration and external policy of Ukraine. These are the questions with the next answers of the respondents. The first such question is "How much do you trust the European Union?" (Zarembo et al., 2017: 38). Organizers of the research provide a representation of answers according to age groups. There is an opportunity to show the answers of age group representatives, which can be students, with highprobability. These are age groups from 18 to 20 years, and 21 to 24 years. How many respondents from the age group from 18 to 20 years trust the European Union?

Answer is absent	5%
Evaluate affirmation	Percentage of support among respondents
I don't trust	12%
I rather don't trust	14%
I trust and don't trust similarly	32%
I rather trust	22%
I trust	6%
It is difficult to answer	10%

How many respondents from the age group from 21 to 24 years trust the European Union?

Answer is absent	3%
Evaluate affirmation	Percentage of support among respondents
I don't trust	13%
I rather don't trust	16%
I trust and don't trust similarly	29%
I rather trust	25%
I trust	8%
It is difficult to answer	7%

The second question from this section is "Is it necessary for Ukraine to join the European Union?" (Zarembo et al., 2017: 40). The responses to this question are next:

Answer is absent	5%
Evaluate affirmation	Percentage of support among respondents
Yes	60%
No	12%
It is difficult to answer	24%

The next two questions are about the reasons for the desirability/non-desirability of joining Ukraine to the European Union (Zarembo et al., 2017: 44-45). So the first such question is "Ukraine joining the European Union is desirable because it will create the following advantage for Ukraine." The answers of the respondents to this question are given below:

Evaluate affirmation	I agree/totally agree	I disagree/totally disagree
Better and faster economic development, improvement of social and economic positions of people;	51%	16%
Fast democratization of society;	49%	15%
A higher standard of living;	52%	15%
Better protection of human rights and rights of minorities ;	52%	14%
Possibility to become acquainted with cultures and religions of other nations;	53%	12%
Better possibilities of employment;	54%	14%
Better education;	52%	12%
Better military protection of Ukraine;	59%	14%
Better possibilities of travels and acquaintances;	57%	12%
Recovery of territorial integrity of Ukraine;	43%	15%
I do not agree with the position that joining Ukraine to the European Union is desirable.	19%	42%

The second such question is "Joining of Ukraine to the European Union is not desirable because…" Answers of respondents to this question are next:

Evaluate affirmation	I agree/totally agree	I disagree/totally disagree
It threatens the national identity of Ukrainians;	13%	50%

It threatens the sovereignty of Ukraine;	13%	48%
It increases the risk of economic exploitation of Ukraine;	18%	42%
It makes Ukraine dependent on developed European countries;	21%	40%
It limits the economic development of Ukraine;	19%	41%
It increases the risk of continuation of Russian aggression of Ukraine;	17%	41%
It inhibits the development of economic and political relationships with Russia;	18%	39%
It means losing Crimea and the occupied parts of Lugansk and Donetsk region forever;	16%	41%
It will aggravate the social and economic position of people;	16%	42%
It will cause massive migration of people from Ukraine;	24%	31%
It will cause a massive invasion of migrants from Near East to Ukraine;	24%	31%
I think there are not any arguments against joining Ukraine to the European Union or being closer to it.	38%	19%

And the last important question from this section in this article is about evaluating the role of the European Union in developing and establishing the last reforms in Ukraine. This question is, "What is necessary to do for the European Union to boost reforms in Ukraine?" (Zarembo et al., 2017: 50). Answers of respondents to this question are next:

Evaluate affirmation	Percentage of support among respondents
Something that is exactly:	
Increasing of support of talented youth of Ukraine because they are future of Ukraine;	65%
Initiating long-term programs of professional exchange of experience;	62%
Support of civil society, non-governmental organizations which influence to establishing of reforms in Ukraine;	57%
Increasing interest to protect Ukrainian borders and giving a weapon to Ukraine;	56%
Giving perspective of membership;	55%
Making clearer confrontation with Russia;	54%
Increasing pressure on authorities of Ukraine;	51%

Make stop giving money to Ukraine because its authorities are stealing it;	45%
Giving more money;	42%
Sending on an official journey more advisors.	30%
Nothing because	
European Union makes enough, and it is necessary to make something to authorities of Ukraine;	50%
I have bigger faith to support from the USA to Ukraine than by support from the European Union;	20%
It is useless to support Ukraine;	12%
I am absolutely against support from the European Union to Ukraine. I support being closer to Russia.	9%

Specification of results of the author's research

Specification of results of the first part of the research

The first part imagines itself like a list of evaluative affirmations with marks from 0 to 5 according to answers of students of Faculty Philosophy of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv to these positions about the European Union countries and the countries of Far East accordingly. To evaluate the results of this part theoretically, it is necessary to present the marks of every leading evaluative affirmation with the biggest and smallest support and percent of this support.

For countries of the European Union		
Evaluative affirmation	Mark with the biggest support and percent of this support	Mark with the smallest support and percent of this support
Availability of the programs of student exchange	4-18 (37.5%)	1-1 (2%)
Prestigiousness, but not high availability of the programs of student exchange	4-19 (39.6%)	0-3 (0%)
Attractiveness for work migration	5-22 (46%)	0-1 (2%)
Positive attitude towards Ukraine	3-15 (31.2%)	0-1 (2%)
Positive attitude of the local population towards Ukrainians like tourists	4-15 (31.2%)	0-1 (2%)
Positive attitude of the local population towards Ukrainians like work migrants	2-13 (27%)	5-3 (6.2%)
Attractiveness for respondent because of civilizational and cultural reasons	5-20 (42.7%)	2-7 (14.6%)
Attractiveness for respondent because of political and economic order	5-16 (33%)	0-2 (4%)

Importance to Ukraine like foreign partners	4-17 (35.4%)	0, 2-1 (2%)
Importance to Ukraine like foreign partners, potentially	5-20 (42.7%)	1-1 (2%)
Economic success	5-15 (31.2%)	0-1 (2%)
Political stability	3.4 -14 (29.2%)	0-2 (4%)
Respect of rights and freedoms of people	4-19 (39.6%)	0-1 (2%)
Influence in the world policy	4-20 (42.7%)	0-2 (4%)

For such countries of the Far East like Japan, China, South Korea, Vietnam		
Evaluative affirmation	Mark with the biggest support and percent of this support	Mark with the smallest support and percent of this support
Availability of the programs of student exchange	3 -15 (31.2%)	5-1 (2%)
Prestigiousness, but not high availability of the programs of student exchange	4-14 (29.2%)	0-3 (6.2%)
Attractiveness for work migration	3-16 (33%)	5-3 (6.2%)
Positive attitude towardsUkraine like country	3-18 (37.5%)	5-1 (2%)
Positive attitude of the local population towards Ukrainians like tourists	4-14 (29.2%)	0-2 (4%)
Positive attitude of the local population towards Ukrainians like work migrants	3-17 (35.4 %)	5-1 (2%)
Attractiveness for respondents because of civilizational and cultural reasons	5- 11 (22.9%)	0,1,4 -7 (14.6%)
Attractiveness for respondents because of political and economic order	2-12 (25%)	5-4 (8.3%)
Importance to Ukraine like foreign partners	2, 3-12 (25%)	5-3 (6.2%)
Importance to Ukraine like foreign partners, potentially	4-13 (27%)	2-3 (6.2%)
Economic success	5-17 (35.4 %)	0-1 (2%)
Political stability	3-14 (29.2%)	0-2 (4%)
Respect of rights and freedoms of people	2-15 (31.2%)	5-1 (2%)
Influence in the world policy	5-17 (35.4 %)	0-1 (2%)

Specification of results of the second part of the research

In the second part, we have some separate affirmations according to which students of Faculty Philosophy of the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv need to evaluate themselves. These affirmations are indicators of students' concern and involvement in the culture and policy of countries of the European Union and the Far East's expressive countries.

It depends not on the subjective opinion of students but the objective conditions of their lives. And it is necessary to show every mark with the biggest and smallest support and percent of this support in every affirmation to evaluate the results of this part theoretically.

Evaluative affirmation	Mark with the biggest support and percent of this support	Mark with the smallest support and percent of this support
Level of English language skill	Upper-Intermediate -17 (35.4 %)	Absent — 1 (2%)
Level of language skill of languages of other countries of the European Union	Absent — 22 (46%)	Upper-Intermediate — 1 (2%)
Level of language skill of languages of such countries of the Far East like Japan, People's Republic of China, Republic of Korea, Vietnam	Absent — 43 (89.6%)	Intermediate — 1 (2%)
Evaluating of relationships between Ukraine and the countries of the European Union	3-26 (54.2%)	1.5 -1 (2%)
Readiness to take part in improving the relationships between Ukraine and countries of the European Union	A person who sees the necessity and has the wish but doesn't have an opportunity to improve these relations -23 (47.9%)	A person who doesn't see a necessity and doesn't have a wish and an opportunity to improve these relations -3 (6.2%)
Evaluating of relationships between Ukraine and People's Republic of China	2-17 (35.4 %)	0.4 -3 (6.2%)
Readiness to take part in improving the relationships between Ukraine and the People's Republic of China	A person who sees a necessity but doesn't have a wish and an opportunity to improve these relations — 21 (43.75%)	The person who sees a necessity and has a wish and an opportunity to improve these relations — 6 (12.5%)
Evaluating relationships between Ukraine and Japan	2 -14	5 -1 (2%)
Readiness to take part in improving the relationships between Ukraine and Japan	A person who sees the necessity has the wish but doesn't have an opportunity to improve these relations — 17 (35.4 %)	A person who sees a necessity, has a wish and an opportunity to improve these relations — 5 (10.4%)

It is also important to point out that in the position about evaluating one's own level of language skill of languages of other European Union countries, some respondents wrote next: Spanish + French, Italian Intermediate, French, Bulgarian Pre-intermediate, Polish Pre-intermediate. And it is important to note that in the question about evaluating own level of language skill of languages of such countries of Far East like Japan, China, South Korea, Vietnam only one respondent writes next: Japanese.

Specification of results of the third part of the research

In the third part, we have a range of evaluative affirmations. And the task that is needed to be solved by it is comparing the attitude of students of Faculty Philosophy of the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv to countries of the European Union exclusively with attitude to expressive countries of Far East. And it is necessary to show every mark with the biggest support and percent of this support in every affirmation to concern this deeply.

Evaluative affirmation	Mark with the biggest support and percent of this support
Availability of the programs of student exchange	Countries of the European Union — 41 (85.4 %)
Prestigiousness, but not high availability of the programs of student exchange	Countries of the European Union — 37 (77%)
Attractiveness for work migration	Countries of the European Union — 42 (87.5%)
Positive attitude towards Ukraine	Countries of the European Union — 43 (89.6%)
Positive attitude of the local population towards Ukrainians like tourists	Countries of the European Union — 33 (68.75%)
Positive attitude of the local population towards Ukrainians like work migrants	Countries of the European Union — 29 (60.4%)
Attractiveness for respondents because of civilizational and cultural reasons	Countries of the European Union — 36 (75%)
Attractiveness for respondents because of political and economic order	Countries of the European Union — 38 (79.2%)
Importance to Ukraine like foreign partners	Countries of the European Union — 44 (91.7%)
Importance to Ukraine like foreign partners, potentially	Countries of the European Union, Japan, China, South Korea, Vietnam — 24 (50%)
Economic success	Japan, China, South Korea, Vietnam -26 (54.1%)
Political stability	Japan, China, South Korea, Vietnam — 24 (50%)
Respect of rights and freedoms of people	Countries of the European Union — 46 (95.8%)
Influence in the world policy	Countries of the European Union — 25 (52%)

Specification of results from "passport data questions"

With these questions' help, we can see that respondents of this questionnaire are students from all specialties of Faculty Philosophy of the Taras Shevchenko National University of

Kyiv and all ages. Exactly 32 students of political science, 8 students of philosophy, 3 students of cultural studies, 2 students of religious studies, 1 student of public administration, and 2 students with not marked specialty joined the poll. Also, according to the questions of this poll, 4 respondents are 17 years old, 18 — 8, 19 — 7, 20 -11, 21 — 11, 22-3, 24 -1, 25 -1, and 38 -1 and also two respondents did not provide the information. So we can see that our respondents study all courses of Faculty Philosophy of the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. Although the author's research and its sample are not representative according to numerical correlation with the general number of students of Faculty Philosophy of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, it is representative according to qualitative distribution to age, course and specialty among the respondents.

Conclusions and comprehension of the results of empirical researches

Based on empirical representative research, we can see that a significant part of Ukrainian students supports Eurointegration of Ukraine and has a positive attitude towards the European Union. And this index is growing with time. It was 49% in 2015 and 60% in 2017. Also, it is obvious that biggest significant part of Ukrainian students evaluates European Union positively and considers that it sets the example in spheres of economic development (51%), protection of human rights (52%), possibilities of employment (54%), education (52%) and tourist activity (57%). Half of the students support the position that the European Union is an important foreign partner of Ukraine now, which makes a lot to boost the development of our country and establish reforms in it.

Like a good addition to this, there can be found a research the attitudes of students of the Faculty of Philosophy of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv in Ukraine towards the European Union, Eurointegration, and Ukraine's external policy. It shows in moderation of its representativeness the students' support of the European Union countries in most directions, both in solo characteristics and in comparativeness with the countries of Far East like Japan, China, South Korea, Vietnam.

1. For example, Countries of the European Union have positive marks of evaluating according to answers of students of the Faculty of Philosophy of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv in Ukraine in such solo categories like:

With mark 5:

a) Attractiveness for work migration with support of 46% of respondents*;
b) Attractiveness for respondents because of civilizational and cultural reasons (42.7%);
c) Attractiveness for respondents because of political and economic order (33%)*;
d) Importance to Ukraine like foreign partners, potentially (42.7%);
e) Economic success (31.2%).

With mark 4:

a) Availability of the programs of student exchange, with support of 37.5% of respondents*;
b) Prestigiousness, but not high availability of the programs of student exchange (39.6%)*;
c) Positive attitude of the local population towards Ukrainians like tourists (31.2%)*;

d) Importance to Ukraine like foreign partners (35.4%);
e) Respect of rights and freedoms of people (39.6%)*;
f) Influence in the world policy (42.7%).

2. Countries of the the European Union have a higher number of support, according to respondents' answers, in comparison with the countries of the Far East, in the categories as follows:

a) Availability of the programs of student exchange, with support of 85.4 % of respondents;*
b) Prestigiousness, but not big availability of programs of student exchange (77%)*;
c) Attractiveness for work migration (87,5%)*;
d) Positive attitude towards Ukraine (89.6%);
e) Positive attitude of the local population towards Ukrainians like tourists (68.75%)*;
f) Attractiveness for respondents because of civilizational and cultural reasons (75%);
g) Attractiveness for respondents because of political and economic order (79.2%)*;
h) Importance to Ukraine like foreign partners (91.7%)*;
i) Respect of rights and freedoms of people (95.8%)*.

3. Countries of the European Union have negative marks of evaluating according to respondents' answers in only such solo category:

With mark 2:

a) Positive attitude of the local population towards Ukrainians like work migrants, with the support of 27% of respondents.

4. Countries of the European Union won expressive countries of the Far East with the small gap or have an equilibrium of support with them according to support of only in such categories like:

a) Positive attitude of the local population towards Ukrainians like work migrants, with the support of 60.4% of respondents;
b) Influence in the world policy (52%);
c) Importance to Ukraine like foreign partners, potentially (50%);
d) Political stability (50%).

5. Countries of the European Union lost to the countries of the Far East only in the comparative category as follows:

a) Economic success, with the support of 48% of respondents.

6. While expressive countries of Far East have negative marks of evaluating according to answers of students of the Faculty of Philosophy of the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv in the solo categories as follows:

With mark 2:

a) Attractiveness for respondent because of political and economic order, with the support of 25% of respondents;
b) Importance to Ukraine like foreign partners now (25%);
c) Respect of rights and freedoms of people (31.2%).

7. And the countries of the Far East have positive marks of evaluating according to respondents' answers in such solo categories:

With mark 5:

a) Economic success, with the support of 35.4% of respondents;
b) Influence in the world policy (35.4 %);
c) Attractiveness for respondents because of civilizational and cultural reasons (22.9%).

With mark 4:

a) Prestigiousness, but not high availability of the programs of student exchange, with support of 29.2% of respondents;
b) Positive attitude of the local population towards Ukrainians like tourists (29.2%);
c) Importance to Ukraine like foreign partners, potentially (27%).

This is the evidence of the present orientations among the students of the Faculty of Philosophy of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv in Ukraine to Countries of European Union in very different questions, like questions of employment, of education, of support in external policy of Ukraine, of civilizational, political and cultural attractiveness. These positions complement the conclusions of previously marked representative research of Ukrainian students' attitude towards the European Union, Eurointegration, and Ukraine's external policy. Especially these are the positions which are marked by.* Also, it is confirmed by answers of respondents to the questions about readiness to develop relationships with a country like a foreign partner. And it is possible to see that this readiness is stronger to the direction of countries of the European Union than to the direction of the Far East's countries on the level of support affirmation of "sees the necessity, has the wish but does not have an opportunity to improve these relations." So the level is as follows:

a) In a question about relationships between Ukraine and the countries of the European Union, it has support of 47.9% of respondents;
b) In a question about relationships between Ukraine and Japan, it has support 35.4 % of respondents;
c) A question about relationships between Ukraine and the People's Republic of China was supported by 25% of respondents.

Eventually, these facts about the Faculty of Philosophy of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv's subjective attitudes coincide with the objective facts about them. For example, most of the students have high English language skills — Upper-Intermediate (35.4 %). Most of them (54%) are proficient in languages of other European Union countries, such as Spanish, French, Italian, Bulgarian, Polish. And only 8.5 % of respondents have proficiency in the languages of the countries comprising the Far East.

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State-Religious Relations during a Coronavirus Pandemic: Collisions of Religious Security

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The article reveals the features of the relationship between the state and religious organizations during a pandemic. There are two strategies of state policy for the functioning of religious buildings: liberal and strategic. It has been proven that conditioned by one or another form of government and understanding of the role and significance of religion in society. The leaders of states in their decisions regarding the functioning of religious organizations in such a crisis period proceeded from the number of cases in a particular country, as well as from the traditions of key religious beliefs in a particular state. It was revealed that religious organizations were faced with a collision: either to submit to the decisions of the authorities of a certain country or to go "against" and thereby inflicting danger on the population. Therefore, it was possible to observe that if the leaders of religious organizations urged believers to adhere to the restrictive measures established by the authorities, then some believers in a number of countries did not obey quarantine measures, explaining this either by their religious beliefs or apocalyptic sentiments.

Keywords: pandemic, state-religion relations, COVID-19, religious life, religious security, Ukrainian reality, state policy

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Introduction

International organizations have been expecting a global pandemic for many years and have planned measures to overcome it, but the world was not ready for the current crisis associated with the incidence of COVID-19 and the subsequent economic shock. The experience of previous epidemics has shown that the greatest socio-economic losses are incurred by developing countries with unfavorable socio-economic conditions, with the unavailability of medical and preventive services in these countries, with a low level of sanitary and hygienic literacy of the population, as well as with cultural and household traditions, including close contact of the population incl. and the activities of religious organizations.

Religious institutions perceived this challenge differently and, therefore, functioned according to their beliefs. At the same time, due to this situation, the governmentэs relations with religious organizations worldwide have changed. It is the understanding of what forms of interaction between government and religious institutions will reveal new aspects of religious security during crises in the world in general and in certain countries in particular.

The practicability of this article also is religious leaders, faith-based organizations, and faith communities played a major role in saving lives and reducing illness related to COVID-19. They were a primary source of support, comfort, guidance, and direct health care and social service for the communities they were serving. Religious leaders of faith-based organizations and communities of faith shared health information to protect their own members and wider communities. They provided pastoral and spiritual support during public health emergencies and other health challenges and were an advocate for the needs of vulnerable populations (WHO, 2020).

The analytical notes and recommendations of international organizations (WHO, 2020) and research institutes became the theoretical basis. Also important were the scientific works of foreign (Sulkowski & Ignatowski, 2020; Lunkin, 2020) and Ukrainian scientists (Kharkovshchenko et al., 2020), which considered certain aspects of the studied problem. However, there is no holistic analysis of the features of state-religious relations during the coronavirus epidemic.

Consequently, this article aims to reveal and analyze the collisions of religious security in the context of state-religious relations during the coronavirus epidemic and to identify key aspects of further interaction between church and state in the world in general, and in Ukraine in particular.

The policy of states in relation to religious organizations

Restrictions imposed by various countries due to the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic also affected denominations' activities. The purpose of such restrictions is to prevent people's mass gatherings, which is a direct consequence of the cultic practice of religious organizations. These include worship services, prayer meetings, festive, funeral, ritual acts, etc. Several factors determined the severity of quarantine measures in each country: the number of patients, the rate of spread of the coronavirus, the religiosity of the population, the approach of major religious holidays, political regime, taking into account the experience of other countries, which recommendations.

We propose the following classification of states' policies towards religious organizations around the world:

a) liberal;

b) restrictive.

Let us consider each of these strategies in more detail.

Among the liberal strategy towards religious organizations, Belarus and relatively Sweden can be distinguished. Belarus has not yet introduced any restrictions to counter the spread of the coronavirus pandemic. The rate of infection in Belarus is similar to that in Ukraine. On April 21, the who called on the Belarusian authorities to at least take measures to distance themselves from people. Accordingly, there were no restrictions on religious activity in the country. President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko personally considers the talk about the special danger of COVID-19 "injection of passions." On Easter, the head of state and his youngest son visited the Church of the Annunciation in the village of Mali Lyady. He thanked the parishioners who attended the service and said that he did not welcome those "who blocked the way to the church" (Tokman, 2020: 5).

At the same time, in Sweden only "on 27 March the government announced that the ban on public gatherings would be lowered to include all gatherings of more than 50 people, to further decrease the spread of the infection, again at the request of the Public Health Agency. The ban would apply to arts and entertainment events including theatre, cinema, and concerts, religious meetings, demonstrations, lectures, competitive sports, amusement parks, fairs and markets" (COVID-19 pandemic in Sweden, 2020). As Yulia Yurchuk, a Ukrainian woman from Stockholm, says: "This greatly influenced religious meetings. This Sunday, we had Easter, but there were no open services in the churches since they always gather more than 50 people. Services were transferred online. Swedes, in general, are very secularized. But there are still groups of people who go to church, especially on big holidays. So this is bad news for them" (Berezhniuk, 2020).

However, the state power of most countries has chosen a restrictive strategy towards religious organizations. In Ukraine, we can see that the government's instructions to restrict religious organizations' activities during the quarantine period turned out to be rather vague. The Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No 211 of March 11, 2020 "On Prevention of Spread of Acute Respiratory Disease COVID-19 Caused by SARS-CoV2 Coronavirus" on the territory of Ukraine has been repeatedly amended. If in the original version of the bylaw, the ban covered mass events, including those organized by religious organizations, which were attended by more than 10 people, on April 2 this year, the government changed the wording, emphasizing that mass events, including religious organizations, are prohibited. At the same time, the official web portal of the Cabinet of Ministers stated that the churches were not closed. Such general maxims have led to the emergence of various interpretations, explanations, interpretations of restrictions on religious freedom. For example, experts from the Institute for Religious Freedom noted that it was a matter of restricting only the collective expression of the latter, "but other religious activities, including home gatherings, social assistance for the needy, and even more so the private expression" (Explanation of IRS, 2020).

It must be said that such uncertainty in understanding how religious organizations should function during the epidemic was observed not only in Ukraine but also in a number of other countries, which led to the fact that services were carried out in the presence of a fairly large number of believers of a particular religious organization. This could be seen both in Europe and Asia (for example, India).

"Many (clergy, believers, ordinary citizens) were interested in the question on temples, prayer houses, other places of worship and ritual activities: what exactly can be practiced in them? As there was no official answer, the heads of churches and denominations, on the basis of certain provisions of the government decree, current legislation on sanitary norms, the foreign experience began to develop methodological advice on how to behave during the quarantine of believers. The implementation of the government's decision on quarantine restrictions by representatives of the state and local authorities in the regions proved to be a real problem for denominations. In the absence of an unambiguous understanding of Resolution No 211, in some cases, it came to the requirements of the complete closure of temples. As a result, shortly before Easter, the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations addressed the Prime Minister of Ukraine Denys Shmygal and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine with their own proposals aimed at ensuring the constitutional right to freedom of religion during the quarantine. The VCRiRO also called on the government to clarify Resolution 211 and provide clarifications to local police and local authorities to avoid misunderstandings and chaos during the Easter celebrations. It should be emphasized that the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, and the Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine demonstrate a high level of discipline under quarantine restrictions, primarily due to compliance with the recommendations of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Vatican" (Tokman, 2020: 8).

Summing up, we can say that different strategies for the attitude of state power to religious organizations are conditioned by one or another form of government and understanding of the role and significance of religion in society. The leaders of states in their decisions regarding the functioning of religious organizations in such a crisis period proceeded from the number of cases in a particular country, as well as from the traditions of key religious beliefs in a particular state.

The functioning of religious organizations during pandemics: between noncompliance and conformity

Western scholars Lukasz Sulkowski and Grzegorz Ignatowski emphasizes that: "Any pandemic disorganizes the life of wider society. One of the manifestations of social activity is religious life. Despite progressing secularization, both religion, churches, and denominational associations have an impact on individual ethical choices and business decisions….The decisions made by the clergymen, regardless of their personal views, resulted from the assumed ecclesiology and tradition. While changing the organization of religious life, the churches maintained contact with the believers in various ways, using modern technologies and access to public media in this regard. Although the churches are not changing their doctrinal positions, they declare different forms of cooperation" (Sulkowski & Ignatowski, 2020).

Hence, we can see that a religious organization becomes a very powerful factor in the perception of believers. This situation is completely different, unlike other ordinary citizens (Religious Fundamentalism, 2020). For example, religious organizations in the crisis situation of the fight against coronavirus were able to sacrifice the most important — public worship, which is the basis of believers' lives in any confession and religion. For the majority, this refusal was a test of strength since the absence of joint prayers in person is the disunity of members of religious communities, the termination of individual parishes' activities, and the deprivation of part of their income. People who do not go to churches and mosques do not bring donations either. Although in many churches (among Catholics, and among Protestants in almost all churches in Russia and Europe, among Orthodox to a lesser extent), the practice of online donations is already common, which can be made without leaving your home on the website of a religious association. In general, all religions and confessions can be called law-abiding.

Christians, Muslims, Jews took the necessary measures, according to the recommendations of the national authorities. The attitude towards the conduct of divine services and the partaking of the sacrament has become a kind of test for "tradition" in various European countries. Two options were presented to solve this problem in conditions of full or partial quarantine for the population:

a) a complete refusal from any public gatherings, including services in temples;
b) partial restriction on attending services with an emphasis on the fact that churches cannot refuse services altogether since it would be contrary to their nature and mission.

At the same time, epidemics are a challenge for religious organizations. The reason is that any social, political cataclysms push to behave differently, develop and implement other, perhaps completely new models of cooperation with believers, representatives of a particular religious tradition and citizens of the country in general.

Mostly, all religions and confessions can be called law-abiding. Christians, Muslims, Jews took the necessary measures, according to the recommendations of the national authorities. The question of attitudes towards conducting divine services and taking the sacrament has become a kind of test for "tradition" in various European countries. In Western Europe, the holding of masses was completely prohibited by the church authorities (in France, in several regions of Italy). In Eastern Europe, representatives of the churches stated that believers should have the right to pray together (Catholics in Poland, Orthodox Christians in Russia). A separate discussion was caused by the attitude to the sacrament and the method of taking it during the fight against coronavirus. In the Catholic Church, lay people receive communion only unleavened bread (the Body of Christ, host, wafer), which is put into their mouth. In the Orthodox churches, everyone partakes with bread and wine (the Body and Blood of Christ) from one bowl and one spoon. From a secular point of view, of course, the Orthodox way of communion is more dangerous in a hygienic sense, but it was the Catholics who imposed the ban on holding masses, obeying centralized instructions from the Vatican, the appeals of Pope Francis. Orthodox churches, which are often accused of close ties with the national authorities of their countries, have proved to be more obstinate in relation to state authorities' demands (Lunkin, 2020: 108).

The involvement of religious organizations in countering the spread of the virus has shown that they are by no means archaic and respond to social challenges. For many, primarily for the Orthodox, the crisis has sharply posed the problem of developing new forms of Christian mission and bringing the church's population. In many countries, the pandemic has helped develop interfaith dialogue. The social changes caused by the coronavirus pandemic have exacerbated existing problems and accelerated those processes that were already taking place in the internal church life.

At the same time, we can note that in a number of countries and religious traditions, one could observe disobedience both to the decisions of the state authorities and to the top leadership of a particular denomination. In particular, we can note the massive religious events held in Pakistan and India and in a number of European (in particular, the Balkan) countries, incl. and in Ukraine. Of course, here, you need to clarify the reasons for disobedience. Suppose in the case of India and Pakistan. The reason is called the religious beliefs of the supporters of Hinduism, then in the case of the Christian faithful. In that case, the reason for this is the apocalyptic mood and disbelief in the existence of the epidemic itself (Impact, 2020).

Summing up, a brief outline of the reaction of religious organizations to the decision of the state authorities to restrict the participation of the faithful in worship, we can say that the majority of confessions (leadership), although with regret, urged their adherents to submit to the decisions of the authorities. This applies to both representatives of the Abrahamic religions (Christianity, Judaism, Islam) and the Far Eastern (Buddhism, Sikhism, Jainism, Hinduism). However, one can also say that with obedience, one can also observe situations of disobedience. They were of a situational and spontaneous nature due to the lack of support from the leadership of one or another religious organization. In general, we can say that the safety of the population of most countries was really ensured by confessions.

Prospects for interaction between states and religious organizations in Ukraine and the world

It should be emphasized that at the time of this writing, the coronavirus pandemic continues, incl. and in Ukraine. Therefore, it becomes important to consider the further development of state-church relations in a pandemic. It is important to say that, based on the experience of the first wave of the World Health Organization, general recommendations were developed for the functioning of religious organizations and relations with the leadership of states.

In particular, they talk about the following: “Various global religious and inter-religious groups have issued guidance, advisory notes, and statements to support the actions and role of religious leaders, faith-based organizations. and faith communities during the COVID-19 pandemic. Many of those same groups have contributed to this guidance through a common acknowledgment that COVID-19 is a global pandemic, affecting all races, ethnicities, and geographic regions, that demands a global response. Inter-faith collaboration between both majority and minority faiths is crucial, particularly through the sharing of knowledge, resources, and best practices where possible. The accompanying decision tree provides a simple flow chart to support decision-making regarding hosting a religious event during the COVID-19 pandemic. When national or local authorities permit gatherings, the organizers of a gathering can make their own informed decision about the risk and plan appropriately based on it. WHO continues to monitor the situation closely for any changes that may affect this interim guidance” (WHO, 2020).

Therefore, we can assume that Ukraine will continue developing a restrictive strategy (in a mild or harsher form, based on the number of cases) in relation to religious organizations to ensure safety for the country’s population in general for believers in particular. However, an important question remains how the leadership of religious organizations will react in the future in relation to the authorities’ decisions, given that it is possible that new measures will be introduced to prevent and stop the pandemic (including mass vaccinations, etc.). Therefore, it can be assumed that protests among believers against the authorities’ decision based on religious beliefs are possible, as could be observed when the weekend quarantine was introduced.

Conclusions

Thus, having analyzed and disclosed the features of state-religious relations in the context of the coronavirus pandemic, we can draw the following conclusions:

1. Government policy in the world towards religious organizations during pandemics has manifested itself in different ways. Some states have chosen a liberal strategy,

allowing the confessions themselves to choose a mode of functioning in a given crisis situation. However, the majority chose a restrictive strategy, thereby ensuring the safety of the population of the entire country — both adherents of one or another religious organization and citizens in general.

2. Religious organizations also faced a collision: either to follow the instructions of the state authorities or not to obey, thereby potentially incurring sanctions from the leadership of the country and the safety and health of citizens. Most of the leaders of confessions recognized the correctness of the authorities' actions in relation to the functioning of religious buildings during the pandemic. However, among certain representatives of religious traditions, there were fanatics sceptical about this epidemiological situation.

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Socio-Political Image of the Kyiv Philosophical School: from Internal Resistance to Open Attitude

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The article deals with the specifics of the socio-political image of the Kyiv philosophical school of the second half of the 20th century as an innovative academic project of directors of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Academicians P. Kopnin and V. Shynkaruk. Their democratic vision of the foundations of educational and scientific processes in the Ukrainian SSR during the Khrushchev thaw was fruitfully embodied by the illustrious generation of the creators of this school or philosophers of the sixties. The study of a significant part of their memories, mainly realized in T. Chaika's project "The Philosophers' Oral Histories" a series of autobiographical reconstructions by Academicians S. Krymskyi, V. Horskyi, M. Popovych, as well as the ones of their colleagues S. Proleev and Y. Stratii, carried out thanks to the Student Society of Oral History of Philosophy, organized at the Department of the History of Philosophy of the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, testifies to the manifestation of a wide range of their civic stands from apolitical non-conformism to nationally oriented dissidence. An analysis of the memories of these members of the two most non-conforming departments of the said institute, namely of the History of philosophy in Ukraine and of the Logic and methodology of science, as well as the memoirs of their colleagues, primarily V. Lisovyi, allows us to recognize the Kyiv philosophical school as a domestic academic micromodel-prototype of an open society with its apparent: democracy, opposition to xenophobia, primarily to anti-Semitism and Ukrainophobia, resistance to official dogmatization of state ideology, openness to international experience in the context of direct dialogue and, which is fundamentally important, awareness of their role in the study and preservation of the spiritual, primarily philosophical, experience of the Ukrainian people and all ethnic groups in Ukraine.

Keywords: Ukrainian philosophy, Kyiv philosophical school, Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Kyiv State University, "The Philosophers' Oral Histories," socio-political image, civic stand, P. Kopnin, V. Shynkaruk, M. Popovych, S. Krymskyi, V. Lisovyi, V. Horskyi, Y. Stratii

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Introduction

The innovative academic project of academicians P. Kopnin and V. Shynkaruk, carried out in the 1950s-1980s from the era of the Khrushchev thaw to Gorbachev's perestroika, and now widely known under the name of the Kyiv philosophical school, became the main evidence of the revival in the Ukrainian SSR of interrupted by the repressive policy of the Stalinist regime the tragic and contradictory Soviet period of the institutionalization of modern domestic national philosophy. This project arose on a material and personnel basis of renewed in the mid-1940-s the Faculty of Philosophy of Kyiv State University and the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, as two leading institutions of Ukrainian philosophical education, science, and culture of that time, became one of the active scientific and public participants of Ukrainian cultural, national and state-building from the times of the Iron Curtain and the Cold War to its end. The Kyiv philosophical school has witnessed and participated in the activation of the world post-war human rights movement from the adoption of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at the third session of the UN General Assembly in 1948 to the singing of the Helsinki Accords or the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975. This period of development of the neo-anti-colonial movement in Asia, Africa, and on other continents, and of the protest movements in Western, Central and Eastern Europe, embodied in the Ukrainian SSR in the human rights movement and, in general, in the phenomenon of the sixties or of the Sixties, continuing the national liberation movement in a peaceful way. An important, but the little-studied source of the reconstruction of the role of the Ukrainian philosophers of the sixties in it is the array of their autobiographical reconstructions, realized by them in many hours of interviews in the T. Chaika's project "The Philosophers' Oral Histories," as the actual approach in the branch of history of the recent Ukrainian philosophy (Chaika, 2009), and, partially, in the project of Student Society of Oral History of Philosophy, organized at the Department of the History of Philosophy of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv (Khelufi, 2019). Thus, *the purpose* of our research is to determine the general specifics of the social and political image of the Kyiv philosophical school, as well as the diverse spectrum of civic stands of its leaders M. Popovych, S. Krymskyi, V. Horskyi, and a group of their colleagues, primarily V. Lisovyi and Y. Stratii, in the context of studying their final autobiographical researches as unique samples of intersubjective analysis.

The Kyiv Philosophical School as an Innovative Project of P. Kopnin and V. Shynkaruk: a Micromodel-Prototype of an Open Society

Over the past three decades in Ukrainian and, in part, foreign historical and philosophical thought, there is a process of studying the Kyiv philosophical school as a unique phenomenon in the history of national philosophy, namely as the leading ideological and organizational academic-institute capital's center-school of institutionalization of the Ukrainian philosophic tradition as a national one in the second half of the twentieth — the first decades of this century. An increasingly active and large-scale study of it in the last decade in Ukraine still faces a number of very problematic questions of the prehistory and process of the emergence of this school and its name, the determination of the founders and the personal composition of generations of its members, as well as the classification of branches and directions of its professional and other activities. Fundamental answers to them are impossible without an analysis of the Kyiv philosophical school not only as a scientific but also, more broadly, a socio-cultural phenomenon. Such a reassessment of it, only partially begun by its creators and their colleagues in the first modern textbooks on the history of philosophy of Ukraine, for example (Horskyi, 1997; Ohorodnyk & Rysun, 1997), and in their memoir essays, in particular (Shynkaruk, 1998; Horskyi, 1998; Krymskyi, 1998), found its large-scale, already to a certain extent generalizing, continuation in the series of scientific publications of both of them and their students and followers from the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv (Konverskyi et al., 2005; Gyberskyi et al., 2010). The first highly professional systematic analysis of the outlined range of problems in the history of the Kyiv philosophical school in these two works was carried out in the light of panoramic coverage of the social and political life of the Ukrainian SSR in the second half of the 20th century and is constantly supplemented and refined in a growing representative list of publications in special periodicals and other issues. They pay more and more attention not only to references to the influence of the social and political life of the Khrushchev thaw and stagnation-neo-Stalinism on the work of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, in particular (Hrabovskyi, 2009; Yolon, 2015), but also to the specifics of its reflection in the worldview attitudes of the creators of the Kyiv philosophical school, the directors of mentioned institute P. Kopnin and V. Shynkaruk (Kozlovskyi, 2016; Yolon, 2016; Yolon, 2017; Andros, 2017), and there, first of all, famous students and colleagues (Horskyi, 2000; Popovych, 2010; Krymskyi, 2010).

Only recently began a study, on a broad archival basis, of the political and scientific collisions of the 1970s, both in the development of research on the history of Ukrainian philosophy in this institute and in its work as a whole (Sheremeta, 2013; Yolon, 2015). Starting approximately from the same years, primarily abroad thanks to the scholars of the Ukrainian diaspora (Zakydalsky, 1976), and later, already in independent Ukraine, the ideological and organizational connection with the human rights movement of arrested in 1972 scientists of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR V. Lisovyi and Y. Pronyuk, as well as the group of their employees who were dismissed from the same place, is being increasingly covered both in their memoirs, mainly (Lisovyi, 2014), and of their colleagues (Hrabovskyi, 2009; Yermolenko, 2016). At the same time, in the first significant, interesting and very polemical, attempts at a scientific and memoir analysis of the origin of the Kyiv philosophical school at the Kyiv State University (Horak, 2009) and its design at the mentioned institute (Tabachkovskyi, 2002), the author's reconstructions of its history as a scientific and socio-cultural phenomenon are presented, both in the context of Soviet social and political life from the end of the era of Stalinism to Gorbachev's perestroika, and in independent Ukraine. T. Chaika's project "The Philosophers' Oral Histories," as the actual approach in the branch of history of the recent Ukrainian philosophy and his continuing initiative of Student Society of Oral History of Philosophy, organized at the Department of the History of Philosophy of the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, became qualitatively new, highly informative steps in this study. The result of the first of them was a series of final interviews with her for more than forty years teachers and colleagues S. Krymskyi, V. Horskyi, M. Popovych, P. Yolon, conducted and partially published by a Kyiv State University former graduate and an employee of the Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine T. Chaika in the journal "Philosophical Thought" and editions (Krymskyi & Chaika, 2012; Horskyi & Chaika, 2014). They are complemented by two interviews (Stratii, 2018; Proleev et al., 2018; Proleev et al., 2019) conducted and published by X. Zborovska and her colleagues from the said society. They were held in the form of a general rethinking in a frank talk with a specialist teacher of his life and scientific experience, in particular, detailed assessments of his and his colleagues' civic stands.

All these autobiographical reconstructions of the creators of the Kyiv philosophical school of different generations, carried out in the genre of "oral history," as well as a number of interviews complementing them, like the M. Boichenko's one (Popovych, 2015), and the memoirs of their colleagues, first of all (Shynkaruk, 1998; Tabachkovskyi, 2002; Horak, 2009; Lisovyi, 2014), allow us to proceed to clarify the social and political image of this school as an inflorescence of personal autobiographical visions of this, in their common opinion, an innovative project of P. Kopnin and V. Shynkaruk. The main aspects of this common image, in our opinion, is a high evaluation by all of them not only of the great scientific abilities and achievements of the two ideologists and leaders of this project, but also of their common civic stand as initiators of the emergence in the 1960-s at the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR albeit embryonic, but a very illustrative micromodel-prototype of an open society. Notable examples of participation in the aforementioned neo-anti-colonial movement of the countries of the Socialist Bloc, for example, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the Prague Spring of 1968, as well as the experience of the Ukrainian national liberation movement, catalyzed the beginning in Ukraine in the 1950s of the dissident individual-group socio-political human rights activities, or the movement of the sixties, in all spheres of the socio-cultural life of the Ukrainian SSR and, first of all, in the sections of the nationally conscious creative and scientific intelligentsia of Kyiv and Lviv. Then a broad non-conformal movement arose in the Ukrainian SSR and other republics of the USSR, designated both as a movement of loyal Soviet citizens, often active members of the CPSU, as a movement of intellectuals, a socio-political protest of the intelligentsia against the system and as national liberation currents among the peoples of the USSR. It is traditionally personified in the definition by A. Gladilin of the post-war generation of the scientific and creative intelligentsia in the USSR as the children of the XX Congress of the CPSU and in its general laconic name of the sixties or Sixtiers by S. Rassadin. It is significant that in the aforementioned memoirs, already in independent Ukraine, the creators of the Kyiv philosophical school and their colleagues declared a firm definition of its creators as philosophers of the sixties or Sixtiers: a generation of students — the core staff of the sixties (Horak, 2009: 24), a new generation of philosophers, which replaced those who formed during the Stalinist period (Stratii, 2018: 186), or the generation of philosophers of the sixties, formed during the Khrushchev thaw (*Horskyi,* 2000: 5), and precisely as a cohort of the most famous philosophers of the sixties in Ukraine and beyond (Tabachkovskyi, 2002: 2).

V. Shynkaruk recognized the appearance of a "humanistic turn" in the policy of the CPSU of that era as one of its initiators in the philosophical thought of the Ukrainian SSR. He clearly stated that behind the official ideological "facade" of the Khrushchev thaw remained the bureaucratic technocratic stand of the command-administrative system as a reactionary utopian ideology focused on achieving social progress through the development of technology with a stupid underestimation and a relative decrease in investment in a person (Shynkaruk, 1998: 7). V. Shynkaruk and his aforementioned colleagues, most detailed (Krymskyi & Chaika, 2012: 383-384), described the complicated staff morale of constantly arising intrigues at the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR under the leadership of D. Ostryanin (1952 — 1962). He was repressed under Stalinism, to a certain extent an unhappy and broken man of the early Soviet era (Krymskyi & Chaika, 2012: 117), who, like the group he headed, looked at philosophy as an addition to CPSU ideology, and looked at this institute as an ideological one (Yolon, 2016: 59). The heading of the said institute by P. Kopnin in 1962 and the reforms carried out by him after the dismissal of D. Ostryanin and his supporters for quarrelsomeness and scientific inconsistency (Horskyi & Chaika, 2014: 77), became the beginning of a change of totalitarian discourse and its images of the chieftain, the people and his enemies in the institute to a democratized Soviet one with pro-European images of the leader as well as an informal leader who is in a constructive dialogue with his staff as a community of ideological like-minded persons. All of them paid special attention in their memoirs to P. Kopnin as a scientist of a new type, who played a significant role at a turning point in the institute's activity (Yolon, 2016: 54), who not only revolutionized it enough (Horak, 2009: 270) but also turned it into a "lacuna of freethinking" as the second in the 20th century but not shot Ukrainian philosophical revival (Tabachkovskyi, 2002: 12). It was he, the initiator of the scientific direction, focused on the liberal rationalist tradition (*Popovych,* 2010: 6), who became the founder of the legendary Kopnin's brotherhood (Krymskyi, 2010: 5) and the Kyiv philosophical school. It was he who not only revived the institute with new ideas, personnel, structural reorganizations but also turned it into a generator of ideas, an essential component of the spirituality of society of that time, which was deeply opposed to the existing system and its specific bearers, despite its apparent loyalty (Horak, 2009: 269). P. Kopnin, like a real manager (Krymskyi & Chaika, 2012: 119), with his insight into personnel intuitions (Tabachkovskyi, 2002: 42), sociability and loyalty (Krymskyi & Chaika, 2012: 387), guessed correctly, according to M. Popovych, promising lines of development of our philosophy and was tragically lost for the country a figure of a state scale (Krymskyi & Chaika, 2012: 386).

The memoirists jointly emphasized that thanks to P. Kopnin, the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR immediately set the tone for a very tolerant, benevolently disposed towards all members of a single-family (Horskyi & Chaika, 2014: 79), a philosophical family (Tabachkovskyi, 2002: 39), with a positive scientific standard of P. Kopnin (Tabachkovskyi, 2002: 52), and his "cult" for the benefit of him and the institute (Krymskyi & Chaika, 2012: 129). They noted together his humanity and wonderful sense of humor, aptly captured in the thought that under P. Kopnin, the institute first smiled openly (Krymskyi & Chaika, 2012: 141). According to the authors of these memoirs, one of the most important aspects of P. Kopnin's organizational and scientific activity, revisionist in relation to the Soviet ideological officialdom, was that it was he who directed great energy and broke through the wall (Tabachkovskyi, 2002: 41) in the reconstruction of the history of Ukrainian philosophy from the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy to the philosophers of the Ukrainian SSR, who were repressed in the 1930s during the Shooted or Red Renaissance. The solidarity of different generations of the Kyiv philosophical school in recognition of it and the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR as a "different world" and, in fact, an antipode to the everyday Soviet existence (Proleev et al., 2019: 179), found their confirmation and development in numerous studies on the history of this school, both of its founders (Shynkaruk, 1998), and a wide range of their colleagues and students, for example (Hrabovskyi, 2009; Kozlovskyi, 2015; Yolon, 2017). These and other scientists recognized the indisputable contribution of this school to the divergence with the traditional interpretation of Marxism in the USSR (Tabachkovskyi, 2002), in particular in the form of the phenomenon of Ukrainian neo-Marxism of the 1970s — first half of the 1980s, as a legal neo-Marxist philosophy within the framework of the Kyiv philosophical school (with accompanying manifestations in psychology and sociology) (Hrabovskyi, 2009: 96). The removal of the Marxist methodology by the members of this school beyond the boundaries of the ideological doctrine, and sometimes beyond the ones of the philosophy of Marxism itself (Yermolenko, 2015: 63), witnessed the recoding of Soviet dogmatic Marxism-Leninism (Kozlovskyi, 2015: 24), and its transition to post-Marxism. These researchers, like (Konverskyi et al., 2005; Andros, 2017), like the creators of the Kyiv philosophical school, first of all (Shynkaruk, 1998), and, in fact, all of his colleagues in this school, for example (Tabachkovskyi, 2002; Krymskyi & Chaika, 2012; Horskyi & Chaika, 2014), identified two conditional periods of its history — the first is named after P. Kopnin, and the second one is named after V. Shynkaruk, and, accordingly, the presence of their two scientific teams of the same name and, in fact, schools of philosophy.

Noting certain differences in their civic stands and scientific positions as directors and scientists, they more than once compared P. Kopnin as the founder of a powerful school of the logic of scientific knowledge (Tabachkovskyi, 2002: 62), and, at the same time, a "charming gentleman," intellectual and secular person without aplomb (Horskyi & Chaika, 2014: 75), pragmatist and talented politician with a typical Moscow face (Krymskyi & Chaika, 2012: 134), to V. Shynkaruk as his heir under P. Kopnin's wing (Horskyi & Chaika, 2014: 96), but is both a different person and a different philosopher (Horskyi & Chaika, 2014: 94). Memories brightly illuminate his "living image": from the personally extravagant with the idea that there were only two philosophers at the Kyiv State University in the 1950s — 1960s, namely Hegel and Shynkaruk, and at the same time, ridicule of his fear of Department of logic and more restrained than P. Kopnin's sense of humor (Krymskyi & Chaika, 2012), to the most epic one (Andros, 2017). General recognition of his moderation and penchant for ideological compromise is combined in these living voices of memory with a high evaluation of his scientific achievements and gratitude for the fact that the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR was not disbanded in the 1970s at all (Krymskyi & Chaika, 2012: 153). Directly admitting that V. Shynkaruk was neither a radical intellectual, much less a dissident (Kozlovskyi, 2016: 71), researchers have repeatedly noted vivid manifestations of the scientist's civic stand as a deeply Ukrainian person who is not indifferent to the fate of his native people (Andros, 2017: 72), in particular, his contribution to the development of civil society in Ukraine, as the authorship of the Law "About Languages in the Ukrainian SSR" (1989) and many years of fruitful work in the Society "Knowledge" of Ukraine as its chairman (Andros, 2017: 72). The reformatory role of P. Kopnin and V. Shynkaruk in the philosophical life of the Ukrainian SSR, defined as the "revisionist line of Kopnin — Shynkaruk" (Shynkaruk, 1998: 19) in the denunciation of them to the Central Committee of the CPU during the stormy wave of struggle against caused by the Prague Spring in the USSR "philosophical revisionism", consisted precisely in the revival by them of interrupted by repressions since the mid-1930s institutional philosophizing in the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR (Horskyi, 1998: 27), as, in fact, a full-fledged foundation for the development of modern Ukrainian both humanities and, at the same time, civil society.

The experience of the "oral history" of the Ukrainian philosophers of the sixties: the inflorescence of personal visions of their civic stands

The phenomenon of the philosophers of the sixties of the Ukrainian SSR, as a socio-communicative problem, witnessed the simultaneous manifestation of a wide range of civic stands by this generation: from apolitical non-conformism through different variations of dissent to nationally oriented dissidence as the inheritance of a number of national-patriotic and national-communist ideas and teachings of the period of the Ukrainian national liberation movement of the first half of the 20th century. One of the indicative manifestations of this in the academic environment of the Ukrainian SSR in the 1960s was the striking distinction between the official and unofficial atmospheres in the institutes of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. Their wide range included both the non-conformal public humorous project of the virtual parallel world "The Country of Cybertonia," initiated in the Institute of Cybernetics of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR under the leadership of V. Glushkov, with its Constitution, the governing "Council of Robots," passports and institutions, and the clearly Ukrainian national-patriotic atmosphere in a number of humanitarian institutes of the said Academy, primarily in the Institute of Art History, Folklore and Ethnography under the leadership of M. Rylskyi. This ideologically diverse spectrum of these domestic academic subcultures of the 1950s — 1970s, which arose in the fifteen-year interval between the XX (1956) and XXIV (1971) Congresses of the CPSU, as markers of the conviction of cult of J. Stalin's personality, and, in fact, its return, has absorbed the contradictory experience. This is both the experience of the rehabilitation of victims of political repressions in the USSR and, at the same time, the pompous anniversaries of the centenary of the birth of V. Lenin (1970) and the fiftieth anniversary of the formation of the USSR (1971), and the arrests of dissidents in the Ukrainian SSR in 1965 and in 1972. This is also both the experience of the mass destruction of archival library funds of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, and, at the same time, numerous academic and official events, significant scientific projects for the hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the birth of T. Shevchenko and the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the birth of G. Skovoroda. The background of the socio-cultural life of the USSR of this era, in addition to turbulent international events, namely the mediated confrontation between the USSR and the US from the Arab-Israeli conflict and the October Crisis of 1962 to the Vietnam War, became outlined by the poet B. Slutsky and started in 1959 in the newspaper "Komsomolskaya Pravda" by I. Erenburg and I. Poletayev discussion of physicists and lyricists and the flight in 1956 of Y. Gagarin into open space. All this found indicative manifestations in the activities of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR during this period of crisis of the ideology of Stalinism with its transition from the cult of Stalin to the cult of Lenin with filling the second of them with a new ideological content — Lenin's "consecration" of N. Khrushchev's reforms (Shynkaruk, 1998: 6).

Summarizing in his memoirs the Kyiv philosophical school's experience, a well-known member of P. Kopnin's circle at the said institute P. Yolon defined two tactics for a scientist's civic stand in the USSR. The first of them is the forced tactics of the conformism of the initiators of innovative, creative undertakings with an imitation of devotion to Marxism-Leninism's dogma. The second one is separate protest actions, like the practice of "samizdat" by V. Lisovyi and Y. Pronyuk, with its enormous socio-political significance without any constructive scientific perspectives (Yolon, 2017: 55). Previously re-examined by us in the light of autobiographical reconstructions of a number of leading members of this school, this thesis is corrected taking into account the first and second plans of their memoir narratives: 1. self-analysis of personal formation until adulthood with family and friends, 2. detailed consideration of the educational process and scientific life of the Ukrainian SSR and the places in them of them and their colleagues. Natives of different regions of Ukraine during the Stalin era before and during the World War II, witnesses of repression, collectivization, industrialization, and military events both in their rural (V. Lisovyi in Tarasivka, Stari Bezradychi) and, mainly, urban (S. Krymskyi in Artemivsk/Bakhmut, M. Popovych in Zhytomyr and Izyaslav, V. Horskyi in Kharkiv, Y. Stratii in Dnipropetrovsk/Dnipro and Lviv) dimensions, they, besides the last of them, had the experience of post-war student life in Kyiv, namely studying at Kyiv State University. It is indicative that their direct and indirect involvement in childhood and adolescence in the domestic and foreign scientific and cultural heritage led to a clear manifestation already in their student years of their original scientific persons and remarkable non-conformity of their civic stands. Vivid examples of this involvement were: love of music, astronomy, physics and philosophy, book mania, in particular reading the collected works of G. Hegel (Krymskyi & Chaika, 2012), interest in German and philosophy, for example, the teaching of I. Kant (Stratii, 2018), passion for music, theater and the history of world literature, in particular the works of W. Shakespeare (Horskyi & Chaika, 2014).

Disclosing in their interviews the multifaceted specifics of institutional changes in education and scientific life of the Ukrainian SSR during the Khrushchev thaw, in particular, distinguishing and describing the official and unofficial atmospheres in universities and academic institutions, they and a number of their contemporaries, for example (Horak, 2009), together with recognized low and, in general, an unsatisfactory level of teaching at the said university. This range of critical assessments, reaching the extreme emotional recognition of the level of teaching philosophy as almost entirely ignored and absurd (Krymskyi & Chaika, 2012: 47), contrasts sharply with Y. Stratii's high evaluation of the traditions of learning classical philology at the Lviv State University. It is noteworthy that it was thanks to the inspired professional contribution of the students-philologists of this university, as a general manifestation of their expressive nationally conscious civic stands, that the rather non-conformal project of the Kyiv philosophical school for the study of old Ukrainian philosophy, initiated by P. Kopnin and V. Nichik, was largely implemented. Describing in detail the difficult conditions of their studies at the university, for example, numerous conflicts based on infringements for scientific views, civic stand and ethnicity (anti-Semitism), S. Krymskyi and a number of his colleagues testified that they developed personal practices to counteract this, such as, for example, developed by him, M. Popovych and V. Mazepa, a certain subculture as a form of defense against "Marxist absurdity" (Krymskyi & Chaika, 2012: 49). Paying exceptional attention to the reproduction of the original images of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR and the Kyiv philosophical school as the central objects of the second plan of their recollections-interviews, the memoirists actualized them in the context of the third plan as evaluate the impact of socio-cultural contexts on their lives, in particular, the socio-political situation of the mid-20th century — early 21st century in the USSR and in the Ukrainian SSR and then in independent Ukraine and in the world. Together with highlighting these institutes and schools' activities mainly in the socio-cultural contexts of the Khrushchev's thaw and, to a lesser extent, neo-Stalinist-stagnation eras, they described the formation and demonstrations of their civic stands and the ones of their colleagues in a differently emphasized manner.

Y. Stratii and V. Horskyi together focused their views on the twists and turns of the work of the Department of the History of Philosophy in Ukraine in the 1960s — 1980s, and the first of them opposed its creative atmosphere to an intolerable moral climate — a terrible atmosphere, at the Institute of Social Sciences in Lviv early 1970s (Stratii, 2018: 201-202). Comparing the certain level of freethinking that was allowed in Moscow at that time with the powerful ideological pressure already perceptible in Kyiv, up to and including repression and an even worse situation in Lviv, Y. Stratii noted, that dissidents non-violently resisted the criminal political regime, and many of the repressed were simply engaged in scientific work, had authority in their industry and were Ukrainians, not Soviet people (Stratii, 2018: 203). In their own words, not dissidents, for example, it is difficult to make a hero-dissident out of me (Horskyi & Chaika, 2014: 103), even with the experience of Stalinist repressions from childhood and acquaintance with V. Lisovyi, Y. Pronyuk and I. Svitlychnyi from institute years (Horskyi & Chaika, 2014:111), with knowledge of the Holodomor, Bolshevik terror and critical attitude from youth to the Soviet political regime (Stratii, 2018: 184-185), they assessed the actions of the authorities against the human rights movement in the Ukrainian SSR as persecution of nationalists (Horskyi & Chaika, 2014: 98) and as repression against the Ukrainian intelligentsia (Stratii, 2018: 202). V. Horskyi noted the indicative solidarity and sympathy at the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR of decent people, mainly young people, and, above all, P. Kopnin, to Y. Pronyuk and V. Lisovyi. In particular, V. Horskyi spoke about the secret storage at his place, at the request of Y. Pronyuk, of photocopies of D. Chyzhevskyi's "Essays on the History of Philosophy in Ukraine" and their joint attempt with V. Nichik to stand up for V. Lisovyi and Y. Pronyuk before the secretary for ideology of the Pechersk District in Kyiv Committee of the CPU (Horskyi & Chaika, 2014: 99-100). Y. Stratii went deep in her interview into a philosophical analysis of the heritage of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and the history of its study, and V. Horskyi highlighted the tragic fate of the "philosophical front" of the Ukrainian SSR during the Shooted Renaissance period. Representatives of different regions of Ukraine and various ethnocultural traditions, Y. Stratii and V. Horskyi described their common contribution to the revival of Ukrainian philosophy in accordance with the principle of the family brought up in P. Kopnin's community (Horskyi & Chaika, 2014: 152) both at the H. S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy and at the revived in independent Ukraine with the active participation of V. Horskyi innovative educational project National University of "Kyiv-Mohyla Academy."

Systematically assessing in the article (Sheremeta, 2013) the work of the said Department in the 1960s — 1970s and the repressive measures of the authorities directed mainly against it in 1972, namely the arrests and exile of V. Lisovyi and Y. Pronyuk and expulsion from the institute and persecution of a number of employees (V. Byshovets, M. Bondar, V, Zhmyr, F. Kanak, S. Kudra, M. Rozhenko and V. Tsymbal), O. Sheremeta indicated, that all this was due to a change in the leadership of the CPU, and along with this and the change in the ideological and administrative climate (Sheremeta, 2013: 99). V. Lisovyi thoroughly comprehended in his memoirs these changes and their socio-political consequences in the context of an autobiographical and philosophical consideration of his arrest, conviction, imprisonment and exile in 1972 — 1983 and recognized the repressions of the second half of the 1960s — early 1970s in the Ukrainian SSR a decisive attempt by the party elite to strangle in the bud the direction of thinking towards the establishment of national identity in the republics of the USSR, especially in Ukraine (Lisovyi, 2014: 230). An activist of the Ukrainian human rights movement, admirer and distributor of "samizdat" materials of I. Dziuba, Y. Sverstiuk, V. Chornovil, M. Osadchy and V. Moroz, as well as A. Sakharov, O. Solzhenitsyn, A. Avtorkhanov, V. Lisovyi according to S. Hrabovskyi, was one of the few Ukrainian post-Marxists of the 1960s (Lisovyi, 2014: 10), not only a scientist, but also a publicist, essayist, poet and an outstanding public figure of historical scale (Yermolenko, 2016). Speaking in his "Open Letter to the deputies of the Supreme

Soviet of the USSR" (1969) in defense of the councils of people's deputies as bodies of representative democracy against the usurpation of their power by a centralized party-state apparatus and recognizing the need to return to a multiparty system (Lisovyi, 2014: 272), he developed these theses already in "Open Letter to the members of the CPSU and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine" (1972). Condemning the new period of political repressions in the Ukrainian SSR as a neo-Stalinist bacchanalia of Ukrainian-hating forces directly violates The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and denies the principle of national self-determination, he vividly highlighted the crisis state of the USSR as a whole. The most famous representative of the nationally oriented dissidence from the Department of the History of Philosophy in Ukraine, as, in fact, its center at the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, V. Lisovyi outlined in his memoirs the common and the different in his civic stand and the one of his colleague and friend M. Popovych.

M. Popovych was then the head of one more non-conformal Department — logic and methodology of science, in this institute, the subject of which was outside the controlled field of official ideology (Krymskyi & Chaika, 2012: 144), recognized by M. Popovych himself as created by P. Kopnin a rather successful, but, at the same time, openly opportunistic research group (Krymskyi & Chaika, 2012: 388). Recalling their discussions with M. Popovych on intellectual and political topics both in those years and later, already in independent Ukraine, with the participation of the employees of this Department P. Yolon, S. Krymskyi and S. Vasiliev, (Lisovyi, 2014: 194-197), V. Lisovyi witnessed a high level of M. Popovych's openness, his knowledge of many European languages and his dissident moods. V. Lisovyi recognized his ideological orientation as a general democratic one, with the clause that M. Popovych, unlike many Russian democrats, had a negative attitude to the stereotypes of Russian chauvinism and in the 1960s solidified himself with the dissidents, whom the authorities blamed as "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists" (Lisovyi, 2014: 195). Pointed out that their discussions in the 1990s revealed differences in their understanding of the defining features of Ukrainian national-cultural identity and the role of the Ukrainian language in it, V. Lisovyi noted that he was trying to shift M. Popovych's position to the right, towards rejecting the too liberal version of multiculturalism, and also noted his tolerant attitude to various ideological positions of the democratic type even as the director (2001 — 2018) of the H. S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy (Lisovyi, 2014: 197). Clarifying in their memoirs the civil position of M. Popovych, his colleagues admitted that in Soviet times he was not a dissident in the established sence of this word, but, of course, was a free-thinker (*Popovych*, 2010: 9), in particular, back in the terrible 1970s expressed a "fundamental thought" that humanity is condemned if it cannot overcome communism (Andros, 2015: 90), and occupied a leading place in the opposition to an inhuman and unlearned officious philosophy (Tabachkovskyi, 2002: 152). One of the initiators of the People's Movement of Ukraine and the head of its Kyiv branch in 1989, co-chairman of the Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine, and then a member of the Initiative Group "December 1," a supporter of European social democracy M. Popovych was the most famous representative of the Kyiv philosophical school in the social and political life of Ukraine.

His name, as a thinker and author of landmark studies on the history of culture and socio-political life of Ukraine and the world, is often recalled by his fellow memoirists next to the name of S. Krymskyi as his long-term colleague in the said Department and institute, just like he is a laureate of the Taras Shevchenko National Prize, his close friend and, more than once, his passionate opponent. The co-authors, together with I. Drach, of the book “Hryhorii Skovoroda: A Biographical Tale” (1984) with its clearly dissident fate, M. Popovych and S. Krymskyi more than once received remarkable assessments from colleagues: old university friends who have always been as an informal structure at the top of the pyramid at the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR (Horak, 2009: 271-272), the leading Kopninists (Tabachkovskyi, 2002: 160), and M. Popovych himself recognized himself a student of S. Krymskyi in many respects, for example, in the “worlds” of music and Kyiv (Krymskyi & Chaika, 2012: 395). Pointing out that from his students day he did not become an enemy of Marxism and a dissident (Krymskyi & Chaika, 2012: 50), and repeatedly reminding T. Chaika that he is an apolitical person (Krymskyi & Chaika, 2012: 393), S. Krymskyi, however, played, in our opinion, an important role in the implementation of P. Kopnin’s opportunistic and “revisionist” innovative scientific project. Reproducing in his interview to T. Chaika, which was extremely interesting and extravagant in terms of the range of assessments and characteristics, in more detail than all his colleagues almost all the juicy events from the history of this institute, he, in fact, very quickly recalled the arrest of V. Lisovyi and Y. Pronyuk. At the same time, S. Krymskyi widely considered the influence of Kyiv and Moscow scientific and socio-cultural, mainly non-conforming, environment of those years on the worldview of both his own and his colleagues. An active participant and attentive chronicler of the history of this institute during the time of its directors D. Ostryanin, P Kopnin and V. Shynkaruk, he described in detail its transition from the “atmosphere of ideological pogroms” and denunciations to the Central Committee of the CPU (Krymskyi & Chaika, 2012: 381), when, thanks to his recommendations, the main staff of both the institute (Krymskyi & Chaika, 2012: 112) and the Kyiv philosophical school was formed, to the emergence of a real philosophical environment at the institute and in Ukraine as a whole. An essential aspect of this description is S. Krymskyi’s consideration of the connections of both his own and other participants of this school with, as he said, their “brothers in mind,” namely non-conforming leaders of Georgian (M. Mamardashvili) and Russian (A. Zinoviev, H. Batishchev and others) academic philosophy.

According to M. Popovych, S. Krymskyi was “our man”: of course, with a democratic and humanistic orientation, a liberal in the political sense of a word, who always felt the abomination of the bureaucratic system in which we live, always resisted everything to the best of his ability, which in one way or another humiliated human dignity (Krymskyi & Chaika, 2012: 394). S. Krymskyi highlighted his spiritual evolution from orthodox Hegelianism to Christian values and paid special attention to the influence on it of the civic stand of his friend, the writer Victor Nekrasov, with its patriotism, alternative to the Soviet way of life (Krymskyi & Chaika, 2012: 201). The general democratic position of the Kyiv philosophical school is attested in the recognition by M. Popovych that the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR then brought up the phenomenon of a philosophical community, which had to be reckoned with (Tabachkovskyi, 2002: 43), and already A. Horak recognized it for the forge of spiritual opposition to the regime, carried out in the form inherent in philosophy (Horak, 2009: 273). The diversity of personal visions of the socio-political image of this institute and school by their members is wide in all their differences: from enthusiastic to the limit, for example, an exceptional and desirable phenomenon, an island of happiness (Horskyi & Chaika, 2014: 79), a blinking light that shone in the darkest periods of obscurantism (Horak, 2009: 273), to exclusively civilly accented, like a lacuna of free thought (Tabachkovskyi, 2002: 11) and an outpost of spirituality (Horak, 2009: 273). This vide positive range of assessments is summarized in the recognition that the search team of the mentioned institute has played and is playing a significant role in our socio-political life, which contributed and contributed to democratic development, the national revival of Ukrainian society, and the establishment of the state independence of Ukraine (Yolon, 2017: 55). In the 1960s, this institute became one of the few prototypes of modern civil society in the Ukrainian SSR with its: democracy, opposition to xenophobia, primarily to anti-Semitism and Ukrainophobia, resistance to official dogmatization of state ideology, openness to international experience in the context of direct dialogue and, which is fundamentally important, awareness of their role in the study and preservation of the spiritual, primarily philosophical, experience of the Ukrainian people and all ethnic groups in Ukraine.

Conclusions

The results of our research are as follows:

1. Comprehension of the history of the Kyiv philosophical school in the context of the memoir and scientific research of its creators, in particular the domestic projects of the oral history of philosophy implemented in their final interviews, brought its professional analysis, including the clarification of the socio-political image of this school, to a qualitatively new, intersubjective-autobiographical, level of its consideration.
2. The autobiographical reconstruction by colleagues of directors of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Academicians P. Kopnin and V. Shynkaruk, both theirs and their own civic stands, attested to the democratic character of the Kyiv philosophical school as a micromodel-prototype of an open society, embodied by the philosophers of the sixties in the Ukrainian SSR as their innovative academic project under the influence of the activation of the human rights movement.
3. Considered on the basis of their own memories, the civic stands of members of the Department of the History of Philosophy in Ukraine in this institute V. Horskyi, Y. Stratii, V. Lisovyi confirmed its socio-political image as the leading center of nationally-oriented dissidence in this institution and, accordingly, the main object of political repression in it by the authorities of the Ukrainian SSR.
4. Considered on the basis of their own memories, the civic stands of members of the Department of Logic and methodology of science in this institute M. Popovych and S. Krymskyi revealed its socio-political image as a leading non-conformal center of an expressively democratic direction in this institute, closely connected with the Department of the History of Philosophy in Ukraine.

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Kharkiv Research School in Ukrainian Philosophy of Soviet Period: Social, Political and Philosophical Researches

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The article analyzes the key points and expresses the future perspectives of socio-political and historical-philosophical researches of Kharkiv Research School of the Soviet period. The main emphasis is on current issues of research of Kharkiv philosophical tradition in the '60s-'80s of the 20th century. An attempt was made to outline the problems and clarify the specifics of Kharkiv Research School of this period to reproduce a holistic picture of the development of Ukrainian philosophy of the Soviet period. For this purpose, the peculiarities of the explication of socio-political, socio-cultural, socio-practical, and philosophical-anthropological issues, which took place in Soviet philosophical thought in the conditions of the dominance of dialectical and historical materialism as a scientific paradigm, were studied. Key points in the research of Kharkiv scholars who tried to move away from the theoretical and methodological doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, contrasting their development of philosophical problems in science, epistemology, and methodological issues of scientific knowledge, ethical and sociological issues, were traced.

Keywords: Kharkiv research school, marxist-leninist philosophy, dialectical materialism, historical materialism, ideology, ukrainian philosophy of the soviet era

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Introduction

Today, the urgency of a systematic study of national philosophy development is due to the need for a comprehensive rethinking of the place and role of the cohort of Ukrainian philosophers in the institutionalization of domestic philosophical education, science, and culture. Today, the evolution and development of Ukrainian philosophical thought is a very interesting subject of study, especially in the Soviet period, when philosophy officially had the status of a political and ideological affair, dominated by strict control over scholars' expression in the spirit of party guidelines. However, neither ideological pressure nor the party's instructions to recognize only Marxist-Leninist philosophy could stop the Soviet-era scholars who managed to carry their own thoughts and research through all the prohibitions. Gradually (after Stalin's repressions), the pressure weakened, and an atmosphere was created for Soviet philosophy in which the main topics of research were the problems of the epistemology and the methodology of science. Different interpretations of the epistemology and different interpretations of the philosophical and methodological ideas of the classics of Marxism-Leninism led to the emergence of different scientific schools (Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa) (Yarmolitska & Gan, 2020). This article aims to investigate the development of Kharkiv Research School of the Soviet period, providing an unbiased and systematic study of its functioning as a center of socio-political and philosophical thought to determine the impact of these studies on Ukrainian science and culture. To accomplish this task, we will try to reconstruct the research field of the outlined period, and for this, we will analyze some publications that were published during this period by Kharkiv scientists and became the basis of this article.

Let us turn to the beginning of the foundation of Kharkiv Research School. For a certain period ('20s-'30s of the 20th century.) Kharkiv Research School was considered as the center of philosophy. During this period, the philosophical research of scholars focused on the history and theory of Marxism-Leninism, Ukrainian philosophy, socio-political thought, and foreign philosophy. From the middle of the 20th century, Kharkiv scholars' researches focus on the development of socio-political and philosophical views of Russian and Ukrainian thinkers. In the '60s-'80s, scientific knowledge's theory and methodology began to be actively developed, attention was paid to ethical issues, and epistemological and logical-methodological issues were developed. However, the philosophical reflection of Kharkiv Research School scholars of the Soviet period is dominated by methodological versions of the contemporary system of Marxist philosophy in the context of the unity of dialectical and historical materialism.

The history of science in Kharkiv, in particular the history of philosophical thought, was mainly concentrated at Kharkiv University, where Western European specialists worked at various times, among whom was the famous German philosopher J. Shad. Many well-known names are also connected with the university — V. Karazin, I. Ryzkyi, I. Osipovskyi, O. Potebnia, D. Bagalii, T. Butkevych, and others.

Based on the research of Western European philosophers, Kharkiv scholars have made a significant contribution to the development of philosophical thought, exploring the humanistic traditions and ideas of freedom and responsibility, and the history of philosophical and social thought in Ukraine and Russia, central problems of epistemology, subject, subjective and objective, actively developed the theory and methodology of scientific knowledge and problems of social activity. The search for Kharkiv scholars in the philosophy and sociology of the Soviet period was based primarily on the social theory of Marxism. Traditionally supported by Ukrainian thinkers was a general approach to the methodology and periodization of the history of philosophy, based on the tasks of the Marxist-Leninist historical and philosophical concept. However, the realities of social practice-led scholars to radically rethink the theories and practices of communist ideals.

About the Kharkiv center of philosophical thought, about its history of the foundation and to the beginning of the 21st century published many articles and monographs (G. Panov, A. Shchedrin, N. Radionova, V. Abashnyk, S. Golikov, O. Mamalui, L. Denisko, V. Korablova, O. Burova, V. Sukhina, I. Shudryk, etc.). However, these studies do not exhaust all possible ways to study the history of Soviet philosophy. There is a need for explications of the definition of such a phenomenon as Kharkiv Research School, the study of which is quite broad and diverse and, accordingly, requires a systematic and in-depth study of the least studied stages of its formation.

Research of philosophical problems of natural science and categories of Marxist dialectics by Kharkiv scientists in Soviet times

Philosophical problems of natural science began to be developed quite intensively during the Soviet period, and most of the works were devoted to the Marxist-Leninist coverage of certain questions of natural science. Thus, Kharkiv researcher K. Havrysh studies the nature of the ideological struggle around one of the most important problems of modern (at that time) natural science — the problem of the essence of life. The main attention of her research is focused on the analysis of the basic principles that constitute the essence of the dialectical-materialist approach to life as a special, qualitatively peculiar form of motion of matter, attempts are made to show the meaning of these provisions for further development of biological research, for the struggle against the idealism and mechanism of that time, the expediency of developing a new definition of life corresponding to the latest scientific achievements is considered. Also, in his research K. Havrysh emphasizes the growing role of Soviet science, which faces the task of broad and comprehensive development of theoretical research in the field of natural sciences. Of fundamental importance here is that several tasks in the first place are to clarify the essence of the phenomena of life. This is primarily due to this problem's practical significance because to manage life processes, and they should be known. "Human beings will only become the complete master of living nature when he/she finds what determines the specifics of life, which underlies the difference between living and non-living" (Havrysh, 1965: 1).

Due to its ideological nature, the problem of the essence of life has always been the subject of a fierce ideological struggle. In Soviet times, this problem was also not overlooked by naturalists and philosophers. The question of what life is, what its nature is, has attracted attention since the birth of philosophical thought. There were acute debates around this issue. At certain stages of the development of philosophy and natural science, there was a struggle between two opposite directions — materialism and idealism. As K. Havrysh notes, only the new philosophy — dialectical materialism — makes a decisive step in solving philosophical issues related to the problem of the essence of life (Havrysh, 1965: 7-41).

In the '60s, there are many studies published by young scientists of Maksym Horkyi Kharkiv State University, which attract attention with their curiosity, but unfortunately are also covered by the same ideology as their senior mentors, who testify to the ideological party pressure from the Soviet authorities on scientists who did not have the opportunity to freely express their views. In the published work "Some Questions of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy" (1964), the categories of Marxist dialectics, the classification of categories of historical materialism, the ideas of historical progress in pre-Marxist sociology, and others were studied. Currently, O. Ivanishchenko, researching the categories of Marxist dialectics, noted that they are the basic logical concepts that reflect certain general aspects of the laws of various processes that take place in nature, society, and thought. At that time, little-studied categories such as — things, property, quality, etc., belong to thinking. According to the young scientist, the study of these categories plays an important role in natural science research. Without clarifying the objective content and their features, it is impossible to correctly understand the laws of science and the laws of society. The material world is the unity of an infinite variety of things. However, "each thing, in turn, acts in the same way as the unity of diversity — the unity of different mutually influential material processes. The presence of the unity of opposites in objects is the basis of their stability" (Some questions, 1964: 15). But such unity is not absolute. It has a relative coincidence. The identity of opposites is incomplete. As a result of which the objects of the material world are subject to change, it can be both transforming into each other and unified into new material systems.

In general, methodological versions of that time system of Marxist philosophy in the context of the unity of dialectical and historical materialism did not go unnoticed in the studies of young Kharkiv scholars. Thus, their scientific research focuses on the study of the concept of historical progress. O. Mamalui conducted his research in this direction. He noted that since its inception, the idea of historical progress had undergone a complex evolution in pre-Marxist sociology, going from the first assumptions to the revolutionary-democratic concept of historical progress. None of its representatives was able to rise to a scientific, dialectical-materialist understanding of socio-historical progress. This was done only by the ideologues of the working class K. Marx and F. Engels (Some questions, 1964: 108). As we can see, totalitarian control and management in Soviet times completely covered the thinking of Kharkiv scientists, leaving almost no chance for independent research and direction to new reforms in science.

Philosophical, sociological, and epistemological research of Kharkiv Research School in '60s-'80s of the 20th century

In the '70s-'80s of the 20th century, Kharkiv scholars actively worked on research on issues related to philosophical and sociological problems, which later became a significant contribution to Kharkiv Research School. During this period, philosophical research focuses on the problem of interaction of legal and moral regulation of social relations, a new aspect of morality and law as interacting complex dynamic systems that perform certain social functions was comprehended. The research of Kharkiv scholar O. Yakuba was devoted to the issues of complex social systems methodology of cognition, theoretical problems of ethics, legal science, and the issues of regulation of human behavior. She explained that only the analysis of the relationship between law and morality would allow us to understand their features, patterns of development, to clarify their role in managing social processes.

Based on interdisciplinary research, there is an interest in the problem of the relationship between communist morality and socialist law, which in the late '50s, and especially in the '60s, became especially popular among scholars. Most scholars devote their work to these problems, studying the relationship between social consciousness forms and more thoroughly considering the commonalities and differences between law and morality. In this aspect, O. Yakuba's attempt to systematically analyze legal and moral phenomena seems extremely important. She makes a general analysis of the relationship between morality and law as certain systems of phenomena, as complex ideological forms of society and shows the peculiarities of their interaction in regulating social activity. In a way, the researcher emphasizes the specific sociological study of the relationship between morality and law as ideological forms of society, which allows her not only to reveal the mechanism of interaction but also to clarify some general theoretical issues.

Exploring morality and law as sociological categories, O. Yakuba turns to such categories as social life and social consciousness, social relations, mode of production, socio-economic formation, laws of development of social processes, etc., which the scientist believes have important methodological significance in the study of morality and law. Along with this, it considers the basic laws and categories of dialectics, such as freedom and necessity, possibility and reality, part and entire, essence and phenomenon, form and content, and others. In general, the study of legal and moral systems of regulation of social relations achieves its goal only when the basic principles of dialectics build it as logic and epistemology. The analysis of social phenomena requires a dialectical-materialist approach, which in turn requires a systematic approach to the study of social processes, which involves the structural and functional analysis of complex systems in their dynamics and relationships with other systems. Both morality and law, as sociological categories, have methodological significance for specific sciences because they allow us to understand the place of morality and law in the system of relations of society as a single social organism, to identify their most significant features as specific aspects of this single whole (Yakuba, 1970: 3 -10).

During the same period, in parallel with O. Yakuba's research, there is another Kharkiv scientist O. Plakhotnyi, who also devoted his research to sociological problems, namely, to the analysis of the sociological aspect of the relationship between freedom and conformity. The study of this problem, the scientist says, will not only reveal the active role of the subject's consciousness but also more fully determine its content, dependence on different social communities of people, on the organization of society itself. However, his research did not pass without a critique of bourgeois sociology, without which no scientific study could do in Soviet times.

Analyzing the sociological aspect of freedom and responsibility, it is necessary to proceed from the organic connection of two problems: philosophical — "freedom — necessity" and sociological — "personality — society." After all, the philosopher, exploring the problem of "freedom — necessity," gives a theoretical analysis of these categories, which reflect the qualitatively special connections of the objective world, which are not covered by other categories. According to O. Plakhotnyi, materialists-dialectics understand by necessity what naturally follows from the internal, essential connections of this process. Necessity is connected with the very essence of the process by which it is conditioned, and freedom is a practical mastery of necessity based on the knowledge of objective patterns. In the history of philosophy, the solution to the problem of freedom has always rested on the understanding of the relationship between necessity and chance (Plakhotnyi, 1972: 4-5).

Suppose we talk about what the sociologist encounters in the study of freedom and responsibility. In that case, we should pay attention to the fact that he is dealing with a specific subject of the study, namely — society, social relations, personality, with special social interests of various social forces, with a world in which the idea, views, moods, social theories, ideologies, worldview, etc. play an important role. "The problem of the relationship between freedom and necessity is the methodological basis of the theory of responsibility because this problem in sociological research takes the form of freedom and social necessity (responsibility). The analysis of freedom and responsibility in the sociological aspect allows not only to reveal the active role of the subject's consciousness but also to more fully determine its content" (Plakhotnyi, 1972: 6-7). Thus, both the philosophical and sociological aspects of the study of freedom and responsibility will be able to give positive results only with a specific historical approach.

At the same time, a young scientist Yu. Bukhalov, known in certain circles of philosophers, began his activity. He began as a historian of Ukrainian philosophy and took part in the "epistemological turn" of national thought, which at that time was headed by P. Kopnin. Subsequently, the Kharkiv scientist joined the research of socio-practical, socio-cultural, anthropological direction in philosophy. Later, these studies based on the Department of Philosophy at Kharkiv University served as the beginning of the laboratory of sociological research, then the department, and finally the creation of the Faculty of Sociology. But all this was later, and in the '60s and 70's the research of the young scientist Yu. Bukhalov concerned problems of epistemology, logic, and methodology of science, the ratio of subjective and objective in practice and cognition, the cognitive activity of the subject, etc. Currently, defining dialectical materialism as the science of the general essential relations of subject and object, which is based on the principle of materialism understanding of history, the scientist explores the relationship between subject and object, based on two main forms of interaction between subject and object, are the two main forms of social activity — practice and cognition, the structure of dialectical materialism is represented as the unity of historical materialism (theory of practice) and epistemology (theory of cognition).

The study of the relationship of philosophy with other sciences, with spiritual culture and social life during the Brezhnev "stagnation" took place under the banner of Marxist-Leninist philosophy as a methodological basis of scientific knowledge and social practice, and the development of principles of the new thinking was associated with party program tasks, the main of which was — to form a scientific, Marxist-Leninist worldview in all Soviet people. Most Soviet scientists worked in the same direction, trying to determine the specifics of philosophy itself, its subject (V. Akulov, M. Alekseiev, V. Babushkin, E. Ilienkov, P. Kopnin, T. Oizerman, V. Rozhyn, E. Solopov, etc.). As limited ideological guidelines, they worked to define the subject of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. During this period in the Soviet philosophical literature, there are several points of view on the subject of Marxist philosophy, one of which can be called ontological, in which scientific philosophy in the main sense is a general theory of matter. Marxist philosophy essentially coincides with ontology as a science of the general in the world, of the world as such, of the essences, substances of the world, the way, and the general laws of its existence. The epistemology occupies a subordinate place. Its subject is the cognitive subject-object relations, as well as the process of cognition. Another logical and epistemological point of view is that the philosophy of Marxism is the science of the general laws of thought that reflect reality. According to Yu. Bukhalov, the materialist understanding of history is not just an important aspect of Marxist philosophy, but its basis, the essence that determines its other aspects and features. It is "the materialist understanding of history, being also dialectical, that has made it possible to reveal the failure of idealism and to overcome the basic shortcomings of pre-Marxist materialism. It substantiated the organic unity of materialism and dialectics, the social role of Marxist philosophy, a new understanding of the subject of philosophy and its relationship with other sciences and forms of social consciousness" (Bukhalov, 1989: 3-9).

Thus, we can conclude that the scientific research of Kharkiv scientists of that period covered a wide range of research on pre-Marxist materialism, epistemological and ontological aspects of the concept of "matter," the relationship between "matter-consciousness" and "object-subject," considered dialectical materialism as the unity of historical materialism and the epistemology, defining dialectical materialism as the science of the relationship between subject and object, considering them from the standpoint of a materialist understanding of history, and others. They argued that the materialist understanding of history is a theoretical basis for the communist restructuring of society (Bukhalov, 1989: 121-122).

Human problems in philosophical and anthropological research of Kharkiv Research School

In the '60s-'70s 20th century, the origin of philosophical anthropology can traced to Kharkiv's philosophical thought; this is manifested in the fact that some philosophers conclude that it is impossible to study the problems of the theory of consciousness without a holistic philosophical and anthropological concept. Scientists of this period follow the path of the critical study of the philosophical heritage of many famous thinkers of the pre-Marxist period, trying to show what place the problem of man occupied in the philosophical theories of philosophers of different times, not avoiding the social meaning of the assessment given by K. Marx, defining the previous philosophy as a contemplative philosophy, as well as not missing the essence of the revolution made by him in philosophy, indicating how this overturn solves the world-historical problem of human.

Let us turn to the point of view expressed by the Kharkiv researcher of that time A. Mark regarding Marxism, the party history of philosophy, and the attitude of pre-Marxist (as well as bourgeois, that was modern at that time) philosophy to human. The author believes this problem is essentially a problem of the scientific worldview, which in itself determines the attitude to human in the epistemology, research methodology, theories of socio-historical, politics, ethics, and aesthetics. In all parts of philosophy, it directly or indirectly affects its general relationship to the human being. Therefore, A. Mark tries to highlight more revealing studies of pre-Marxist philosophical speculation, turning to its most influential representatives (Heraclitus, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Democritus, Kant, Hegel, etc.). He also examines how man was considered in the philosophy of bourgeois society (F. Bacon's materialism, Spinoza's philosophy, French materialism of the 18th century, Kant's "critical" idealism, Hegel's absolute and dialectical idealism, L. Feuerbach's materialism). According to A. Mark, such a study will help to find an answer to the question: what place did human occupy and occupies in philosophical constructions, in the worldview of thinking people throughout the prehistory of human society (Mark, 1970: 4-75).

The vast majority of researchers of that time held the view that the problems of a human, his social activity formed the real basis of the Marxist revolutionary worldview and served as a guide to the study of the development of philosophical thought in historical and philosophical science. Interpretation of important problems of cognition, says A. Mark, as well as the interpretation of issues directly related to social and moral issues in philosophical systems, were largely devoid of social and human meaning and imbued with contemplative objectivism, which many philosophers had antihumanism meaning. The lack of purposefulness aimed at real changes in the objective world in the interests of a human, at real subordination to a human, all this led to the fact that in the development of human thought, there was a historical need to humanize philosophy, especially as a worldview (Mark, 1970: 184- 186).

Until the early '70s, there was intensive research in Soviet philosophy, which focused on the problems of the essence and education of human simplicity and modesty in public and private life, considered the formation of the principle of communist morality in its inseparable connection with the education of a new person. Marxist-Leninist ethics, on the formation of the moral image of the Soviet human, established the principles of the moral code of the builder of communism. For example, Kharkiv philosophers' research focused on the education of communist consciousness, the formation of communist morality, determined the most important norms (rules) or requirements imposed by a particular class or society as a whole on human behavior. By the principles of morality are characterized by a human's moral state, he evaluates his actions and behavior. On this basis, J. Bludov and O. Stepanchenko define one of the principles of the moral code of the builder of communism — simplicity and modesty in public and private life, the basis for the formation of certain qualities that characterize the moral purity of man (Bludov & Stepanchenko, 1963: 3-5).

They are working within the framework of Marxist-Leninist ethics, Ya. Bludov and O. Stepanchenko explored such concepts as simplicity and modesty, as well as the moral principles that should guide everyone, and which are contained in the moral code of the builder of communism. Philosophical understanding of such concepts and principles is the next attempt at research, which was prescribed in the moral code. Here are some of them: devotion to communism, love for the socialist homeland; conscientious work for the benefit of society; high awareness of public duty; collectivism and friendly mutual assistance; humane attitude and mutual respect between people; honesty and truthfulness, moral purity, simplicity and modesty in public and private life, etc. (Bludov & Stepanchenko, 1963: 11-13). Such principles of the moral code had to be followed by every builder of communism because it is in the principles of communist morality that its deep reliability, humanity, human justice, and nobility are expressed.

Conclusions

The period of difficult Soviet times, when philosophers were required to ideologically support party policy in the form of scientific communism, philosophical commentaries and propaganda of party decisions, the official recognition of the philosophy of dialectical and historical materialism, domestic philosophy was able to survive, passing to new philosophers philosophical thoughts to those who were interested in it. In this context, the activity dimension of scientific research of Kharkiv Research School enabled philosophy to perform some important functions in the cultural system, to promote the unification of the philosophical community into a single communicative space to ensure the continuity of philosophical knowledge and methodological principles, as well as the education of the ability to think critically, and a certain philosophical critique of Soviet ideology helped to survive Ukrainian philosophical thought.

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